26 April 2014

Reforms in Defence Industrialisation and Procurement

25/04/2014

For India to emerge as a major international power, or acquire a regional military edge, it must reduce its dependence on imports. Besides sophisticated systems, India is today importing even basic defence items such as assault rifles and carbines. As of now, India’s high technology industry and Research and Development (R & D) base has not developed adequately. Our capacity to spend on long gestation R & D projects too is limited. In addition to finances, the expertise to integrate systems and the availability of qualified and trained manpower falls short of the requirement to develop or indigenously manufacture complex weapon systems in the country. We therefore need a dual approach encompassing a time bound indigenisation programme with a roadmap for developing necessary R & D and manufacturing set ups for the long term and a simplified and an efficient defence purchase procedures to tide over the present equipment requirements for maintaining operational readiness of the services.

Defence Industrial Base

India today has a fairly large Defence Industrial Base which has not been effectively directed or monitored to deliver the country’s defence needs. It has 41 Ordnance Factories (OFs), 9 Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) and a network of over 50 Defence R & D Laboratories under the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) employing 1,80,044 employees (81,130 in DPSUs and 98,914 in OFs). These OFs produce relatively low technical level items such as ammunition, explosives, weapons, equipment, materials and components, armoured vehicles, ordnance equipment and the like. DRDOs budget in 2013–14 was Rs 10,610.17 crore, amounting to 5.21 percent of the total defence budget[i]. The budget allocation is huge compared to Indian benchmarks, yet too little for the type and quality of work and output these organisations are expected to deliver.

Despite the existence of a large defence base in the government sector, India’s arms imports have been growing consistently over the years, giving the country the dubious distinction of being the largest arms importer in the world. The public sector performance has not enthused the Armed Forces, who happen to be the buyers of the end product. Most projects are characterised by time delays, cost escalations and poor quality control. Even the 5.56 INSAS rifle developed by DRDO after 15 painfully long years is nowhere comparable to the modern assault rifles, leading to the government to approve the import of some 66,000 assault rifles and 44,000 carbines amongst other items. The night vision devices produced by the DRDO, though with 100 per cent imported Infra-Red (IR) tubes are far bulkier and heavier than the imported ones. Even in items like clothing and bullet proof jackets, the quality of the products leave much to be desired. As for equipment like the TATRA trucks, even when the Indian private sector is quite capable of manufacturing a similar vehicle both technologically and industrially, we chose a DPSU for procurement which acted as a mere middleman in importing them at huge costs to the exchequer.

The functioning of the DPSUs, OFs and DRDO hence need a review. Considering the high quality which the Indian private sector is now capable of producing, manufacture of stores and equipment like clothing, ordnance equipment, vehicles, ammunition, explosives and communication equipment can well be left to the private sector with an eye on breeding an export market for the future. We need to dispassionately review the cost benefit ratios of continuing with some of the government establishments and close down or relocate those that can be dispensed with. Organisations which can be retained must have adequately trained manpower with the desired technological expertise. These must be headed by professionals from amongst the best available in the country rather than being handled by bureaucrats. To enhance capability, performance audit could encompass quality and efficiency of products, quality of after sales service, economic prudence and the ability to build technological capabilities and skills. Public sector units should also compete with the private sector on a level playing field and not be given any preferential treatment including in the offer of contract and other terms and conditions. 

The IAF’s Elusive Quest for a New Tactical Transporter

25 Apr , 2014

Antonov AN32

Although it is certainly important to have an indigenous aerospace production base, a monopoly (as HAL has enjoyed so far) is not conducive to efficiency. Some private sector competition might help HAL to shape up, as state-owned Air India is doing after the entry of private airlines. However, if no foreign entity is willing to enter the Indian defence market by tying up with Indian industry, the Avro replacement process needs to go ahead in any case by purchasing a suitable tactical transport aircraft off the shelf. The IAF’s requirement is urgent and cannot be delayed much longer lest safety issues begin to emerge with the ageing Avro fleet.

The Avros are by far the worst off, as they are fast approaching the half-century service mark…

The Indian Air Force (IAF) is in the throes of an exciting transformation into a strategic air force. Armed with the latest aerospace technology it will gradually be able to extend its vigilance, reach and power. Although fighter aircraft rightly dominate the process, transport aircraft are no less important, and the IAF is striving to greatly boost its airlift capability by the end of the Twelfth Plan (2017). Once again, though strategic airlifters regularly make the headlines, tactical transport aircraft are equally necessary. One of the important requirements of air power is that it should offer a range of options – tactical as well as strategic. This applies also to the transport fleet, where a balanced structure is imperative. The question therefore arises – is the IAF transport fleet balanced?

Delayed Action

The recent enhancements of the IAF’s airlift capability have come after a gap of almost 30 years. It was in the mid-1980s that the transport fleet witnessed a flurry of activity as the government at last recognised that the IAF needed to be better equipped to meet its numerous responsibilities. First, the Dakota and Packet fleets were replaced by 110 Antonov An-32 twin-turboprop medium-tactical transport aircraft, from 1984 onwards. Then, 17 four-engine Ilyushin IL-76MD jets were acquired in place of the An-12 turboprops, commencing 1985. The giant 43-tonne payload IL-76 was the IAF’s first true strategic airlifter and made a dramatic difference to its transport fleet. Finally, in 1988, Dornier Do-228 light transport aircraft were inducted to replace the Otter and Devon aircraft for communication, liaison and training duties. All these aircraft are still flying today, as is a large fleet of HS 748M Avro medium transport aircraft.

Avro HS748

The twin-turboprop Avros with a payload capacity of 5.1 tonnes were acquired from Britain’s Hawker Siddeley from 1964 onwards and later produced under licence by HAL. About 56 remain in service, employed primarily for communication and medium lift tasks. The IAF’s current predicament stems mainly from the urgent need to replace the ageing Avro fleet.

Fleet replacement is a hugely expensive process. Since most of the current transport aircraft were inducted over a short period, practically the entire fleet is falling due for replacement, at a cost the nation can ill afford. The IAF’s transformation plan therefore has three key components – “preserve and maintain”, “upgrade and improve” and “replace and acquire”.

Pakistani Generals Baring Knuckles

By Karamatullah K Ghori

Old habits die hard: of jaded scribes like this one who, in their misplaced exuberance, may think and jump to conclusion that one swallow makes a spring. Scribes writing about Pakistan ought to be a little more circumspect than that.

What they can’t afford to discount in the context of Pakistani Bonapartes is their apparently infinite capacity to hit back. And they did hit back with force since my last column on the civilians gaining the upper hand in Musharraf’s trial.

GHQ in Rawalpindi took exception—a robust one—to some ministers of Nawaz Sharif speaking their mind out loud on Musharraf and insisting, in so many words, that nobody should be deemed above the law and that if other generals thought of abusing the law—as Musharraf obviously did—they, too, should be ready to face the music.

Ministers are politicians, and politicians all over are in the habit of shooting their mouth, isn’t it? And what politician worth his salt would pull back from making a statement if that could make catchy headlines and land him copious exposure in the media? Professional politicians have to earn their bread, too.

But not so according to Pakistan’s military culture. The generals, who have traditionally arrogated to themselves the sole title on Pakistan’s land and ideological frontiers, feel the ministers in power must calibrate their public pronouncements in line with them, if not seek prior clearance. They took umbrage at the stinging comments of minister of defence Khwaja Asif and railways minister Saad Rafiq. Both spoke with candour to remind any Bonaparte-in-waiting that Pakistan had come out of its “Dark Ages” and its democratic aspirations were now robust enough to call any bounty hunter’s bluff.

For the sake of argument it might be said the railways minister was, perhaps, out of his depth but was the defence minister, too, in the same boat? What good will be a defence minister if he couldn’t speak on matters of his jurisdiction?

However, GHQ thought Asif was also punching above his weight. So a warning shot came the very next day of his unguarded comments from the bow of none other than Nawaz Sharif’s hand-picked Army Chief, General Raheel Sharif. Addressing a company of the Special Services Group where Musharraf had earned his spurs as a “commando” General Sharif warned his Pakistani audience that the army knew how to defend its “honour”. The chief’s bleating was echoed the following day by a hastily summoned meeting of the corps commanders, the elite of the military brass that also expressed “deep concern” at the military’s “honour” being dragged in the dirt.

Attack on Hamid Mir: Pak Media Caught in Pincer of Military, Militants & Market


The attack on one of the best known Pakistani journalists, Hamid Mir, has only reaffirmed Pakistan's reputation as one of the most dangerous places in the world for journalists. Mir, who took six bullets, barely survived the well planned ambush carried out in broad daylight on a busy road in Karachi when he was heading from the airport to his office. The attempt on his life created a veritable storm in the Pakistani media, more so after his brother alleged that the ISI chief, Lt. Gen Zaheerul Islam, was responsible for the attack.

According to reports in the Pakistani media, Mir had confided in his friends and family about the threats to his life from ISI and had even recorded his testimony on paper and in a video which was to be made public if something happened to him. Naturally, as soon as news of the attack broke, fingers started being pointed at the ISI. The military spokesman was quick to condemn the incident and deny any involvement of the ISI in the incident. But cut to the bone by the audacity and temerity of the journalists who were accusing the ISI of being behind the attack, the intelligence agency, which is a virtual state within a state, unleashed its army of plants in the media to launch a fierce counter offensive, not just against Mir (accusing him of all sorts of anti-national activity) but also the media group –Jang/Geo – that he works for. For the rival channels, this was a Godsend opportunity to pull the Jang Group down from its pedestal as the most popular and powerful media group in Pakistan.

