20 March 2018

Syria: Russia's Military Proving Ground


In the past decade, Russia has made a strategic breakthrough in terms of developing its military, but before its operations in Syria, it had not tested its armed forces in combat. In this regard, Syria became the perfect laboratory for mastering skills and testing equipment of the Russian military machine.The Russian-Georgian War For the Russian Federation, the Russian-Georgian War in 2008 was a harsh lesson regarding its military weaknesses and strategic backwardness compared to the West, and it triggered a reassessment of the real situation with the Russian Army. Although victory was achieved quickly, the military noted its deficiencies and the advantages Georgia enjoyed compared to Russia.

For example, Russia did not have unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and its army had problems with military equipment; training and preparedness; reconnaissance; and synergy on the battlefield among all military branches and fighting forces.

In September 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev offered several factors to improve the Russian army by 2020: 1

• Improve the organizational staff structure and the system of troop basing

• More effectively manage the armed forces

• Improve personnel training, military education, and military science

• Equip the army with the most advanced weapons

Particularly, attention was paid to the achievement of air superiority, in delivering precision strikes on land and sea targets, as well as in the operational transfer of troops.

Armament Program 

The first stage of Russian military reform launched immediately after the Russian-Georgian War. According to The Military Balance 2017 , 70 percent of army weaponry was replaced. 2 Nikolay Makarov, Chief of the General Staff from 2008 to 2012, compared the armament program with the military reforms of Peter of Great. 3 It was Makarov who introduced the idea of Russian special operations forces, who are mastering their special skills in Syria. 

Reform in the army was started by Vladimir Serdyukov, minister of defense from 2007 until 2012. His key goals were increasing the mobility of military forces, ensuring the highest levels of readiness in military units and districts, and bringing the army to 21st-century standards. Under his command the military units and districts became much smaller and more mobile. According to some Russian experts, these measures were preparing Russia to participate “in the local conflicts in the territories of former Soviet Union.” 4

Current Minister of Defense Sergey Shoygu continued the reforms, bringing his own innovations. Shoygu worked to improve combat training and began constant checking of army readiness through military drills and training. Training exercises have intensified drastically since 2014. According to The Military Balance 2017 , the number of interservice exercises increased by 30 percent in comparison to 2014, and the number of joint exercises was up by 50 percent. Under Shoygu’s supervision, Russia opened the National Military Command Centre, which became the operational hub during the Syrian campaign.

The Syrian civil war threatened the last remnants of Soviet gains in the Middle East and pushed Russia also to begin restoring its naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean region. The Operational Squadron was reestablished in 2013 after several decades of hiatus to, according to Shoygu “ensure the naval presence of Russia in the Mediterranean. All this will ensure the protection of our national interests in such an unsettled, unsettling region.”

Use of the Military Before Syria

In December 2015, Alexander Turchinov, head of the Council of National Defence and Security of Ukraine, stated, “For Russia both Syria and Donbas are free of charge testing grounds.” 5 Some Russian experts cite Crimea as the first example of the tremendous results of the military reforms. 6 Ineed, “little green men” from special operations forces, airborne forces, and other units were used in Crimea, and it is reasonable to say the Crimean operation was the debut of the Russian Army’s “New Look.” But Crimea was different from Ukraine and Syria. In Crimea, Russia was demonstrating to the world its breakthrough in military logistics and operations and its new military equipment. It was showcasing its achievements. In Syria it is using and testing them.

If Ukraine was perfect for testing ground forces and artillery, Syria was perfect for the use of missiles and air forces. For example, it recently was revealed that Russia is testing a new stealth fighter, the Sukhoi Su-57, at Khmeimim air base. 7

The Syria Campaign

On 22 December 2016, Vladimir Putin and Sergey Shoygu held a meeting of the Collegiums of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. Both expressed their satisfaction with the military reforms and campaign in Syria.

