Showing posts with label Counter Insurgency. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Counter Insurgency. Show all posts

20 August 2017

The Ongoing Challenge of Irregular Warfare: Thoughts on Responses and Intelligence

by Noah B. Cooper

The range of irregular warfare challenges faced by the United States in the future will be extensive (e.g. non-state actors – terrorists, violent extremist organizations, drug traffickers – and state actors that adopt asymmetric tactics to negate U.S. military power – Iran, North Korea, and Russia). Currently, defeating the “hybridized” threat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and eliminating its geographical span of control in Iraq and Syria is the priority of U.S. counterterrorism actions. As the U.S., the coalition of forces, and local allies, regain territory lost to ISIS and drive the group out from its urban redoubts, the sinking morale of foreign fighters is encouraging them to repatriate their home countries. Considerable portions of these fighters originate from nations throughout the Asia-Pacific region, namely the Southeast Asian countries of Indonesia and Malaysia. As they return, the sharing of their experiences, their promotion of the ISIS ideology, and their proliferation of irregular warfare tactics presents a serious concern to the security and stability of the region.

The Asia-Pacific region has emerged as a second front in the battle against not only ISIS, but also other transnational violent extremist organizations (VEOs), local separatist groups, insurgencies, and criminal organizations. Not surprisingly, the study of this area is lacking, but several facts are worth emphasizing to illustrate the importance of the Asia-Pacific region to U.S. counterterrorism efforts. First, the region has the world’s largest population of Muslims (approaching one billion) and, as noted by Admiral Harry Harris (Commander, U.S. Pacific Command), “If a very small percentage of the Muslims in the USPACOM AOR [Area of Responsibility] are radicalized, there could be deadly results.” Second, a negative consequence of the successful counter-ISIS operations in Iraq and Syria is the return of foreign fighters originally from the Asia-Pacific to their home countries and the corresponding security implications for the region. The dangers of returning jihadists are manifold and include such activities as the proliferation of advanced terrorist practices, the spread of the volatile ISIS ideology, and of central concern, the coordination and launching of attacks in their home countries. Moreover, the growing association of VEOs in the Asia-Pacific with ISIS presents a threatening dimension for counterterrorism. These disparate groups are working together, often with deadly results.

19 August 2017

Leapfrogging: Terrorists and State Actors

by Mohammad Naved Ferdaus Iqbal

The paper attempts to establish that there is an inadvertent exchange of intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) capabilities between terrorist groups and national intelligence as both seek to learn from each other’s successes and failures and adapt accordingly. While national security and intelligence pose as an existential threat for terrorist groups, these violent non-state actors (VNAs) tend to employ high regards for intelligence and CI and, actively pursue a faster pace of learning and adapting to their volatile operating environment. The groups’ competitive edge in asymmetric warfare with state actors have also been a catalyst in altering the intelligence and CI environment, particularly the modus operandi (MO) of national intelligence. The alterations, however, are reciprocal, suggesting leapfrogging between VNAs and state actors. When terrorist groups develop themselves as learning organizations, the ramifications of changes that become evident in their operating environment get quickly incorporated into their MO as well. This expanding intelligence and CI capabilities of terrorist groups, therefore, surface as a considerable threat as opposed to hostile states actors. In order to establish that there is an inadvertent exchange of intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities between terrorist groups and national intelligence, the paper is, organized to lay out how VNAs learn to adapt from past activities; gauge where intelligence and CI activities of VNAs are similar and contrary to those of national intelligence; probe how intelligence and CI activities of VNAs and national intelligence have caused alterations in each other’s intelligence and CI capabilities; and finally, evaluate the magnitude of threat posed by VNAs as opposed to hostile states actors with a national intelligence apparatus.

Subs, Swarms, and Stricken Infrastructure: The Vulnerability of the United States to Non-Traditional Terrorist Threats

by Robert Bunker

A thesis submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Global Security Studies, Baltimore, Maryland, May 2017 

The lack of mass casualty domestic attacks in the United States, carried out by

foreign fighters, since 9/11 should not be taken for a sign of future invulnerability. Major Islamic terrorist organizations have previously conducted attacks focused on splashy news headlines and high body counts. However, Al-Qaeda‟s original stated goal was to bankrupt the West, not kill everyone in it. Is the United States simply impervious to such an attack aimed at causing extensive financial or economic damage? Or is the United States vulnerable, and ultimately a sitting duck? This paper will argue the latter.