For some months now, the ISI has been using a rival channel ARY (owned by a dubious UAE based Pakistani-origin businessman who is alleged to be hand in glove with Dawood Ibrahim and involved in all sorts of shady deals, including Hawala and gold smuggling) to target Jang, its owner and its journalists. After the Hamid Mir attack, other channels like Express (owned by the Lakhani group) have also jumped into the act. The idea is to severely damage, if not destroy, Jang’s credibility and popularity and at the same time increase their own market share at Jang’s expense. The icing on the cake will be currying favour with the real power centre in Pakistan – the Pakistan Army.

The Battle Between Pakistan’s Intelligence Agency and Popular TV News Channel Over Killings Of Journalists

April 23, 2014
Pakistan Is Asked to Shut Down News Channel
Declan Walsh and Salman Masood
New York Times

LONDON — The attempted killing of a prominent Pakistani journalist has prompted a bruising public dispute between Pakistan’s powerful army spy agency and the largest media group that has exacerbated tense relations between the country’s civilian and military leaders.

In a first, the Defense Ministry on Tuesday requested that the government invoke media regulations to shut down a major news channel — in this case Geo, Pakistan’s largest television news station. The ministry accused Geo of running a “vicious campaign” against the military’s Inter-Services Intelligence directorate, or ISI.

Acrimony had been steadily building after Hamid Mir, a television anchor and Geo’s most famous journalist, was shot multiple times by unidentified gunmen as he was being driven to a television studio in Karachi on Saturday.

Mr. Mir survived the attack and is being treated for gunshot wounds to the chest and shoulder. But as he was still receiving emergency treatment, Geo prominently broadcast heated accusations from Mr. Mir’s brother, the journalist Amir Mir, who accused the ISI of being responsible for the attack.

During extended commentary, Geo also repeatedly broadcast a photograph of the ISI chief, Lt. Gen. Zahir ul-Islam, while a senior journalist employed by the station called for the general to resign.

Hamid Mir, whose pugnacious style has frequently stirred up controversy, has been a fierce critic of the military, and in February he privately told station managers that he had received a threat from ISI operatives about his work, according to the station. In November 2012, a bomb was found strapped to the underside of his car outside his home in Islamabad.

Even before the new dispute with Geo broke out, the military had been publicly bristling on several other fronts, including government concessions to the Pakistani Taliban during talks and the continuation of the treason trial of the country’s former military ruler, Pervez Musharraf.

When India had a consulate general in Lhasa

April 25, 2014


China has just turned down India's proposal for an Indian consulate in Lhasa, Tibet. Claude Arpi reveals how India once had a full-fledged consulate general office in Lhasa, which was shut down after the 1962 war.

The Nepalese newspaper The Republica recently reported: 'China has turned down India's proposal to establish its consulate general office in Lhasa, Tibet.'

The proposal was presented by Sujatha Singh, India's foreign secretary, during the 6th China-India strategic dialogue held in Beijing earlier this month.

According to The Republica, after meeting her Chinese counterpart, Deputy Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin, Singh told reporters that 'India will now plan a decisive talk with China in this regard.'

It probably signifies that the government is ready to drop the idea of reopening the Lhasa consulate. Nepal is today the only country to have a consulate general office in Lhasa.

Why? Simply, because the idea of having an Indian consulate general irritates the Chinese; it reminds them of the days when Tibet managed its own affairs.

Otherwise, the Sino-Indian bilateral situation is rosy. Liu affirmed that China is ready to work with India to advance the partnership to a new level, while Singh explained 'All political parties in India share a common ground on advancing India-China strategic cooperative partnership.'

Xinhua added: 'He (Sujatha Singh!!!) reiterated the Indian government's view of attaching high priority to its relations with China. He (!!!) said the Indian government is working to consolidate the strategic cooperative partnership that is oriented to peace and prosperity.'

Regarding the opening of a new consulate, it appears that Delhi would be satisfied with another consulate general in Chengdu (Sichuan) or Kunming (Yunnan province) instead of Lhasa.

HAGEL’S VISIT HIGHLIGHTS GREATER CHINESE MILITARY TRANSPARENCY – ANALYSIS


One of the most positive developments regarding China-U.S. relations in recent years has been how the military-to-military relationship has expanded in size, broadened in scope, and persisted without interruption despite the inevitable disputes and disagreements that always trouble such a complex relationship. In addition to the many reciprocal visits of senior military officers and the joint interactions on exercises and other projects, the last few years have seen a welcome Chinese effort to become more transparent in military capabilities and activities. Although China, like other countries, continues to withhold much information on national security grounds, we should acknowledge this positive trend.

For decades, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) highly valued military secrecy. Even after the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began to interact more with foreign militaries following the Cold War, its leaders did not show much interest in developing the kinds of dialogues and confidence-building measures with the United States that the Pentagon had established with the Soviet Union and other countries. Washington always had to take the initiative in pressing for more defense diplomacy and transparency.

Several reasons probably explain Chinese unease with defense openness. When the PLA was considerably weaker than the United States and other powers, Chinese policy makers naturally feared that excessive transparency could expose vulnerabilities to potential foes. As leaders of a rising military power, PRC policy makers have been reluctant to freeze existing military balances and operating patterns that were becoming more favorable to Beijing over time. Furthermore, Chinese leaders did not want to highlight their rapidly modernizing defense capabilities for fear of provoking foreign countermeasures.

Conceptual differences have also been at work. Whereas the Pentagon pursues deterrence through certainty, the PLA seeks deterrence through uncertainty. U.S. policy makers believe that they can best deter possible foreign aggressors by demonstrating superior military capabilities and a willingness to use them. In contrast, Chinese strategists believe that concealing China’s military assets and plans helpfully complicates foreign military efforts to target or respond to them. Another difference is that U.S. analysts often see transparency as helping build mutual trust, whereas the Chinese position has been that strategic trust is a prerequisite for meaningful military dialogue and data sharing.

CHINA’S LITTLE KNOWN SECURITY STAKES IN UKRAINE – ANALYSIS


The Chinese position on the Ukraine crisis and the Russian intervention in Crimea has been described as being of “studied ambiguity”, and one of the objectives of this policy was to balance interests in both Russia and Ukraine. The discussion on Chinese interests in Ukraine has largely centered on military cooperation and shipbuilding, obscuring Ukraine’s developing connection to China’s food security strategy.

China late last year concluded a deal to farm three million hectares of arable Ukrainian land over the span of half a century. Under the initial agreement worth $1.7 billion with KSG Agro, Ukraine’s leading agricultural company, 100,000 hectares were slated to be leased to Xinjiang Production and Construction Corp (XPCC), a Chinese quasi-military organization, also known as Bingtuan. The leased farmland in Dnipropetrovsk region of eastern Ukraine was to be cultivated principally for crops and raising pigs and the output sold to two Chinese state-owned grain conglomerates at preferential prices. Eventually the project size was expected to increase to three million hectares, 50 percent more than China’s own agricultural land – becoming China’s largest overseas project involving farmland.

Food Security

According to the 2013 FAO report on food insecurity in the world, in 2011–13 a total of 842 million people or around one in eight people in the world are estimated to be suffering from chronic hunger, regularly not getting enough food to conduct an active life. Food security is a complex condition, with dimensions relating to availability, access, utilization and stability. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is home to 22 percent of the world’s population, but has only 9 percent of its total arable land. In 2009 China possessed just 2 million hectares of farmland. In 2011-13, the number of undernourished people in China stood at 158 million.

The situation has been aggravated by rapid industrialization and population growth, resulting in rising demand for farmlands which are not available within the country. A recent report declared nearly one-fifth of the nation’s soil, including 19.4 percent of its crop-growing areas, as polluted. China faces increasing pressure to enhance its domestic food production as it consumes one-fifth of all global food supplies.

Although China’s domestic grain output had grown for 10 straight years, demand for imported grain had also grown. It imported nearly 14 million tonnes of cereal and cereal flours last year, an increase of more than 150 percent from 2011. With a target to become 90 percent self-sufficient in food production, the Ukraine farming project was an important part of China’s food security programme and strategy of outsourcing the production of food to farms overseas.

China’s Military Urges Increased Secrecy

A new official report cited by state media urges the PLA to more closely guard its military secrets. 
April 25, 2014

From U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel’s tour of the Liaoning aircraft carrier earlier this month to therecent release of two music videos featuring footage ofLiaoning’s crew in training, we’ve been seeing a lot of what might be termed “military transparency with Chinese characteristics.” Lest anyone get too optimistic, however, those initiatives were followed up this week by an article in the People’s Liberation Army Dailyextolling the virtues of secrecy. Xinhua also carried excerpts of the article in English translation, with the headline “China’s military requires tightened secrecy.”

