5 December 2016

China and Russia: Gaming the West

By François Godement

ECFR’s “China Analysis” series provides a window into the foreign policy debates within the country. The short articles in this edition focus on the “axis of convenience” between China and Russia – i.e., they look at the possibility of a newly minted alliance treaty between the two countries; Beijing’s possible role in Moscow’s military strategy; Sino-Russian economic competition and cooperation, and more.

In September 2016, Russia held joint naval manoeuvres in the South China Sea with China, bringing some of its best ships to the party. Two weeks later, China shied away from joining Russia in a veto of yet another Western resolution on Syria at the UN. The discrepancy sums up the extent and the limits of the strategic convergence between both countries.

The “axis of convenience” between China and Russia has, without question, grown larger. And the positive dynamics pushing cooperation forward are largely economic. But there is also a negative dynamic, coming from the West. Both countries have a perception of regime insecurity that emerges from the international promotion of democracy, and the attractiveness of corruption-free and comparably safe Western societies for individuals, be they Chinese or Russian.

But economic growth isn't the only thing drawing China and Russia together. The possible eastward extension of NATO, the high-tech superiority of the US and other Western armaments has not been undermined by the financial crises and political uncertainties of established democracies. This is why China and Russia describe their moves as reactive rather than assertive. For Russia, it means the possibility of mounting pre-emptive strikes and sudden regional escalation that leads to conflict dominance, as is the case today in the Syrian civil war. For China, it is the endless increase in military spending and deployment, and the game it is playing in the empty spaces of the South China Sea, East China Sea and border areas with India. Here again, the comparison reveals differences: Russia has conducted or directly condoned hot wars, from Georgia, Chechnya, and Serbia to Crimea, the Donbas and Syria. They target or concern large civilian populations. Instead, China fills open spaces, sometimes turning them into military assets. So far, it has lived up to its affirmation that it “will not fire the first shot”. Military adventurism is very far from the Chinese tradition, which is to take a much more comprehensive view of national power and influence.

Still, the China that has refused to enter into any alliances since the demise of the Sino-Soviet treaty in 1960 currently has its second track experts debating the opportunity of a new alliance with Russia. Indeed, there are few strong justifications for such an alliance, but many opportunities to team up on an issue-by-issue basis. Both China and Russia share a track record of flouting or rejecting international law on territorial issues, although in very different situations. Invoking and restraining the UN is becoming a key topic of interest as China’s budgetary influence over the organisation has grown considerably in recent years. Bridging the Eurasian landmass with strategically significant projects that might somewhat balance the US domination at sea is another cause – although the writers cited in this special issue of China Analysis make it clear that this is a project for the long haul and with elements of competition for markets and influence.

It is only the growing malaise inside Western democracies that makes this conjunction impressive. As our writers are well aware, Russia’s well-being still depends on trade with Europe and on the price of oil and gas – things that China cannot dictate or help with. Russia is only a minor supplier of technology to China, even in the military and aerospace sectors. Historical distrust and even a lingering identity dispute lurk behind the surface of relations between the two countries. It is entertaining to see that leading diplomat Fu Ying, now a key speaker for China, presided over the latest PLA-inspired Xiangshan Forum in Beijing this October, where Russian participants were granted front row seats. Nonetheless, in a Chinese version of a piece published in English by Foreign Affairs, she cited, at length, the various Russian turnarounds since the nineteenth century that have ended alliances with China.

In a world where economics is increasingly separated from politics, and where international relations often mix engagement policies with containment policies, there is no reason why a strong Chinese-Russian partnership cannot endure, whatever the misgivings, distrust and diversity of interests. China and Russia are not perfect partners, but the weakness of Western alliances creates opportunities for risk-free strategic convergence on a growing list of issues. China and Russia might not be able to form a functioning alliance, but can we be sure that their issue-by-issue cooperation won’t yield stronger results than existing Western alliances?

China and Russia: Towards an Alliance Treaty?

by Mathieu Duchâtel

The possibility of an alliance treaty with Russia has been an undercurrent in Chinese foreign policy debate since the reciprocal visits of China’s President Xi Jinping and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin to the two military parades of 2015: Moscow’s 9 May Victory Parade and Beijing’s 3 September parade to commemorate the end of the “Chinese people’s war of resistance against Japanese aggression”. The key driver of the current rapprochement between the two countries is China and Russia’s increasingly similar views on the state of international affairs – including a shared hostility towards the United States. After the two parades, during another state visit by Putin to Beijing in June 2016, China and Russia signed a “joint statement on strengthening global strategic stability”. As argued by Yan Xuetong, a longstanding supporter of a grand strategy based on alliances, the most significant part of the document is its effort to broaden the concept of “strategic stability” from its restrictive definition in the field of nuclear arms control to a much wider political context. But how far can China and Russia actually go? Chinese sources indicate that the prevailing thinking is sober and cautious, and that there is still widespread resistance to the idea of any alliance.

“Friendly neutrality”

The year 2016 marks the twentieth anniversary of the launch of the China-Russia strategic partnership. Liu Fenghua lists the many concrete achievements that have been made in the framework of the partnership: the final border delimitation of 2004; strategic alignment against colour revolutions; joint opposition against missile defence; the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation; close cooperation in multilateral international organisations, including the United Nations; China’s acquisition of advanced defence systems; and energy cooperation. Economic cooperation has also reached a strategic level (一定的战略性, yiding de zhanlüexing). Bilateral trade totalled $95 billion in 2014, and although it decreased to $69 billion in 2015, China remains Russia’s most important bilateral trade partner, and Russia is in China’s top ten. China is also the fourth-largest provider of foreign investment to Russia. Liu says that one important characteristic of the partnership is its strategic ambition – it aims to shape the international order and create global strategic stability. This ambition was the starting point of the partnership, but it has since expanded to encompass many more areas.