By examining the relationships between Islamic terrorist organizations and drug- trafficking organizations in Central and South America, and investing the use of advanced narco-submarines by the latter, the goal is to explore a viable means for inserting a group of armed, trained men undetected into the United States. Case studies examine the effectiveness of swarm-style terrorist attacks when compared to WMD and lone-wolf terror attacks. Further case studies seek to highlight extensive vulnerabilities within the U.S. energy and economic infrastructure that, if taken offline via terrorist attack, would result in long-lasting and immensely expensive consequences if attacked. 

18 August 2017

*** The Patterns in Global Terrorism: 1970-2016

By Anthony Cordesman

Terrorism has become one of the dominating national security threats of the 21st century. It is also one of the most complex — mixing the actions of states, extremists, and other non-state actors in a wide range of threats and types of conflicts. Terrorists range from individuals carrying out scattered terrorist acts, to international terrorist networks of non-state actors, to state terrorism including the use of conventional forces and poison gas to terrorize portions of a civil population. Terrorism has also become a key aspect of civil war, insurgency/counterinsurgency, and asymmetric warfare, as well as ideological, ethnic, and religious warfare.

There is no easy way to categorize the resulting patterns of violence, to measure their rise, or to set national security priorities. For more than a decade, the U.S. has focused on the threat of terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq, but it has dealt increasingly with the expansion of the threat into North Africa, other parts of the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the rest of the world. Key warfighting threats like the Islamic State and its affiliates, and the Taliban and Haqqani Network, are only a comparatively small part of the rising threat in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia.

Is the Afghanistan Debate the Beginning of the End for U.S. Counterinsurgency?


Washington remains consumed by America’s long military involvement in Afghanistan. Many policy experts, members of Congress and government officials favor continuing the existing approach, while others—including President Donald Trump himself—are unconvinced. Whichever side prevails this time, one thing is certain: This is not an isolated debate. Rather, it is the beginning of a deeper reconsideration of the role that counterinsurgency should play in U.S. security strategy.

The United States first took on counterinsurgency, known by its military acronym COIN, in the 1960s out of fear that the Soviet Union was exploiting nationalist and leftist insurgencies to weaken the West. The U.S. military, along with other agencies, eventually developed elaborate counterinsurgency doctrine. After Vietnam, though, this hard-won knowledge was largely forgotten, only to be rediscovered in the 1980s as insurgencies threatened pro-U.S. governments in places like El Salvador. But after the demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the U.S. military and the rest of the government lost all interest in counterinsurgency.

After the 9/11 attacks made Americans aware of the threat from al-Qaida and the transnational Islamist extremist network it led, counterinsurgency once again assumed a central role in American security strategy. As the United States became involved in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military and other government agencies developed new counterinsurgency doctrine and policies. But their thinking never strayed far from Cold War ideas. The process was more about refining old concepts than creating new ones. There was never a broad assessment of whether the precepts of counterinsurgency created to fight 20th-century rural insurgents remained valid in the very different security environment of the 21st century, or whether counterinsurgency should even be a component of American strategy. This oversight, as is now becoming clear, was a problem…

In Race Between Turkey and the UAE, Somalia Wins

By Stratfor

The base in Somalia will be Turkey's second overseas installation, but it will be focused more on assisting Somalia than demonstrating Turkish military capabilities.

As Turkey expands its geopolitical and economic presence in the Middle East and East Africa, the projection of power through the military will be a key part of this growth.

The development of overseas military capabilities will lead Turkey into competition with other countries, such as the United Arab Emirates, that have embarked on a similar path.

With a new military camp in Somalia, Turkey is strengthening its ties to the East African country while extending its reach as a regional power. Turkish forces are expected to get to the installation, which has been under construction for about two years, sometime this month. Their arrival comes soon after the deployment of Turkish forces to a larger base in Qatar. While Ankara has been operating military facilities in northern Iraq, the Qatari and Somali bases are the first of its military installations hosted by allied states. And as Turkey pursues its interests throughout the region, it no doubt will run into like-minded countries, such as the United Arab Emirates.