The article quoted from a document entitled “Suggestions Regarding the Work of Protecting Secrets Under New Trends,” which PLA Daily said had been issued by China’s Central Military Commission at the order of Xi Jinping. The report named military secrecy as a key requirement to fulfilling Xi Jinping’s exhortation that China’s military should be capable of winning a war. Chinese military personnel must “clearly recognize the severe and complicated situation facing the protection of secrets, always remain sober-minded, persist in strengthening knowledge of enemies and awareness of duty, and spare no effort to fight the battle of maintaining secrecy,” the report urged.

The report, or at least the version carried in Chinese media, did not contain any specific details on how China would strengthen its military secrecy — such plans would naturally be themselves considered military secrets. The document did generally refer to a need to strengthen the protection of documents and other classified information as well as increasing security for computer networks and mobile communications.

While the report did not mention any specific countries, it’s likely that at least part of the impetus for it comes from revelations about the U.S. National Security Agency’s widespread cyber espionage programs, including substantial hacking into Chinese telecommunications firm Huawei. Following that revelation, China’s military announced they planned to increase cybersecurity, and the report cited by PLA Daily may be part of that campaign.

Regardless of the cause, the new document provides an interesting juxtaposition for China’s recent attempts at transparency. Even while providing some degree of access to PR showpieces like the Liaoning, China’s military is apparently working even harder to protect the information that actually matters — military secrets that will affect China’s ability to fight and win a war.

Official information on China’s military has always been hard to come by. For example, despite numerous rumors in Chinese media, China’s Ministry of Defense has yet to confirm if China is constructing a second aircraft carrier. Such information may be even more tightly guarded in the future as China alters it methods for ensuring military secrecy. As Dingding Chen wrote earlier for The Diplomat’s Flashpoints blog, there are compelling strategic reasons for China to curtail its military transparency. The new report from the Central Military Commission suggests that China’s military brass agree



Taiwan to Simulate Chinese Aircraft Carrier Assault


Taiwan’s annual computer-aided war games will simulate a PLA assault led by its carrier, the Liaoning. 

April 25, 2014

Taiwan will simulate an attack against China’s sole aircraft carrier during annual war games scheduled for next month.

According to a report in the China Post, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced on Tuesday that annual computer war games will simulate Taiwan’s response to an all-out invasion of the island by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 2015. The report said that this will include simulating attacks against China’s only aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, which Taipei apparently expects would be utilized by the PLA were it to invade Taiwan next year.

China Post went on to say that Taiwan’s military would also be simulating various responses to some of the other most recent additions to the PLA’s arsenal, without specifically naming any weapon systems besides the aircraft carrier. Other reports have suggested that Taiwan’s simulated response will include the use of weapon systems that Taiwan recently acquired from the United States, including the AH-64E Apache attack helicopter and the P-3C anti-submarine aircraft. In addition, the drill will include the use of Taiwan’s recent, domestically produced Thunderbolt-2000 artillery multiple-launch rocket system.

No reports suggested that Taiwan’s military would simulate using any of its new so-called “carrier killers,”although the lead ship of the class is expected to be deployed early next year.

The computerized war games are scheduled to take place May 19 through May 23. They will be part of the Han Kuang 30 military exercise, Taiwan’s most important annual military drill which features all of the different services of the military. Senior retired U.S. military officials often travel to Taiwan to observe the proceedings.

The Han Kuang military drills are divided into two parts: one consisting of live-fire drills and the other of computer simulations. The China Post report notes that the live-fire portion of the drills are usually held in April, followed by the computer-aided war games in July. This year the live-fire drills have been pushed back to September while the computer simulated portion of the war games have been moved up a month.

Be Afraid: China Can't Control North Korea

Published on The National Interest (http://nationalinterest.org)
April 25, 2014

This month in Beijing, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel asked China’s leader Xi Jinping to do more to disarm North Korea [3]. In February, Secretary of State John Kerry, when he was in the Chinese capital, goaded his counterparts on the same topic [4]. President Obama, while meeting Xi in The Hague during the Nuclear Security Summit in March, discussed the denuclearization of the North [5].

The Chinese are getting a little peeved by all this recent attention. Beijing’s ambassador to the United States in the middle of this month was unhappy about Washington leaning on his country. “You are giving us a mission impossible [6],” Cui Tiankai said to an audience in the American capital.

A decade ago, China chose not to use its considerable influence on the North. Now, from all appearances, it doesn’t have much of it. That’s probably why Ambassador Cui complains about receiving impossible missions from Americans.

Cui certainly remembers what happened in December. Then, Kim Jong-un, the young North Korean ruler, had his uncle, Jang Song Thaek, executed [7]. China not only lost its most influential contact in Pyongyang when Jang died in a hail of large-caliber rounds, but it also found itself demonized by the regime as it explained the harsh sentence.

In detailing Jang’s crimes, the official Korean Central News Agency on December 13 made two references to the People’s Republic of China [8]: his selling of “coal and other precious underground resources at random” and his “selling off the land of the Rason economic and trade zone to a foreign country for a period of five decades.” And the charge of Jang being “bribed by enemies” is undoubtedly a reference to the Chinese as well.

Chinese officials genuinely appeared surprised by Jang’s purge and execution, and that is an indication of how much access and influence they have lost in Pyongyang in recent years. When Kim Il-sung and Mao Zedong both ruled, the two states professed to be—and often were—lips-and-teeth close. Then, both leaders were communist, Confucian, Chinese-speaking, and chubby. No wonder diplomacy was conducted on a leader-to-leader basis.

Subsequent generations of rulers on both sides of the border have drifted apart, however, and the execution of Jang signals a rupture. Kim Jong-un had given Jang Song Thaek nearly free rein to handle relations with Beijing. This almost-complete delegation meant that in late 2013, Kim essentially cut himself off from his biggest benefactor when he killed his uncle.

Chinese Dominance Isn't Certain

Published on The National Interest (http://nationalinterest.org)
April 25, 2014

FEARS OF CHINA’S RISE ARE GROWING. Only a decade ago, most experts insisted that the Chinese Communist Party’s overseas ambitions were limited to Taiwan. Now that Beijing has begun to adopt a more assertive posture abroad, the conventional wisdom has changed from dismissing the China threat to accepting it fatalistically. But must Washington and its Asian allies defer to Chinese expansionism? Can we really have jumped from one world to another so quickly?

Not a chance. Two new books provide a corrective to the lately fashionable gloom-and-doom analysis. Each is by a crack journalist. The first, Geoff Dyer’s The Contest of the Century, addresses the U.S.-Chinese relationship through the prism of China’s military, political, diplomatic and economic development. The second, Robert Kaplan’s Asia’s Cauldron, focuses on the competition between China and the states around the South China Sea—the central route for shipping between the Middle East and East Asia, and the site of disputed claims to resource-rich maritime territory.

Certainly the fresh attention to China’s aspirations is a good thing. As late as 2006 the defense correspondent Fred Kaplan (no relation to Robert) was belittling the Pentagon’s attention to Chinese military modernization in its annual congressionally mandated report on the subject. In an article called “The China Syndrome,” Kaplan wrote:


“At present,” the report states, “China’s concept for sea-denial appears limited to sea-control in water surrounding Taiwan and its immediate periphery. If China were to shift to a broader ‘sea-control’ strategy”—in other words, if it were seeking a military presence farther away from its shores—“the principal indicators would include development of an aircraft carrier, development of robust, deep-water anti-submarine-warfare capabilities, development of a true area anti-aircraft warfare capability, acquisition of large numbers of nuclear attack submarines,” etc., etc. The point is: The Chinese aren’t doing—they’re not even close to doing—any of those things [Kaplan’s italics].

Obama’s Trip to Asia: A View From China

Obama’s Trip to Asia: A View From China
April 22, 2014 

Summary 

Heightened tensions in the Asia-Pacific, coupled with China’s adjustment of its regional security policy, has meant that the results of the U.S. rebalance to Asia are not as good now as they were two years ago.

U.S. President Barack Obama is kicking off a weeklong trip to Asia on April 23. Sun Xuefeng, an associate professor and deputy dean at Tsinghua University, offers a perspective on U.S. aims with the trip and stability in the region.

The Philippines and Malaysia both have territorial disputes with China, with the Philippines taking a strong stance and Malaysia a mild one. China established an air defense identification zone in the East China Sea in 2013, which made the United States feel it had failed to gain the upper hand when engaging China. By visiting the Philippines, Obama is highlighting his support for the country in the territorial dispute. Malaysia has sought U.S. help, and Obama is responding actively with his visit. 

Japan and South Korea are both U.S. allies, but their attitudes toward China’s rise differ—Japan takes a tough stance while South Korea’s approach is mild.

With this visit, the U.S. administration wants to demonstrate its support for Japan, highlighting its security commitment to its ally and its dominant role in Asia. And it would like to ensure that Japan’s approach is in line with the U.S. plan to rebalance toward Asia. Washington should also take steps to ensure that the Diaoyudao Islands (or Senkaku Islands, in Japanese) crisis does not escalate. If the relationship between Japan and China were to spiral out of control, the United States would be significantly affected and Washington’s role in East Asia would be greatly undermined.

Obama has two primary reasons for visiting South Korea. First, he will urge Seoul to smooth out its relationship with Japan. Washington is staging a comeback to the Asia-Pacific region, so it will try to alleviate disputes among its allies. Second, the United States is seeking to shore up its relationship with Seoul at a time when South Korea and China are getting closer. This closeness was on display when South Korea returned to China the remains of Chinese volunteer soldiers who died in the Korean War.

