By Taylor Butch
April 30, 2015
Although Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first official visit to Pakistan was ‘postponed’ last year, Xi successfully completed a two-day tour April 21-22, 2015 that focused on further strengthening bilateral relations between the visiting nation and Pakistan on a number of essential political, security and infrastructure issues. One topic of prime focus was the Chinese western province Xinjiang, an incredibly strategic, culturally rich area, and home to millions of Muslims.
Significance of Xinjiang
What is the significance of Xinjiang to China? The simple answer is the tremendous strategic importance the western territory plays in Beijing’s political, geographic, economic and cultural landscape. By holding this area that accounts for about one-sixth of China’s land, China can influence internal political unrest and maintain rule. Xinjiang is also a vital part of Beijing’s energy strategy. Much talk has been made of the secessionist movement in China about Tibet and Taiwan, but far less discussion is given to the secessionist movement of Xinjiang made by the predominately Muslim, ethnic Uyghur population. During the past 1,300 years, the Muslim population in China has rebelled against ruling authority and Beijing has seen spikes in violence during the late 1990s, 2000s and present. Fully aware of the implications that such conflict could inspire others from within its borders if it was to grant Xinjiang independence, China has opted for another path.
Beijing’s East Turkestan Islamic Movement Problem
Given Beijing’s choice to mitigate episodes of unrest that may spark change, it has embarked on a strategy for combatting terrorism and secessionism that has thus far proven to be successful. At the 56th Session of the U.N. General Assembly, Tan Jiaxuan, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs and Head of Delegation of the People’s Republic of China, declared terrorism to be a worldwide issue and reiterated that Beijing, “has always been opposed to all forms of terrorism.” Tang’s words brought China’s terrorist issue in Xinjiang to the forefront of the conversation. “China is also threatened by terrorism. The East Turkestan Islamic Movement(ETIM) terrorist forces are trained, equipped and financed by international organizations. The fight against the “East Turkestan” group is an important aspect of the international fight against terrorism,” he explained. His speech proved powerful as Washington altered its stance in 2002 when it agreed alongside the European Union and Beijing in identifying ETIM as a terrorist organization. Beijing may fear that ETIM threatens its internal security in Xinjiang and other territories because their actions may inspire unrest against the government.
What Beijing perceives to be a concern is the Muslim majority of ethnic Uyghur living in Xinjiang because some, not all, desire separation from China to form “East Turkestan”. From the Uyghur perspective, the main complaints against Beijing are religious and culturalrepression and mass migration of Han Chinese into the region. No matter which side is right, Beijing has adopted an effective strategy.
Three-Pronged Strategy for Countering Terrorism in Xinjiang
Beijing is “determined to safeguard China’s sovereignty, security and territorial integrity and help to maintain world peace,” asserted former Chinese President Hu Jintao at the 17th Party Congress in 2007. To maintain the status quo in Xinjiang, Beijing implemented a three-pronged approach under Hu’s leadership and Xi seeks to continue his predecessor’s policies.
Beijing has first demonstrated the show of military presence. The western territory has now become a military training ground for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to perform combat training scenarios and joint military training operations with regional countries, includingPakistan and India. Xi’s official visit to Islamabad further sought to extend bilateral relations beyond security and economic matters to include those considered to be “regional hotspot[s]”, according to the Chinese Foreign Military Spokesperson. In subtle wording, the area of discussion was likely Xinjiang. This should come as no surprise as Beijing has continually calledfor Islamabad and other regional countries to step up their offensive measures against Islamic militants. Xi made clear that joint military exercises shall continue with the host country to combat “non-traditional security threats”.
A second method to deter terrorist activity is by example. Chinese officials have often demonstrated this tactic by use of force showing that they are indeed serious about maintaining internal stability. In doing so, Beijing has launched anti-terrorism-related activities under Xi’s watch against those in the western territory of Xinjiang. The government routinely requestsChinese media to report events therein serving as a warning, but foreign media is not allowed in Xinjiang.
An alternative method Beijing has employed to combat uprisings and secessionist groups in Xinjiang is the Shanghai Five. The ‘Five’ coalition formed in 1996, comprising Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and China, in a move to enhance regional cooperation among Central Asian countries primarily in the sectors of politics, trade, security and diplomacy. The group became the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) following the joining of Uzbekistan in 2001 and to which Iran, Afghanistan Pakistan, and others have obtained designated observer status. During Xi’s April 2015 visit to Pakistan, he made clear that his country supports the host’s status to become a full SCO member. Xi and Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif also discussed many of the issues outlined in the SCO Charter.