Unlike the base in Qatar, the facility in Mogadishu will be primarily occupied with military training, and the training of Somali soldiers, in particular. Current plans do not include the deployment of a Turkish contingent capable of conducting military operations. Instead, about 200 Turkish soldiers will train up to 10,000 Somali National Army troops.

13 August 2017

Country Reports on Terrorism 2016

by US Department of State

Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (the “Act”), which requires the Department of State to provide to Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of the Act.

Beginning with the report for 2004, it replaced the previously published Patterns of Global Terrorism.


Chapters






11 August 2017

Marketing to Extremists: Waging War in Cyberspace

By Andrew Byers and Tara Mooney

Online, the Islamic State is a technologically savvy, sophisticated, and nimble organization that learns from its mistakes and from the actions of the Western intelligence services and NGOs that have sought to counter it. It is no secret that past and current efforts to reach potential terrorists before they can become radicalized and committed to a path of jihad and terrorism have proved inadequate. To use the language of online marketers, countering ISIS’s online activities will require quality content disseminated on a massive scale, with careful product placement. Placing counter-messaging products into platforms and forums that extremists frequent will increase the chances of potential terrorist recruits coming into contact with narratives outside of ISIS’ control.

ISIS’s cyber efforts have paid off; the FBI told Congress in July 2016 that “the message of radicalization spreads faster than we imagined just a few years ago.”[i] The number of foreigners who have been inspired by the Islamic State’s online propaganda to travel to Syria and Iraq (or elsewhere) and participate in the fighting is unclear, but most estimates place the tally at more than 20,000. Others have been set on the path of radicalization by ISIS’s online propaganda and have become “lone wolf” attackers in the United States or in Europe.[ii] Demographically speaking, the people who ISIS is most interested in targeting for recruitment came of age in the twenty-first century as “digital natives”; they have lived their entire lives surrounded by ubiquitous online communications and have embraced it in technologically sophisticated ways.[iii] ISIS knows how to appeal to these potential jihadis. Reaching them with counter-messages will require a sophisticated and multi-faceted approach.

5 August 2017

Shades Of Terrorism: War Against Terrorists Is Not A War On Islam – Analysis

By SAAG

Though British political philosopher Edmund Burke used the term “terrorism” in the 18th century to demonize the French Revolution, Maximillian Robes Pierre spoke of “first maxim to conduct the people by reason and the enemies of the people(is) by terror”, and his reiteration that “terror is nothing else but justice, prompt, secure and inflexible”. Modern terrorism in one form or another has been a part of human history since 1st century.

Of the early religious terrorists (religious terrorism is motivated primarily by religion as opposed to ethnic or a politically ideological terrorist group) the notables were Hindu Thugees, the Muslim Assassins, and the Jewish Zealot-Sciari. The Thugees pursued religious ends by offering their victims to the Hindu Goddess of destruction — Kali (the Thugees were active from the 7th till mid-19th century India). The assassins killed politicians and clerics who refused to submit to their brand of Islam. Zealot-Sciari, on the other hand, used political violence for religious solution. Though short lived this group waged what they believed to be God ordained war against Cannanites for possession of the Promised Land.

Marxism created its own brand of terrorism subscribing to Italian revolutionary Carlo Piscane’s theory of the “propaganda of the deed” recognizing the usefulness of terrorism to deliver a message to an audience other than the target and draw attention to and support for the terrorist’ cause. Piscane’s theory was put into practice through the assassination of Alexander II in 1881 and of Arch Duke Ferdinand of Austria triggering the outbreak of the First World War.

27 July 2017

The Role of the Intelligence Officer: Knowing the Enemy


"If you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles; if you do not know your enemies but do know yourself, you will win one and lose one; if you do not know your enemies nor yourself, you will be imperiled in every single battle."