Fu Ying’s piece on the subject in Foreign Affairs at the beginning of 2016 drew much attention. In a longer version published in Chinese in another leading international relations journal, she argues against describing the current strategic partnership between China and Russia as an alliance. An important point that was omitted in the English version is that China has taken on board the lessons of history. In the twentieth century, each successive Chinese regime signed an alliance treaty with Russia. None of them was successful in protecting or advancing vital Chinese national interests. In 1896, after the Qing Empire’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War, General Li Hongzhang signed a secret alliance treaty on the sidelines of the coronation of Tsar Nicholas II. The treaty granted Russia a railway concession in Manchuria in exchange for security guarantees if Japan should invade. Less than five years later, Russian and Japanese troops were fighting alongside each other against the Boxer Rebellion and Qing dynasty troops as part of the Eight-Nation Alliance. In August 1945, a day before Japan’s surrender in World War II, the Republic of China signed a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with the Soviet Union. This treaty forced the Nationalists to recognise the independence of Mongolia, to accept a Soviet military base in Lushun, and to concede ownership of the Changchun railway to the Russians. The 1950 Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance between the two communist giants of the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union lasted less than ten years and did not prevent a dramatic strategic break that opened the way for decades of military tension. Fu Ying makes it clear: the lessons of history are bitter.

Zhao Huasheng also has vivid memories of a past characterised by tension and strategic competition. The current friendly situation was hard won, but in his opinion, there is nothing to suggest that it will last over the long term. Zhao argues that the present state of China-Russia relations can best be described as “friendly neutrality” (友好中立, youhao zhongli). In 2015, trade and investment statistics showed a sharp decline, but mutual strategic trust continued to increase, and cooperation expanded on all fronts. Zhao believes that the key to all this was the decision to coordinate between the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union and China’s One Belt, One Road project. Even though observers are still searching for a flagship cooperation project that can demonstrate substantial progress, Zhao says that the real value of the agreement is political – it means that Russian concerns about a dominant Chinese economic presence in Russia’s traditional backyard in Central Asia have at least partially been addressed. In other positive news, he says that Russia’s image is improving in China, including among the younger generation – Russia is perceived as a country that resists “international hegemony” (国际霸权, guoji baquan), and it is also increasingly appreciated for its culture, as more Chinese people travel as tourists to Russia. There has also been a considerable decrease in the number of complaints by Chinese tourists who felt discriminated against by Russian law-enforcement agents, which has been a major problem in the past.

But general friendliness does not make an alliance. Zhao believes that Russia and China’s respective international identities on the world stage have already been firmly established – both are “independent strategic actors”. The partnership has some of the characteristics of an alliance relationship, and Zhao says there is some support for a real alliance in the strategic communities of both countries. However, the reality is that a “flexible partnership” (弹性的伙伴模式, tanxing de huoban moshi) serves both sides’ interests much better than an alliance would: this kind of relationship has fewer commitments, which means that differences can be handled more easily. Fu Ying agrees: China does not have a “political culture” of alliances and does not follow a policy of “political blocs” (没有搞集团政治, meiyou gao jituan zhengzhi). That said, it sees Russia as a key strategic partner in advancing China’s vision of a future international order.

Managing differences and expectations

Zhao thinks the main thing that will continue to prevent Russia and China from becoming allies is the way that they deal with each other’s conflicts with third states. Clearly, the situations in Ukraine and the South China Sea do not provide evidence for a pattern of unconditional mutual support. In the future, the two sides “will not completely come down on the other’s side, and will not provide full support to each other” in times of crisis. Zhao says that the real challenge is not bringing the partnership to the level of full strategic support; rather, it is managing the differences that could easily generate strategic distrust. For this reason, he suggests “friendly neutrality” – even if it is, in his opinion, an “imperfect concept”. In the absence of anything more concrete, the concept at least describes what is needed to prevent future distrust.

Chen Yu is similarly sceptical in his piece assessing the strategic value for Russia of its ties with China in the context of Western sanctions. The phrase “pivot to Asia” is sometimes used to describe the increased attention that Russia has given to China since the Ukraine conflict. Chen’s conclusion is clear-cut and straightforward: China will never replace Europe as the centre of gravity of Russian foreign policy. His two major arguments are economic and cultural. On the economic front, in 2015, in spite of a decrease of 40 percent since the previous year, trade with Europe still represented 44.8 percent of Russian foreign trade, more than four times its total trade with China. Europe also remained the Russian economy’s main source of capital and advanced technologies. The “strategic replacement” has just not happened. Chen sees this as also being a result of China’s policies, which have persistently focused on Russia as an export market rather than as a destination for outward investment. The second argument is simply that Russians are Europeans, and Putin himself is a “Europeanist” (欧洲主义者, ouzhou zhuyi zhe). In spite of Putin’s ideological contempt for Europe’s liberalism, Chen argues that Russia’s values are closest to Europe’s. His conclusion: beware disappointments, because “while Russia values its relationship with us, we should not be overly excited, and we should certainly not expect too much from our bilateral partnership”.

Liu Fenghua draws the most optimistic conclusion of the Chinese authors. He argues that the timing is not right for forming an alliance, because general trends in the evolution of the international system serve the interests both of Russia and of China: “At the present stage, our interest is in completing modernisation, not in transforming the existing international order.”

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