Is the U.S. strategy to rebalance toward Asia working? Is it here to stay? When the approach was introduced, Chinese scholars debated whether Obama proposed the strategy to win the presidential election and whether it was long term. It now seems that the shift toward the Asia-Pacific will be a long-term strategy.

Chinese Military Going Through Major Expansion; China Will Have 3 Aircraft Carriers In 10 Years

April 24, 2014
China Splurging on Military as US Pulls Back
Associated Press

QINGDAO, China — China’s navy commissioned 17 new warships last year, the most of any nation. In a little more than a decade, it’s expected to have three aircraft carriers, giving it more clout than ever in a region of contested seas and festering territorial disputes.

Those numbers testify to huge increases in defense spending that have endowed China with the largest military budget behind the United States and fueled an increasingly large and sophisticated defense industry. While Beijing still lags far behind the U.S. in both funding and technology, its spending boom is attracting new scrutiny at a time of severe cuts in U.S. defense budgets that have some questioning Washington’s commitments to its Asian allies, including some who have lingering disputes with China.

Beijing’s newfound military clout is one of many issues confronting President Barack Obama as he visits the region this week. Washington is faced with the daunting task of fulfilling its treaty obligations to allies such as Japan and the Philippines, while also maintaining cordial relation with key economic partner and rising regional power China.

China’s boosted defense spending this year grew 12.2 percent to $132 billion, continuing more than two decades of nearly unbroken double-digit percentage increases that have afforded Beijing the means to potentially alter the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific. Outside observers put China’s actual defense spending significantly higher, although estimates vary widely.

Increases in spending signal “strength and resolve to China’s neighbors,” requiring other countries to pay close attention to where Beijing is assigning its resources, said China defense expert Abraham Denmark, vice president for political and security affairs at the U.S-based National Bureau of Asian Research.

At the same time, the U.S. military is seeking to redirect resources to the Asia-Pacific as it draws down its defense commitment in Afghanistan, although officers warn that budget cuts could potentially threaten plans to base 60 percent of U.S. naval assets to the region. Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert recently warned that U.S. capabilities to project power “would not stay ahead” of those of potential adversaries, given the fiscal restraints.

Meanwhile, China’s navy is rapidly developing into a force to contend with the U.S., long the dominant military player in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Inconvenience of History Obama abandons another country to its fate


“Yeah, let’s talk about that.” The president wished to change the subject. At a press conference the other day he was being interrogated about Ukraine when a reporter asked a question about health care. Obama was delighted. As the excellent Peter Baker reported in The New York Times, “Mr. Obama seems intent on not letting Russia dominate his presidency.” This is not the first time the president has attempted to resist such intrusions upon his idea of how the world ought to be. He has been trying to escape the Middle East for years and “pivot” to Asia, as if the United States can ever not be almost everywhere, leading and influencing, supporting or opposing, in one fashion or another. On the eve of the president’s trip to Asia, Susan Rice remarked that “increasingly [we] see our top priorities as tied to Asia, whether it’s accessing new markets or promoting exports or protecting our security interests and promoting our core values.” What is this strange choice, this retiring either / or calculation? Only small powers think this way. Can the United States ever have “top priorities” only in one place, even if it is a place as big as Asia? Are our “security interests” not also broached by the failure of the Syrian state, or our “core values” not also invoked by its slaughter without end?

The tiresome futurism of Obama, his dogmatic views about what this ritualistically ballyhooed century will be like and what it will not be like, are only a part of what lowers his vision. The bigger problem is that the president feels inconvenienced by history. It refuses to follow his program for it. It regularly exasperates him and regularly disappoints him. It flows when he wants it to ebb and it ebbs when he wants it flow. Like Mr. Incredible, the president is flummoxed that the world won’t stay saved, or agree to be saved at all. After all, he came to save it. And so the world has only itself to blame if Obama is sick of it and going home.

Obama has concluded, according to Baker, that he “will never have a constructive relationship with Mr. Putin,” and so he has decided that he “will spend his final two and a half years in office trying to minimize the disruption Mr. Putin can cause, preserve whatever marginal cooperation can be saved and otherwise ignore the master of the Kremlin.” Ignoring the master, of course, has the consequence of ignoring the master’s victims: the Obama administration abandons to their fates one people after another, who pay the price for the president’s impatience with large historical struggles. The Ukrainians, the Syrians, the Iranians, the Israelis, the Palestinians, the Egyptians, the Saudis, the Moldovans, the Poles, the Czechs, the Japanese, the Taiwanese, the Baltic populations: they are all living with the jitters, and some of them on the cusp of despair, because the United States seems no longer reliable in emergencies, which it prefers to meet with meals ready to eat. No wonder that so much of our diplomacy consists in tendering reassurances. The United States now responds to oppressed and threatened peoples by making them more lonely and afraid—a sentimental objection, I know, and one that is unlikely to trouble Henry Kissinger’s epigone in the White House.

Eastern Ukraine Descent into darkness

http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21601313-deal-geneva-fails-ground-descent-darkness
A deal in Geneva fails on the ground
Apr 26th 2014

FOR a brief moment it seemed that eastern Ukraine’s slide into conflict might be halted. A deal struck in Geneva on April 17th between Russia, the United States, the European Union and Ukraine called for illegally occupied buildings to be vacated and armed groups to give up their weapons. But Denis Pushilin, head of the self-proclaimed People’s Republic of Donetsk, brushed it off, saying that, since the Ukrainian government was illegal, only if it left its buildings would his people do so.

Armed men have seized public buildings in a string of towns in the Donbas region. It is unclear how much support they have. Polls suggest that two-thirds of people in the south and east want to stay part of Ukraine and not be annexed by Russia, as Crimea was in March. Even among anti-government protesters and gunmen there is disharmony over aims. Some want to join Russia; others want more autonomy within a federal country.

Mr Pushilin says the Donetsk region will vote on local “sovereignty” on May 11th. Vladimir Makovich, a spokesman, says that, if the vote is passed, “we will be part of Ukraine until we separate from it.” Yet it is unclear how much of the region the rebels control. In Donetsk they occupy the regional administrative building, yet around it life carries on. In Luhansk normal life continues in most of the city. In Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, both surrounded by checkpoints, the rebels’ control is more obvious. If they are still there on May 25th, they will be able to stop locals from voting in Ukraine’s presidential election, which many think is a main goal. Eastern separatists, pro-Russian forces and the Kremlin will then be able to continue arguing that the government in Kiev is illegitimate.

The Ukrainian government faces a forbidding task to regain control. On April 16th two armoured convoys near Sloviansk were halted by civilians and gunmen. On April 20th three men at a rebel barricade near Sloviansk were killed in a mysterious shooting. Rebels claimed to have been attacked by men from the extreme nationalist Ukrainian Right Sector. Whatever the truth, locals were whipped up. “They died for our freedom and our future in great Russia,” said one at the funeral. “Rest assured we will have our revenge for this. We will have it for sure,” said another. The bodies of two tortured men were later fished out of a nearby river. The two incidents seem unconnected, but one body was of a politician from Gorlovka opposed to the rebels. On April 24th there were reports of more clashes, including shootings, around Sloviansk.

Putin's Grand Strategy for Ukraine

Published on The National Interest (http://nationalinterest.org)
April 25, 2014

The past several weeks of Russian activity in eastern Ukraine demonstrate that Moscow has found a winning tactic during its annexation of Crimea, and has made it the overarching strategy for achieving interests in broader Ukraine. Russia’s use of operational ambiguity to create confusion, mobilizing the populace in support of its objectives, and creating points for plausible disengagement all suggest one thing: Moscow has become far more clever and capable than the West originally gave it credit. Western leaders continue to misjudge the nature of Ukraine, and Russia’s plans for it. That has led to the loss of Crimea [3], and may conclude in the loss of other regions of Ukraine.

Russia’s military reforms have certainly made it more confident [4] and given it a capability it visibly did not have during the Georgian conflict. In 2008 Russia’s military deficiencies were laid bare for all to see. Before the reforms Russia had a large paper army that could not put together a combat ready force in response to a crisis, little ability to transport them to the crisis point, and terrible coordination amongst the different services. Out of one million men, Russia struggled to assemble anything coherent. In Georgia, Moscow won despite itself, because no matter how an elephant sits down, it crushes all the ants. Today, Russia has somewhere on the order of about 650,000 to 700,000 in its military, and can visibly transport 20,000 men to a crisis point on its borders. Its performance in Ukraine suggests that with a few weeks’ preparation, it can gather double that amount. That is enough to act decisively anywhere on its periphery and steam roll over any former Soviet republic.

However, it is not the better-trained, better-funded and better-equipped army that has given Russia the edge in this conflict. It is how skillfully Russia has chosen to use it. Western leaders continue to expect that Moscow will use heavy force in order to shape the environment for its objectives, but it continues to do the opposite. Russia is acting with intelligence operatives and disguised special forces, while using its conventional build up to blunt any effective response from the West or Kiev. Western leaders keep bracing for that Russian armored column to pull out onto the road and invade Ukraine with a classically heavy-handed approach, but it will likely never come. By avoiding the use of its conventional forces Russia has given itself the option to disengage, and the ability to spread disinformation about the conflict to sow confusion. In the interim, the credible threat of an all-out invasion has rendered the West helpless.