-Sun Tzu (The Art of War)

The nature of warfare continues to evolve, to the point where we don't know much of anything regarding our next major conflict; where it will occur, when, or how it will be fought. Despite this unnerving period of ambiguity, the basics concepts of warfare endure. Chief among these concepts is Sun Tzu’s principle of knowing your enemy while also knowing yourself. Unfortunately, as our Army prepares for combat through execution of decisive action, we persistently struggle to know the enemy. This problem stems from struggles across the Army in understanding how to employ and integrate the intelligence warfighting function at the tactical level.

While conducting decisive action at the Battalion/Brigade level, Commanders and their staffs must thoroughly examine the role of the intelligence officer. Is the S2 a conduit for information from higher echelons or is he the lead proponent for attaining knowledge - not just data, or information, but knowledge - of the enemy? Most would like to argue the latter, but in order to truly know the enemy, our current processes and behaviors must change.

20 July 2017

Terrorist Use of Virtual Currencies: Containing the Potential Threat


Will virtual currencies (VC) increasingly replace traditional methods of funding terrorism, including the halawa system? According to Zachary Goldman et al, extremists in the Gaza Strip have already used virtual currencies to fund their operations and members of the Islamic State have been particularly receptive to the new technology, at least at the local level. To prevent the spread of VC funding on a larger scale, our authors argue that counterterrorism communities should adopt three guiding principles to shape their future policies. Explore them here.

Download 

18 July 2017

Inequality and Armed Conflict: Evidence and Policy Recommendations


The data analysts in this article confirm a common belief – i.e., the onset and recurrence of armed conflict is likely where high inter-group inequalities exist. Indeed, groups that have strong shared identities, a collective perception of ill treatment, and opportunities to take up arms are likely to use violence to rectify existing inequalities. In response, policy makers should take concrete measures to ensure the fair distribution of public goods and more.

Research shows that the onset and recurrence of armed conflict is likely where high inter-group inequalities exist. Groups that have strong shared identities, a collective perception of ill treatment, and opportunities to take up arms are likely to use violence to rectify existing inequalities. Policy makers can take concrete steps to reduce group-level inequalities through measures that share political and economic power between groups, ensure the fair distribution of public goods and services, and recognize cultural identities.

Brief Points 

Inequalities can provoke and prolong conflict as well as its recurrence in fragile settings. 

Strong group identities coupled with salient grievances can inspire violence. 

Both objective and subjective inequalities are important predictors of conflict onset. 

Effective policies need to address underlying sources of inequality. 

17 July 2017

‘We Own the Night’: The Rise And Fall Of The US Military’s Night-Vision Dominance

by Adam K. Raymond

The sky was moonless on the night of May 1, 2011, as two MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters flew toward a walled compound in an upscale enclave of Abbottabad, Pakistan. A power outage further drenched the city in blackness.

To the 23 Navy SEALs fast-roping to the ground, the conditions could not have been better. Under the cover of darkness, they crept toward the home of the world’s most wanted man and stormed inside.

The timing was by design. When retired Navy Adm. Bill McRaven, then the head of U.S. Joint Special Operations Command, scheduled the raid on Osama bin Laden’s home, he did so based partly on the lunar cycle. As for that power outage, although McRaven called it a total coincidence, it may have been more than that.

In the end, it took SEAL Team 6 just 38 minutes to blast its way into bin Laden’s bunker, erase him from existence, and collect a trove of intelligence strewn about his cluttered house. The ability to see in the dark made it all possible.

For decades, the U.S. military has prided itself on “owning the night” thanks to its unmatched night-vision technology. From the early days, when soldiers used clunky infrared scopes to detect and beat back Japanese night raids in Okinawa, the United States has maintained that advantage.

8 July 2017

Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communications: Back to the Future, Lessons from Past and Present

Read the Report.

This Report explores the lessons that can be learned from past communication experiences to aid Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communications (CTSC) campaigns targeting the current propaganda threat from so-called “Islamic State” (IS). It will do this by highlighting four lessons from the past from two different areas of communication practice – the history of propaganda and political communication – that are relevant for the current information war against IS. These are i) the need for multiple mediums of communication, ii) the say-do-gap, iii) defensive and offensive messaging, and, finally, iv) market research and targeting.