According to Putin, the tasks of the Russian Army in the coming years are: 8

• Pay careful attention to any changes in the balance of power in military and politics in the world, particularly along Russia’s borders, and introduce corrections to plans for the neutralization of potential threats

• Ensure the balanced development of all military branches and fighting forces

• Master the new types of precision weaponry, electronic means of communications, reconnaissance, management, and electronic warfare 

• Ensure the warfare potential of the strategic nuclear forces

• Bring the strategic non-nuclear forces to a level of operation that would allow them to neutralize any potential military threats to Russia

• Continue the current momentum in the rearmament of the army and navy

In conclusion, Putin said Russia has to explore opportunities from the Syrian military campaign and that the efficiency of Russian weapons is opening new opportunities for military technical cooperation.

At the same time, Shoygu concentrated on the more concrete aspects and challenges of the Russian Army. 9 He stressed two achievements in the development of the military in 2016: the modernization of the Russian Army and the experience gained during the military drills and direct engagements in Syria.

According to Shoygu, the Russian Army gained huge military and combat experience. Since the beginning of the Syria campaign in 2015, Russia made 18,800 sorties and conducted 71,000 strikes, demonstrating a high level of air readiness. However, there also were several failures with naval aviation. During her Mediterranean deployment in 2016, the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov lost two aircraft, a MIG-29K and an SU-33. Those losses were blamed on a lack of experience among Russian pilots. 

Moreover, Shoygu emphasized that during the Syria campaign Russia got ample opportunities for testing new military armament and equipment in direct fighting. Testing showed a high level of efficiency, as well as highlighted defects that were not detected during the proving ground testing. Weapons that did not pass tests primarily were ground-launched cruise missiles, communication systems, and radio technical intelligence. 10

The minister also mentioned the National Military Command Center. The center was created in December 2014 and became the intellectual, command, and communications core of the Russian military and political leadership. Syria offered a chance to test coordination of urgent military operational tasks. In this regard, Shoygu pointed out that the center provided a single system of interdepartmental interaction and brought operations to a higher level.

Testing new weapons

Russian leadership has never refuted the idea that Russia is using Syria as a testing ground. In December 2015, Vladimir Putin suggested better exercises for the army would be difficult to imagine. 11On 22 March 2017, he encouraged foreign states to buy products of the Russian military-industrial complex and again mentioned Syria. He pointed out, “The capabilities of Russian weapons, their exceptional reliability and effectiveness are also manifested in the fight against terrorism in Syria. . . . The use of aviation and air defense systems in real combat conditions gives absolutely invaluable experience to flight and engineering personnel, air defense calculations, as well as to developers of domestic military products.” 12

These speeches suggest Russia is practicing in real war and winning geopolitical and military benefits. Putin noted “the modern Russian weapons have passed the test, and not on the firing range, but in the real world, in the fight. This is the most severe test. This experience will allow us to make the necessary adjustments to improve the efficiency and reliability of the technology, to create a new generation of weapons, improve the armed forces to increase their combat capabilities.” 13

Russia has deployed and tested almost every military force in Syria; however, priority was given to the use of aerospace forces, especially in conjunction with the different military branches and fighting forces—most especially ground forces. Moscow tries to employ staff in Syria from all Russian air bases to develop the flying skills of its pilots. 

For just several months of 2017, according to the 22 February report of the Ministry of Defence, Russian air forces conducted 5,681 airstrikes. 14 In addition, 86 percent of the Russian air force, including 75 percent of long-range aviation crews; 79 percent of tactical air forces crews; 88 percent of military-transport, and 89 percent of army aviation crews gained combat experience. 