Significance of SCO Charter
According to Article 1 of the SCO Charter, the organization seeks to encourage trust and shared cooperation amongst members in critical areas of politics, trade, security, energy and diplomacy. But as Beijing further connects Xinjiang to Central Asia, it exposes the western territory and China itself to terrorist training areas. Article 3 states in part that the coalition’s areas of cooperation include ‘jointly countering terrorism, separatism and extremism’. In other words, SCO members seek to maintain peace in the surrounding states through joint cooperation. Backing the SCO Charter, Sharif voiced support for the visiting country’s handling of Xinjiang and other areas. Given that member states encompass a combined population of almost one-fourth of the world’s population and knowledge of Pakistan’s own terrorist troubles, Sharif made the correct choice. Countries associated with the SCO understand the significance of Beijing’s predicament as they have witnessed their own episodes of extremism and terrorist-related activities.
Aside from combating terrorism, the two leaders praised each other for their friendly neighbor actions as they recently coordinated efforts to evacuate foreign nationals from Yemen. Xi and Sharif also completed major bilateral energy and trade agreement win in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), highlighted by the signing of their part of the Iran-Pakistan pipeline contract therein allowing oil to flow from Iran through Pakistan and into China, and drastically shortening the amount natural resources must travel. Such a move requires expert navigation on behalf of all parties, but especially China. In a move that greatly helped Beijing, Islamabad remained neutral in the Sana’a conflict and decided not to support Riyadh in airstrikes against Tehran backed Houthi rebels. It is these multi-faceted affairs that China continually balances successfully to ensure a secure energy strategy amongst neighbors.
China’s Energy Quest Must Include Xinjiang
Although Xinjiang plays a significant role to help China fulfill its objective in acquiring energy resources for the world’s largest economy and the number one oil importer, it cannot support the entire country. By 2010, estimates of crude oil output in the Tarim Basin, territory comprising of Xinjiang and surrounding areas, was said to reach 50 million tons. Such opportunity for China is too lucrative to ignore. Besides holding natural resources, Xinjiang serves as a major hub for pipelines, railways, and roads that transport resources from surrounding SCO countries to disperse their contents throughout China. Such a vital energy location is essential for Beijing to control and the leadership recognizes this fact.
Increasing Violence in the Western Territory
Relations between the Chinese government and Xinjiang remain strained, especially when energy is the subject. China tends to transport Xinjiang’s pipeline oil to eastern and more often, wealthier cities. Such a move has drawn criticism from those in Xinjiang, and some have felt enough distaste to act using simple but effective methods to disrupt Chinese rule. Prime targets in Xinjiang include oil pipelines and transportation services. Headlined by the July 2009incident in which at least 184 people were killed in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capitol, large scale violence has become commonplace and has now spilled into other areas of China. Incidents involving terrorists include the 1997 bus bombings, 2013 Kashgar attacks and the 2014 Urumqi attacks, among others.
Mind the Economic Gap
Large gaps between the North and the South exist and Beijing has ushered in new economic policy to economically stimulate Urumqi. Major capital was invested to create a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in hopes to replicate successes of eastern coastal cities. Chinese officials have also encouraged Pakistani economic development in Xinjiang during this latest officialvisit. Such strategies aim to strengthen ties with the Muslim population in Xinjiang with the intention of suppressing any secessionist movement. But Beijing is fully aware: As economic improvements in Xinjiang continue, so too will the terrorist threat.
In closing, the relationship between Islamabad and Beijing remains incredibly strong and will further be strengthened from Xi’s visit this month. Overarching cooperative efforts made during this visit in particular touch many areas that benefit both parties and further fortify regional stability within diplomatic, trade and security arenas. Given the host country’s support for how China handles Xinjiang, its SCO ties and agreement on a host of cooperative issues like combatting terrorism and furthering joint-economic ventures, the future is promising.
Taylor Butch graduated magna cum laude from King’s College London with a Master’s Degree in Middle East and Mediterranean Studies, earning distinction on his thesis titled “Sino-Iranian Relations, 1993-2009”, focusing on military, diplomatic, economic, and security issues between China and Iran. He speaks Farsi and French, and has lived in or traveled through Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. He earned his Bachelor’s of Arts in History from Elizabethtown College.
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