This Report was originally published as part of the book “Terrorists’ Use of the Internet: Assessment and Response”. This book compiles revised versions of a selection of papers delivered at an Advanced Research Workshop on ‘Terrorists’ Use of the Internet’ supported by the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme and held at Dublin City University on 27–29 June 2016. The event was co-organised by Swansea University’s Cyberterrorism Project and the EU FP7-funded VOX-Pol project.

Today’s Terror Threat Poses Array of New Challenges

SUZANNE KELLY

When a suicide bomber in Manchester, England detonated a backpack full of explosives in May, killing 22 people at a concert venue, the National Counterterrorism Center took more than a passing interest.

Officials from NCTC, as it’s more often referred to, immediately began reaching out to their British counterparts via representatives in London, with the intention of making sure that every U.S. counterterrorism resource, from the FBI to the NSA, was available to assist in gathering information on the culprit and potential planners of the attack. That was mission number one. Mission number two hit a little closer to home.

“From a selfishly, narrowly U.S. perspective, we are of course at the same time trying to think about what links do those individuals potentially have to anybody who has traveled to the U.S. or who may be in the U.S.” said Nick Rasmussen, Director of NCTC.

Rasmussen was at NCTC in its earliest days. The Counterterrorism Center was established as a direct result of the 9/11 Commission Report, with the intention of making sure that information was more widely shared among federal, state, and local counterterrorism officials. In part, to ensure to the highest extent possible, that the intelligence mistakes leading up to 9/11 didn’t ever happen again. 

4 July 2017

A View From The CT Foxhole: LTG Michael K. Nagata, Director, Directorate Of Strategic Operational Planning, NCTC


Lieutenant General Michael K. Nagata assumed the position of Director, Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning at the National Counterterrorism Center on May 13, 2016. Previously, LTG Nagata served as the Commander, Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT), a sub-unified command of CENTCOM, from June 2013 to October 2015. A native of Virginia, Lieutenant General Nagata graduated from Georgia State University and commissioned as an Infantry Officer in 1982. He initially served as a Platoon Leader in the 2d Infantry Division before volunteering for Army Special Forces in 1984.

Throughout his career he served in various positions within Army Special Forces to include: Detachment Commander, Executive Officer, Battalion S-3, Operations Center Director, BN Executive Officer, and Group Operations Officer. Later, he served as the Commander of 1st BN, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, responsible for the Special Forces Qualification Course. In 1990, he volunteered and assessed for a Special Missions Unit (SMU), in which he served at various times throughout his career as a Troop Commander, Operations Officer, Squadron Commander, and SMU Commander. After graduating from the National War College, Lieutenant General Nagata served in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence. He then served within the Intelligence Community as a Deputy Director for Counter Terrorism. As a general officer, he has served as the Deputy Chief, Office of the Defense Representative to Pakistan (ODRP), the Deputy Director for Special Operations and Counter Terrorism (J-37) of the Joint Staff, and Commander, SOCCENT.

A VIEW FROM THE CT FOXHOLE: LTG MICHAEL K. NAGATA, DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF STRATEGIC OPERATIONAL PLANNING, NCTC

Brian Dodwell, Don Rassler 

Lieutenant General Michael K. Nagata assumed the position of Director, Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning at the National Counterterrorism Center on May 13, 2016. Previously, LTG Nagata served as the Commander, Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT), a sub-unified command of CENTCOM, from June 2013 to October 2015. A native of Virginia, Lieutenant General Nagata graduated from Georgia State University and commissioned as an Infantry Officer in 1982. He initially served as a Platoon Leader in the 2d Infantry Division before volunteering for Army Special Forces in 1984. 

Throughout his career he served in various positions within Army Special Forces to include: Detachment Commander, Executive Officer, Battalion S-3, Operations Center Director, BN Executive Officer, and Group Operations Officer. Later, he served as the Commander of 1st BN, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, responsible for the Special Forces Qualification Course. In 1990, he volunteered and assessed for a Special Missions Unit (SMU), in which he served at various times throughout his career as a Troop Commander, Operations Officer, Squadron Commander, and SMU Commander. After graduating from the National War College, Lieutenant General Nagata served in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence. He then served within the Intelligence Community as a Deputy Director for Counter Terrorism. As a general officer, he has served as the Deputy Chief, Office of the Defense Representative to Pakistan (ODRP), the Deputy Director for Special Operations and Counter Terrorism (J-37) of the Joint Staff, and Commander, SOCCENT.