Recently, the Valdai Discussion Club posted an infographic of the new types of weapons Russia is testing in Syria. 15 For example, Russia tested new aircraft: Su-35 (Flanker-E+) and Su-34 (Fullback); missiles: Kaliber, KAB-500, Kh-29, and Krasnopol; and new helicopters: Mi-28H (Havoc) and Ka-52 (Hokum-B). In addition, Russia has been using Special Operations Forces in Syria since the beginning. 16 Putin even involved the National Guard to learn in the combat fields. 17

In December 2015, Russia conducted its first employment of combat robots in the Syrian province of Latakia. 18 Six robotic “Platform-M” and four “Argo” took part in the operation. Self-propelled artillery mounts “Akatsiya” and Syrian soldiers supported the robots' attack. The reconnaissance was carried out by IAI Searchers, Orlan-10, and Eleron-3 UAVs. The collection of intelligence, robot control, and target designation was carried out by the newest automated command-and-control system, called “Andromeda-D.” According to Russian General Vladimir Shamanov, the main function of the robots is to provoke fire and thereby identify the positions of the “terrorists.” 19 The robots themselves were controlled from Moscow. 20

It is a new stage for the Russian army, as the Kremlin is striving to use state-of-the-art military doctrine such as netcentric warfare, integration of all data in an operational environment, personnel, equipment and machines, and geographical landscape to provide a full picture of the operational military situation. It is still unknown whether Russia used the new universal combat platform “Armata,” which is going to be an integral part of the network-centric war system, in Syria. 21

Conclusion

In terms of experience, the Syria campaign has provided significant benefits to all Russian armed forces. 

Russia found ample opportunities to use and test precision-guided munitions in direct combat. It was able to test tactical engagement of UAVs in a variety of operations, including reconnaissance and correction of indirect fire. Even the reported drone attack on Khmeimim air base will be meticulously studied and used to find ways to establish an appropriate defense system in highly strategic places such as the Kerch Strait Bridge between the Black Sea and the Azov Sea. 22 Russian aerospace forces also made real breakthroughs in flight hours in all branches and gained experience on how to to organize defenses against UAVs.

Because of the Syria campaign, Russia is able to project power beyond of its “Near Abroad” and to solve logistical and supply problems. It also got indispensable experience in organizing, employing, and integrating military forces. 

In Syria, Russia also is tackling problems related to arms export. Recently, during the meeting of the Commission for Military Technical Cooperation with Foreign Countries, Putin once again stated that in the Syria campaign Russia succeeded in demonstrating the “exceptional reliability and effectiveness” of Russian arms. 23 It no doubt was a call to potential buyers.

While Russia is trying to demonstrate to the West the strength of its military and its ability defend itself, according to Jane’s , Moscow is about announce the deepest cuts of military expenditures since the early 1990s. 24 Even if these cuts happen, it is likely Russia will continue military operations in Syria.

The Syria campaign brought Russia a chance to reshuffle the army inherited from the old Soviet Union. It has given Moscow mobile and experienced forces for external and domestic use, with less budget burden. Instead of military drills, forces have gained battle experience in Syria.


2. “The Military Balance 2017,” International Institute for Strategic Studies,www.iiss.org/en/publications/military%20balance/issues/the-military-bala... .













15. “Testing New Types of Weapons by the Russian Armed Forces in Syria,” Valdai Discussion Club, 21 February 2017, http://valdaiclub.com/multimedia/infographics/testing-new-types-of-weapo... .

16. Dave Majumdar, “Get Ready, America: Russia Has Its Own Deadly ‘Delta Force,’” The National Interest , 16 March 2017, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/get-ready-america-russia-has-i... .






22. Ridvan Urcosta, “The Kerch Strait Bridge and Russia’s A2/AD Zone Around Crimea,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 15, no 21 (12 February 2018).


24. Craig Caffrey, “Russia Announces Deepest Defence Budget Cuts since 1990s,” Jane’s Defence Weekly , 16 March 2017, www.janes.com/article/68766/russia-announces-deepest-defence-budget-cuts... .

Mr. Urcosta is a researcher at the Institute of International Relations at Warsaw ​University. He has worked as an expert on Russia at the Polish Institute of Foreign Affairs and specializes in Russian foreign policy. Before the Russian annexation of Crimea, he worked as a civil servant in the Sevastopol State Administration.

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