****** Overview of What Is Now Known About NSA’s PRISM Electronic Eavesdropping Program April 25, 2014 What is known about NSA’s PRISM program Peter Koop electrospaces.blogspot.com April 23, 2014 In June last year the Snowden-leaks started with the disclosure of the PRISM-program. For many people it stands for NSA surveillance in general because they often have still no idea what PRISM is actually about. Therefore, this article presents a wrap up of almost everything we know about the PRISM program, combining information from my earlier postings and from other media and government sources. Most of what we know about PRISM comes from an internal NSA presentation of 41 slides. Edward Snowden initially asked The Washington Post to publish the full slide deck, but the paper refused and so only 4 were subsequently published by The Guardian. A few other slides were revealed later on. In total 13 slides have been published and 4 were incidentally or partially shown on television. All of them are shown here, in an order that probably comes closest to the original presentation. The slides have a number which is only for reference. If new slides of this PRISM presentation become available, they will be added here. - General aspects of PRISM - Section 702 FAA Operations - - Reporting based on PRISM - 1. This slide was one of the first four revealed by The Guardian and The Washington Post on June 6, 2013, and shows the title of the presentation. All slides are marked TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN, which means they are classified as Top Secret and protected by the control system for Special Intelligence (SI). The dissemination is strictly controlled by the originator, while it’s generally prohibited to release them to foreign nationals. The SIGINT Activity Designator (SIGAD) of the PRISM program is US-984XN, which indicates that PRISM is part of the BLARNEY-family and used for collecting data under the authority of the FISA Amendments Act. > See also: PRISM as part of the BLARNEY program The media have redacted the name of the person who is the PRISM collection manager, a title which is followed by S35333, which is NSA’s internal organization designator for a unit of the Special Source Operations (SSO). The logo of this division is in the top left corner of each slide, with in the opposite corner a logo for the PRISM program itself. Immediatly after the first slides of the presentation were published, some people thought it could be fake or photoshopped because of the not very professional looking design and the copy-paste elements. After more slides became available, we can now assume the presentation to be genuine. > See also: Are the NSA’s PRISM-slides photoshopped? This presentation about PRISM was given in April 2013, which is just a month before Edward Snowden left his job at NSA and therefore this seems to be one of the most recent documents he was able to download from the internal NSA network. General aspects of PRISM The following slides are about the workings of the PRISM program in general: 2. This slide was one of the first four revealed by The Guardian and The Washington Post on June 6, 2013, and shows a short introduction of the world’s telecommunications backbone. The diagram shows that the majority of international communications from Latin America, Europe and even from Asia flow through the United States, which makes it easy for NSA to intercept them on American soil. Note that most of the communications from Africa (the continent where many jihadist groups from the Middle East went to in recent years) are going through Europe, which explains why NSA sometimes needs European partner agencies (like from the Netherlands) to access them. 3. This slide was one of the first four revealed by The Guardian and The Washington Post on June 6, 2013, and shows which internet companies are involved and what kind communications can be received by the NSA. We see that under PRISM the NSA is able to collect e-mail, chat, video and voice messages, photo’s, stored data and things like that. But there are also “Notifications of target activity - logins, etc”. This was interpreted by The Washington Post as a function that gives NSA analysts live notifications “when a target logs on or sends an e-mail”. But as these notifications are clearly listed as collected data (see also slide 8 down below), it’s more likely they refer to the notification messages you get when someone logs in at an internet chatroom or an instant messenger, or when you receive an e-mail through an e-mail client. It is possible though that NSA analysts can get a notification when new communications from a target they are watching becomes available in NSA systems. Whether (near) real-time monitoring of a target’s communications is possible, depends on the way these data are made available to NSA (see slide 5 below). 4. This slide was one of the first four revealed by The Guardian and The Washington Post on June 6, 2013, and shows the dates when PRISM collection began for each provider: - Microsoft: September 11, 2007 - Yahoo: March 12, 2008 - Google: January 14, 2009 - Facebook: June 3, 2009 - PalTalk: December 7, 2009 - YouTube: September 24, 2010 - Skype: February 2, 2011 - AOL: March 31, 2011 - Apple: October 2012 According to the book ‘Der NSA Komplex’, which was published by Der Spiegel in March 2014, PRISM also gained access to Microsoft’s cloud service SkyDrive (now called OneDrive) as of March 2013. This was realized after months of cooperation between FBI and Microsoft.* The Washington Post reported that in the speaker’s notes accompanying the presentation, it’s said that “98 percent of PRISM production is based on Yahoo, Google and Microsoft; we need to make sure we don’t harm these sources”. The Post also says that “PalTalk, although much smaller, has hosted traffic of substantial intelligence interest during the Arab Spring and in the ongoing Syrian civil war”. The program cost of 20 million dollar per year was initially interpreted as being the cost of the program itself, but later it came out that NSA pays for expenses made by cooperating corporations, so it seems more likely that the 20 million is the total amount paid by NSA to the companies involved in the PRISM program. 5. This slide was one of four disclosed by The Washington Post on June 29, 2013 and shows the PRISM tasking process, which means how the actual collection facilities are instructed about what data should be gathered. The process starts with an NSA analyst entering selectors into the Unified Targeting Tool (UTT). In this case, selectors can be e-mail or IP addresses, but not keywords. According to an article in the French paper Le Monde, there are some 45.000 selectors involved in the PRISM collection. Analysts can order data from two different sources: - Surveillance, which means communications that will happen from the moment the target was selected (although the media interpreted this as the ability to real-time “monitor a voice, text or voice chat as it happens”) - Stored Comms, which are communications stored by the various providers dating from before the moment the target was selected Edward Snowden vehemently accuses NSA for a lack of control and oversight mechanisms, which according to him, makes that analysts have unrestricted access to the communications of virtually everyone in the world. But the diagram in the slide clearly shows that there are multiple steps for approving every collection request: 1. For Surveillance a first review is done by an FAA Adjudicator in the analysts Product Line (S2) and for Stored Comms there’s a review by the Special FISA Oversight and Processing unit (SV4). 2. A second and final review is done in both cases by the Targeting and Mission Management (S343) unit. Only after passing both stages, the request is released through the UTT and the PRINTAURA distribution managing system. 3. For Stored Comms the Electronic Communications Surveillance Unit (ECSU) of the FBI even does a third check against its own database to filter out known Americans. Then it’s the Data Intercept Technology Unit (DITU) of the FBI that goes to the various internet companies to pick up the requested data and then sends them back to NSA. As indicated by companies like Google, they deliver the information to the FBI in different ways, like through a secure FTP transfer, an encrypted dropbox or even in person. According to a report by the journalist Declan McCullagh, the companies prefer installing their own monitoring capabilities to their networks and servers, instead of allowing the FBI to plug in government-controlled equipment. > See also: The PRISM tasking process 6. This slide was shown on Brazilian television and seems also to be about PRISM Tasking, more specifically about a procedure for emergency tasking when lives are in danger. The slide was uploaded to Wikipedia, where there’s also a transcript of the text: […] your targets meet FAA criteria, you should consider tasking to FAA. Emergency tasking processes exist for [imminent/immediate] threat to life situations and targets can be placed on […] within hours (surveillance and stored comms). Get to know your Product line FAA adjudicators and FAA leads. According to an NSA report (pdf) published in April 2014, analysts “may seek to query a U.S. person identifier when there is an imminent threat to life, such as a hostage situation”. Just like a number of other slides and fragments thereof shown on television, there seems to be no good reason why a slide like this is still not published in a clear and proper way. They contain nothing that endangers the national security of the US, but instead would help to much better understand how the PRISM program is actually used. 7. This slide was one of four disclosed by The Washington Post on June 29, 2013. It shows the flow of data which are collected under the PRISM program. Again we see that it’s the FBI’s DITU that picks up the data at the various providers and sends them to the PRINTAURA system at NSA. From PRINTAURA some of the data are directed to TRAFFICTHIEF, which is a database for metadata about specifically selected e-mail addresses and is part of the TURBULANCE umbrella program to detect threats in cyberspace. The main stream of data is sent through SCISSORS, which seems to be used for separating different types of data and protocols. Metadata and voice content then pass the ingest processing systems FALLOUT and CONVEYANCE respectively. Finally, the data are stored in the following NSA databases: - MARINA: for internet metadata - MAINWAY: for phonecall metadata - NUCLEON: for voice content - PINWALE: for internet content, video content, and “FAA partitions” > See also: Storage of collected PRISM data 8. This slide was one of four disclosed by The Washington Post on June 29, 2013. It shows the composition of the Case Notation (CASN) which is assigned to all communications which are intercepted under the PRISM program. We see that there are positions for identifying the providers, the type of content, the year and a serial number. Also there’s a fixed trigraph which denotes the source. For NSA’s PRISM collection this trigraph is SQC. From another document (pdf) we learn that the trigraph for FISA data used by the FBI is SQF. The abbreviations stand for: IM = Instant Messaging; RTN-EDC = Real Time Notification-Electronic Data Communication(?); RTN-IM = Real Time Notification-Instant Messaging; OSN = Online Social Networking. > See for more about this slide: PRISM case notations 9. This slide was one of four disclosed by The Washington Post on June 29, 2013. The content of the slide shows a screenshot of a web based application called REPRISMFISA, which is probably accessible through the web address which is blacked out by the Post. Unfortunately there’s no further explanation of what application we see here, but if we look at the word REPRISMFISA we can imagine the application is for going “back to data collected under the PRISM program according to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)”. In the center of the page there are three icons, which can be clicked: PRISM, FBI FISA and DOJ FISA. This shows that both NSA, FBI and the Department of Justice (DOJ) are using data collected under the authority of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), and that the NSA’s part is codenamed PRISM. Below these icons there is a search field, to query one or more databases resulting in a partial list of records. The search options seem rather limited, as only two keywords can be entered, with an additonal “and/or” option. At the left there’s a column presenting a number of options for showing totals of PRISM entries. > See for more about this slide: Searching the collected data Section 702 FAA Operations The following slides are about how PRISM can be used to collect various types of data. This collection is governed by section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act (FAA), which in NSA-speak is called FAA702 or just merely 702. Section 702 FAA was enacted in 2008 in order to legalize the interception that was going on since 2001 and that became known as the “warrentless wiretapping" because it was only authorized by a secret order of president George W. Bush. The FAA was re-authorized by Congress in December 2012 and extended for five years. Under section 702 FAA, NSA is authorized to acquire foreign intelligence information by intercepting the content of communications of non-US persons who are reasonably believed to be located outside the US. This interception takes place inside the United States with the cooperation of American telecommunication and internet companies. Operations under the original Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) from 1978 require an individual determination by the FISA Court, but under FAA the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) certify an annual list of targets. These certifications are then reviewed by the FISA Court to determine whether they meet the statutory requirements, like the minimization rules for hiding names and addresses of US citizens. 