3 July 2017

BEYOND THE CALIPHATE: ISLAMIC STATE ACTIVITY – INSPIRED OR LINKED – OUTSIDE OF THE GROUP’S DEFINED WILAYAT


This project documents and identifies activity linked to and inspired by the Islamic State outside of the territory it claims as part of its physical Caliphate. In doing so, the project seeks to provide insights into how the influence, operational reach, and capabilities of the Islamic State are changing in certain locales over time.

To provide a nuanced analysis of the group’s operational activity, the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) has created a database that categorizes different indicators of such activity (see methodology overview here for details). The temporal starting point for the data collection is June 2014, when the group’s Caliphate was officially created. Since that point in time, CTC researchers have collected open-source data regarding the Islamic State’s operational activity in select locations outside of the physical territory claimed by the group.

As collection and analysis continues, the CTC plans to release a number of short country and regional reports that leverage the data CTC has collected. All releases will be available on this page.

1 July 2017

Four steps we’re taking today to fight terrorism online


Terrorism is an attack on open societies, and addressing the threat posed by violence and hate is a critical challenge for us all. Google and YouTube are committed to being part of the solution. We are working with government, law enforcement and civil society groups to tackle the problem of violent extremism online. There should be no place for terrorist content on our services.

While we and others have worked for years to identify and remove content that violates our policies, the uncomfortable truth is that we, as an industry, must acknowledge that more needs to be done. Now.

We have thousands of people around the world who review and counter abuse of our platforms. Our engineers have developed technology to prevent re-uploads of known terrorist content using image-matching technology. We have invested in systems that use content-based signals to help identify new videos for removal. And we have developed partnerships with expert groups, counter-extremism agencies, and the other technology companies to help inform and strengthen our efforts.

Today, we are pledging to take four additional steps.

First, we are increasing our use of technology to help identify extremist and terrorism-related videos. This can be challenging: a video of a terrorist attack may be informative news reporting if broadcast by the BBC, or glorification of violence if uploaded in a different context by a different user. We have used video analysis models to find and assess more than 50 per cent of the terrorism-related content we have removed over the past six months. We will now devote more engineering resources to apply our most advanced machine learning research to train new “content classifiers” to help us more quickly identify and remove extremist and terrorism-related content.

28 June 2017

SOF Operational Design and Strategic Education for the 21st Century Warrior-Scholar

by Tony Rivera and Robert Schafer

Introduction

In August of 2011 a special working group was assembled at the Pinewood Campus of the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) on MacDill, Air Force Base in Florida. In attendance were “Eleven participants from various SOF and academic backgrounds... the SOF Chairs from PME institutions; Senior Fellows from the JSOU Strategic Studies Department; and other academic and strategic thinkers with an interest in SOF’s strategic utility.”[1] The attendees were given three very difficult questions to answer: What is Special Operations Forces (SOF) power? What is the theory and art of SOF power? How can SOF power be better implemented by civilian leadership? “The workgroup confirmed the Special Operations community lacks a unifying theory and associated literature on how Special Operations fit into national security policy even as preference for their use as an instrument of national policy increases.”[2] The recommendations were thoughtful, serious, and worthy of further consideration. What was striking, however, was the virtual absence of the mention of SOF Operational Design.

The United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) has been taking the lead in answering some of these questions through their development of SOF Operational Design. SOF Operational Design emerged from the work done by the J-7 Operational Design Planner’s Handbook[3] and the School of Advanced Military Studies’ Art of Design curriculum—a curriculum that embraces the complex adaptive nature of the battlefield and the operational environment. “These continually emerging realities require adaptive leadership techniques, new strategic and tactical cognitive approaches, and organizational learning methodologies to keep pace with the multiple adversaries who are confronting our country. These lethal assemblages have a strategic perspective and are using asymmetric