10. This slide was additionally published by The Guardian on June 8, 2013, to clarify that PRISM, which involves data collection from servers, is distinct from the programs FAIRVIEW, STORMBREW, BLARNEY and OAKSTAR. These involve data collection from “fiber cables and infrastructure as data flows past”, which is called Upstream collection. NSA can collect data that flow through the internet backbone cables, as well as data that are stored on the servers of companies like Google, Facebook, Apple, etc. The latter are collected “directly from the servers” as opposed to the communications that are still on their way to those servers when passing through the main internet cables and switches. Directly from servers The words “directly from the servers” were misinterpreted by The Guardian and The Washington Post, leading to the claim that NSA had “direct access” to the servers of the internet service providers. As the next slide will show, there’s no such direct access. (The claim of NSA having “direct access” was not only based on this slide, but also on misreading a section from the draft of a 2009 NSA Inspector General report about the STELLARWIND program, which on page 17 says: “collection managers sent content tasking instructions directly to equipment installed at company-controlled locations”. The Washington Post thought this referred to the companies involved in the PRISM program, but it actually was about Upstream Collection, which has filters installed at major internet switches. This follows from two facts: first, that the STELLARWIND program was terminated in January 2007 while PRISM only started later that year; second, that STELLARWIND only involved companies that operate the internet and telephony backbone cables, like AT&T and Verizon, not internet service providers like Microsoft and Google) Upstream collection An important thing that wasn’t well explained by the media, is that not only PRISM, but also the domestic part of Upstream collection is legally based upon section 702 FAA. Note that NSA also conducts Upstream collection under three other legal authorities: FISA and Transit inside the US and Executive Order 12333 when the collection takes place abroad. > See for more: Slides about NSA’s Upstream collection From a 2011 FISA Court ruling (pdf) that was declassified upon request of the Electronic Frontier Foundation we learn that under section 702 FAA, NSA acquires more than 250 million “internet communications” each year. This number breaks down as follows: - Upstream: ca. 9% or more than 22 million communications * - PRISM: ca. 91% or more than 227 million communications The ruling doesn’t explain what exactly a “internet communication” is. A problem that troubled both NSA and the FISA court was that under Upstream it’s technically very difficult to distinguish between single communications to, from or about targeted persons and those containing multiple communications, not all of which may be to, from or about approved targeted addresses. The latter may contain to up to 10,000 domestic communications each year.* 11. This slide was one of three published on the website of the French paper Le Monde on October 22, 2013. It compares the main features of the PRISM program and the Upstream collection. Direct Access? The last line says that for PRISM there is no “Direct Relationship with Comms Providers”. Data are collected through the FBI. This clearly contradicts the initial story by The Guardian and The Washington Post, which claimed that NSA had “direct access” to the servers of the internet companies. This led to spectacular headlines, but also a lot of confusion, as it allowed the companies involved to strongly deny any direct relationship with the NSA - because it’s actually the FBI that is picking up their data. Had this slide been published right in the beginning, then more adequate questions could have been asked and probably we could have got answers that made more sense. A direct relationship does exist however with the companies which are involved in the Upstream collection, like AT&T and Verizon, who most likely have high volume filtering devices like the Narus STA 6400 installed at their switching stations. Unlike intercept facilities outside the US, where the XKeyscore system can store and search 3 days of content, the sites inside the US only seem to filter data as they flow past, and hence there’s no access to Stored Communications. About Collection The slide also shows that the so-called “Abouts” collection is only conducted under the Upstream method. As we learned from a hearing of the Presidential Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB ), this About Collection is not for gathering communications to or from a certain target, but about a specific selector, like for example an e-mail message in which an e-mail address or a phone number of a known suspect is mentioned. This About Collection is not looking for names or keywords, is only used for internet communications and was authorized by the FISA Court. Because under Upstream NSA is allowed to do About Collection which pulls in a broader range of communications, the retention period (the time the data are stored) is only two years. Data collected under PRISM, which are restricted to communications to and from specific addresses, are stored for the standard period of five years. Both under PRISM and Upstream there’s no collection based upon keywords. 12. The slide was seen in a television report and shows a world map with the undersee fiber optic cables according to the volumes of data they transmit. This map is used as background of a number of other slides about FAA 702 Operations. In seems that additional information, like in the next slide, appears by mouse clicking the original powerpoint presentation. 13. The slide shows the same world map with fiber-optic cables and is hardly readable, but according to Wikipedia, the subheader reads “Collection only possible under FAA702 Authority” and in the central cyan colored box the codenames FAIRVIEW and STORMBREW are shown subsequently. Maybe other codenames are in the yellow box at the right side. It’s not clear what the irregular blue shapes in the Indian Ocean are. The figure which is right of New Zealand is a stereotype depiction of a terrorist with a turban. 14. This partial slide was seen on the laptop of Glenn Greenwald in a report by Brazilian television and shows two scenarios for collection data under FAA 702 authority. It has two boxes with text, the one on the right reads: UPSTREAM Scenario #2 OPI tasks badguy@yahoo.com under FAA702 and 12333 authority in UTT Badguy sends e-mail from [outside?] U.S. and comms flow inside U.S. FAIRVIEW sees selector but can’t tell if destination end is U.S. or foreign RESULT Collection allowed Only the target end needs to be foreign OPI stands for Office of Primary Interest and UTT for Unified Targeting Tool, the NSA application used for instructing the actual collection facilities. 15. This slide was one of three published on the website of the French paper Le Monde on October 22, 2013. It shows a list of 35 IP addresses and domain names which are the “Higher Volume Domains Collected from FAA Passive”. This indicates that data from these domains are collected from fiber optic cables and other internet infrastructures, which is called Passive or Upstream collection. All IP addresses and domain names are blacked out, except for two French domains: wanadoo.fr (a major French internet service provider) and alcatel-lucent.com (a major French-American telecommunications company). The rest of the list will most likely contain many similar domain names, which shows that redactions of the Snowden-documents are not only made to protect legitimate security interests, but also when the papers, in this case Le Monde, want to keep these revelations strictly focussed to their own audience. Reporting based on PRISM The following slides show some of the results from the PRISM program: 16. This slide was one of three published on the website of the French paper Le Monde on October 22, 2013. It shows a highlight of reporting under the section 702 FAA authority, which in this case includes both PRISM and the STORMBREW program of the Upstream collection capability. Information derived from both sources made the NSA/CSS Threat Operations Center (NTOC) figure out that someone had gotten access to the network of a cleared defense contractor (CDC) and was either preparing to, or at least had the ability to get 150 gigabytes of important data out. NTOC then alerted the FBI, which alerted the contractor and they plugged the hole the same day, apparently December 14, 2012. Another cyber attack that was detected by PRISM occured in 2011 and was directed against the Pentagon and major defense contractors. According to the book ‘Der NSA Komplex’ this attack was codenamed LEGION YANKEE, which indicates that it was most likely conducted by Chinese hackers.* PRISM slide about reporting topics in February 2013 17. This slide of the PRISM presentation appeared on the website of O Globo and is titled “A Week in the Life of PRISM Reporting” and shows some samples of reporting topics from early February 2013. It seems the bottom part of this slide was blacked (or actually whited) out by Brazilian media, as the Indian paper The Hindu disclosed that this slide also mentions “politics, space, nuclear” as topics under “India”, and also information from Asian and African countries, contributing to a total of “589 End product Reports”. These lists show that collection under the PRISM program is not restricted to counter-terrorism, but is also not about monitoring ordinary people all over the world, as many people still think. PRISM is used for gathering information about a range of targets derived from the topics in the NSA’s Strategic Mission List (pdf). The 2007 edition of this list was also among the Snowden-documents and subsequently published, but got hardly any attention. According to former NSA deputy director Chris Inglis some 41 terrorist plots were foiled by information collected under section 702 FAA, most of them by PRISM. This is not a very large number, but as we’ve seen, PRISM is also used for creating intelligence reports about many other topics. In 2012, these were cited as a source in 1477 items of the President’s Daily Brief, making PRISM one of the main contributors to this Top Secret intelligence briefing which is provided to the president each morning. Links and Sources - MatthewAid.com: New NSA Report on Its Electronic Eavesdropping Programs - EmptyWheel.net: Back Door Searches: One of Two Replacements for the Internet Dragnet? - DNI.gov: NSA’s Implementation of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Section 702 (pdf) - TED.com: Edward Snowden: Here’s how we take back the Internet - C-Span.org: Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board Hearing, Government Officials Panel - TechDirt.com: Why Does The NSA Focus So Much On ‘TERROR!’ When PRISM’s Success Story Is About Cybersecurity? - SealedAbstract.com: The part of the FISC NSA decision you missed - GlobalResearch.com: New Documents Shed Light on NSA’s Dragnet Surveillance

Overview of What Is Now Known About NSA’s PRISM Electronic Eavesdropping Program

April 25, 2014
What is known about NSA’s PRISM program
Peter Koop
electrospaces.blogspot.com
April 23, 2014
In June last year the Snowden-leaks started with the disclosure of the PRISM-program. For many people it stands for NSA surveillance in general because they often have still no idea what PRISM is actually about.

Therefore, this article presents a wrap up of almost everything we know about the PRISM program, combining information from my earlier postings and from other media and government sources.

Most of what we know about PRISM comes from an internal NSA presentation of 41 slides. Edward Snowden initially asked The Washington Post to publish the full slide deck, but the paper refused and so only 4 were subsequently published by The Guardian. A few other slides were revealed later on. In total 13 slides have been published and 4 were incidentally or partially shown on television.

All of them are shown here, in an order that probably comes closest to the original presentation. The slides have a number which is only for reference. If new slides of this PRISM presentation become available, they will be added here.


1. This slide was one of the first four revealed by The Guardian and The Washington Post on June 6, 2013, and shows the title of the presentation.

All slides are marked TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN, which means they are classified as Top Secret and protected by the control system for Special Intelligence (SI). The dissemination is strictly controlled by the originator, while it’s generally prohibited to release them to foreign nationals.

The SIGINT Activity Designator (SIGAD) of the PRISM program is US-984XN, which indicates that PRISM is part of the BLARNEY-family and used for collecting data under the authority of the FISA Amendments Act.

> See also: PRISM as part of the BLARNEY program

The media have redacted the name of the person who is the PRISM collection manager, a title which is followed by S35333, which is NSA’s internal organization designator for a unit of the Special Source Operations (SSO). The logo of this division is in the top left corner of each slide, with in the opposite corner a logo for the PRISM program itself.

Immediatly after the first slides of the presentation were published, some people thought it could be fake or photoshopped because of the not very professional looking design and the copy-paste elements. After more slides became available, we can now assume the presentation to be genuine.

> See also: Are the NSA’s PRISM-slides photoshopped?

This presentation about PRISM was given in April 2013, which is just a month before Edward Snowden left his job at NSA and therefore this seems to be one of the most recent documents he was able to download from the internal NSA network.



General aspects of PRISM

The following slides are about the workings of the PRISM program in general:

2. This slide was one of the first four revealed by The Guardian and The Washington Post on June 6, 2013, and shows a short introduction of the world’s telecommunications backbone.

The diagram shows that the majority of international communications from Latin America, Europe and even from Asia flow through the United States, which makes it easy for NSA to intercept them on American soil.

Note that most of the communications from Africa (the continent where many jihadist groups from the Middle East went to in recent years) are going through Europe, which explains why NSA sometimes needs European partner agencies (like from the Netherlands) to access them.


3. This slide was one of the first four revealed by The Guardian and The Washington Post on June 6, 2013, and shows which internet companies are involved and what kind communications can be received by the NSA.

We see that under PRISM the NSA is able to collect e-mail, chat, video and voice messages, photo’s, stored data and things like that. But there are also “Notifications of target activity - logins, etc”. This was interpreted by The Washington Post as a function that gives NSA analysts live notifications “when a target logs on or sends an e-mail”.

But as these notifications are clearly listed as collected data (see also slide 8 down below), it’s more likely they refer to the notification messages you get when someone logs in at an internet chatroom or an instant messenger, or when you receive an e-mail through an e-mail client.

It is possible though that NSA analysts can get a notification when new communications from a target they are watching becomes available in NSA systems. Whether (near) real-time monitoring of a target’s communications is possible, depends on the way these data are made available to NSA (see slide 5 below).


4. This slide was one of the first four revealed by The Guardian and The Washington Post on June 6, 2013, and shows the dates when PRISM collection began for each provider:
- Microsoft: September 11, 2007
- Yahoo: March 12, 2008
- Google: January 14, 2009
- Facebook: June 3, 2009
- PalTalk: December 7, 2009
- YouTube: September 24, 2010
- Skype: February 2, 2011
- AOL: March 31, 2011
- Apple: October 2012

According to the book ‘Der NSA Komplex’, which was published by Der Spiegel in March 2014, PRISM also gained access to Microsoft’s cloud service SkyDrive (now called OneDrive) as of March 2013. This was realized after months of cooperation between FBI and Microsoft.*

The Washington Post reported that in the speaker’s notes accompanying the presentation, it’s said that “98 percent of PRISM production is based on Yahoo, Google and Microsoft; we need to make sure we don’t harm these sources”. The Post also says that “PalTalk, although much smaller, has hosted traffic of substantial intelligence interest during the Arab Spring and in the ongoing Syrian civil war”.

The program cost of 20 million dollar per year was initially interpreted as being the cost of the program itself, but later it came out that NSA pays for expenses made by cooperating corporations, so it seems more likely that the 20 million is the total amount paid by NSA to the companies involved in the PRISM program.


5. This slide was one of four disclosed by The Washington Post on June 29, 2013 and shows the PRISM tasking process, which means how the actual collection facilities are instructed about what data should be gathered.

The process starts with an NSA analyst entering selectors into the Unified Targeting Tool (UTT). In this case, selectors can be e-mail or IP addresses, but not keywords. According to an article in the French paper Le Monde, there are some 45.000 selectors involved in the PRISM collection.

Analysts can order data from two different sources:
Surveillance, which means communications that will happen from the moment the target was selected (although the media interpreted this as the ability to real-time “monitor a voice, text or voice chat as it happens”)
Stored Comms, which are communications stored by the various providers dating from before the moment the target was selected

Edward Snowden vehemently accuses NSA for a lack of control and oversight mechanisms, which according to him, makes that analysts have unrestricted access to the communications of virtually everyone in the world. But the diagram in the slide clearly shows that there are multiple steps for approving every collection request:

1. For Surveillance a first review is done by an FAA Adjudicator in the analysts Product Line (S2) and for Stored Comms there’s a review by the Special FISA Oversight and Processing unit (SV4).

2. A second and final review is done in both cases by the Targeting and Mission Management (S343) unit. Only after passing both stages, the request is released through the UTT and the PRINTAURA distribution managing system.

3. For Stored Comms the Electronic Communications Surveillance Unit (ECSU) of the FBI even does a third check against its own database to filter out known Americans.

Then it’s the Data Intercept Technology Unit (DITU) of the FBI that goes to the various internet companies to pick up the requested data and then sends them back to NSA.

As indicated by companies like Google, they deliver the information to the FBI in different ways, like through a secure FTP transfer, an encrypted dropbox or even in person. According to a report by the journalist Declan McCullagh, the companies prefer installing their own monitoring capabilities to their networks and servers, instead of allowing the FBI to plug in government-controlled equipment.

> See also: The PRISM tasking process


6. This slide was shown on Brazilian television and seems also to be about PRISM Tasking, more specifically about a procedure for emergency tasking when lives are in danger. The slide was uploaded to Wikipedia, where there’s also a transcript of the text:
[…] your targets meet FAA criteria, you should consider tasking to FAA.
Emergency tasking processes exist for [imminent/immediate] threat to life situations and targets can be placed on […] within hours (surveillance and stored comms).
Get to know your Product line FAA adjudicators and FAA leads.

According to an NSA report (pdf) published in April 2014, analysts “may seek to query a U.S. person identifier when there is an imminent threat to life, such as a hostage situation”.

Just like a number of other slides and fragments thereof shown on television, there seems to be no good reason why a slide like this is still not published in a clear and proper way. They contain nothing that endangers the national security of the US, but instead would help to much better understand how the PRISM program is actually used.


7. This slide was one of four disclosed by The Washington Post on June 29, 2013.

It shows the flow of data which are collected under the PRISM program. Again we see that it’s the FBI’s DITU that picks up the data at the various providers and sends them to the PRINTAURA system at NSA.

From PRINTAURA some of the data are directed to TRAFFICTHIEF, which is a database for metadata about specifically selected e-mail addresses and is part of the TURBULANCE umbrella program to detect threats in cyberspace.

The main stream of data is sent through SCISSORS, which seems to be used for separating different types of data and protocols. Metadata and voice content then pass the ingest processing systems FALLOUT and CONVEYANCE respectively. Finally, the data are stored in the following NSA databases:
MARINA: for internet metadata
MAINWAY: for phonecall metadata
- NUCLEON: for voice content
PINWALE: for internet content, video content, and “FAA partitions”
8. This slide was one of four disclosed by The Washington Post on June 29, 2013.

It shows the composition of the Case Notation (CASN) which is assigned to all communications which are intercepted under the PRISM program.

We see that there are positions for identifying the providers, the type of content, the year and a serial number. Also there’s a fixed trigraph which denotes the source. For NSA’s PRISM collection this trigraph is SQC. From another document (pdf) we learn that the trigraph for FISA data used by the FBI is SQF.

The abbreviations stand for: IM = Instant Messaging; RTN-EDC = Real Time Notification-Electronic Data Communication(?); RTN-IM = Real Time Notification-Instant Messaging; OSN = Online Social Networking.

> See for more about this slide: PRISM case notations


9. This slide was one of four disclosed by The Washington Post on June 29, 2013.

The content of the slide shows a screenshot of a web based application called REPRISMFISA, which is probably accessible through the web address which is blacked out by the Post. Unfortunately there’s no further explanation of what application we see here, but if we look at the word REPRISMFISA we can imagine the application is for going “back to data collected under the PRISM program according to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)”.

In the center of the page there are three icons, which can be clicked: PRISM, FBI FISA and DOJ FISA. This shows that both NSA, FBI and the Department of Justice (DOJ) are using data collected under the authority of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), and that the NSA’s part is codenamed PRISM.

Below these icons there is a search field, to query one or more databases resulting in a partial list of records. The search options seem rather limited, as only two keywords can be entered, with an additonal “and/or” option. At the left there’s a column presenting a number of options for showing totals of PRISM entries.

> See for more about this slide: Searching the collected data



Section 702 FAA Operations

The following slides are about how PRISM can be used to collect various types of data. This collection is governed by section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act(FAA), which in NSA-speak is called FAA702 or just merely 702.

Section 702 FAA was enacted in 2008 in order to legalize the interception that was going on since 2001 and that became known as the “warrentless wiretapping" because it was only authorized by a secret order of president George W. Bush. The FAA was re-authorized by Congress in December 2012 and extended for five years.

Under section 702 FAA, NSA is authorized to acquire foreign intelligence information by intercepting the content of communications of non-US persons who are reasonably believed to be located outside the US. This interception takes place inside the United States with the cooperation of American telecommunication and internet companies.

Operations under the original Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) from 1978 require an individual determination by the FISA Court, but under FAA the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) certify an annual list of targets. These certifications are then reviewed by the FISA Court to determine whether they meet the statutory requirements, like the minimization rules for hiding names and addresses of US citizens.


10. This slide was additionally published by The Guardian on June 8, 2013, to clarify that PRISM, which involves data collection from servers, is distinct from the programs FAIRVIEW, STORMBREW, BLARNEY and OAKSTAR. These involve data collection from “fiber cables and infrastructure as data flows past”, which is calledUpstream collection.

NSA can collect data that flow through the internet backbone cables, as well as data that are stored on the servers of companies like Google, Facebook, Apple, etc. The latter are collected “directly from the servers” as opposed to the communications that are still on their way to those servers when passing through the main internet cables and switches.

Directly from servers

The words “directly from the servers” were misinterpreted by The Guardian and The Washington Post, leading to the claim that NSA had “direct access” to the servers of the internet service providers. As the next slide will show, there’s no such direct access.

(The claim of NSA having “direct access” was not only based on this slide, but also on misreading a section from the draft of a 2009 NSA Inspector General report about the STELLARWIND program, which on page 17 says: “collection managers sent content tasking instructions directly to equipment installed at company-controlled locations”. The Washington Post thought this referred to the companies involved in the PRISM program, but it actually was about Upstream Collection, which has filters installed at major internet switches. This follows from two facts: first, that the STELLARWIND program was terminated in January 2007 while PRISM only started later that year; second, that STELLARWIND only involved companies that operate the internet and telephony backbone cables, like AT&T and Verizon, not internet service providers like Microsoft and Google)

Upstream collection

An important thing that wasn’t well explained by the media, is that not only PRISM, but also the domestic part of Upstream collection is legally based upon section 702 FAA. Note that NSA also conducts Upstream collection under three other legal authorities: FISA and Transit inside the US and Executive Order 12333 when the collection takes place abroad.

> See for more: Slides about NSA’s Upstream collection

From a 2011 FISA Court ruling (pdf) that was declassified upon request of the Electronic Frontier Foundation we learn that under section 702 FAA, NSA acquires more than 250 million “internet communications” each year. This number breaks down as follows:
Upstream: ca. 9% or more than 22 million communications *
PRISM: ca. 91% or more than 227 million communications
The ruling doesn’t explain what exactly a “internet communication” is. A problem that troubled both NSA and the FISA court was that under Upstream it’s technically very difficult to distinguish between single communications to, from or about targeted persons and those containing multiple communications, not all of which may be to, from or about approved targeted addresses. The latter may contain to up to 10,000 domestic communications each year.*


11. This slide was one of three published on the website of the French paper Le Monde on October 22, 2013. It compares the main features of the PRISM program and the Upstream collection.

Direct Access?

The last line says that for PRISM there is no “Direct Relationship with Comms Providers”. Data are collected through the FBI. This clearly contradicts the initial story by The Guardian and The Washington Post, which claimed that NSA had “direct access” to the servers of the internet companies. This led to spectacular headlines, but also a lot of confusion, as it allowed the companies involved to strongly deny any direct relationship with the NSA - because it’s actually the FBI that is picking up their data.

Had this slide been published right in the beginning, then more adequate questions could have been asked and probably we could have got answers that made more sense.

A direct relationship does exist however with the companies which are involved in the Upstream collection, like AT&T and Verizon, who most likely have high volume filtering devices like the Narus STA 6400 installed at their switching stations. Unlike intercept facilities outside the US, where the XKeyscore system can store and search 3 days of content, the sites inside the US only seem to filter data as they flow past, and hence there’s no access to Stored Communications.

About Collection

The slide also shows that the so-called “Abouts” collection is only conducted under the Upstream method. As we learned from a hearing of the Presidential Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB ), this About Collection is not for gathering communications to or from a certain target, but about a specific selector, like for example an e-mail message in which an e-mail address or a phone number of a known suspect is mentioned. This About Collection is not looking for names or keywords, is only used for internet communications and was authorized by the FISA Court.

Because under Upstream NSA is allowed to do About Collection which pulls in a broader range of communications, the retention period (the time the data are stored) is only two years. Data collected under PRISM, which are restricted to communications to and from specific addresses, are stored for the standard period of five years. Both under PRISM and Upstream there’s no collection based upon keywords.


12. The slide was seen in a television report and shows a world map with the undersee fiber optic cables according to the volumes of data they transmit. This map is used as background of a number of other slides about FAA 702 Operations. In seems that additional information, like in the next slide, appears by mouse clicking the original powerpoint presentation.


13. The slide shows the same world map with fiber-optic cables and is hardly readable, but according to Wikipedia, the subheader reads “Collection only possible under FAA702 Authority” and in the central cyan colored box the codenames FAIRVIEW and STORMBREW are shown subsequently. Maybe other codenames are in the yellow box at the right side. It’s not clear what the irregular blue shapes in the Indian Ocean are. The figure which is right of New Zealand is a stereotype depiction of a terrorist with a turban.


14. This partial slide was seen on the laptop of Glenn Greenwald in a report by Brazilian television and shows two scenarios for collection data under FAA 702 authority. It has two boxes with text, the one on the right reads:
UPSTREAM
Scenario #2
OPI tasks badguy@yahoo.com under FAA702 and 12333 authority in UTT
Badguy sends e-mail from [outside?] U.S. and comms flow inside U.S.
FAIRVIEW sees selector but can’t tell if destination end is U.S. or foreign
RESULT
Collection allowed
Only the target end needs to be foreign
OPI stands for Office of Primary Interest and UTT for Unified Targeting Tool, the NSA application used for instructing the actual collection facilities.


15. This slide was one of three published on the website of the French paper Le Monde on October 22, 2013.

It shows a list of 35 IP addresses and domain names which are the “Higher Volume Domains Collected from FAA Passive”. This indicates that data from these domains are collected from fiber optic cables and other internet infrastructures, which is called Passive or Upstream collection.

All IP addresses and domain names are blacked out, except for two French domains: wanadoo.fr (a major French internet service provider) and alcatel-lucent.com (a major French-American telecommunications company). The rest of the list will most likely contain many similar domain names, which shows that redactions of the Snowden-documents are not only made to protect legitimate security interests, but also when the papers, in this case Le Monde, want to keep these revelations strictly focussed to their own audience.



Reporting based on PRISM

The following slides show some of the results from the PRISM program:

16. This slide was one of three published on the website of the French paper Le Monde on October 22, 2013.

It shows a highlight of reporting under the section 702 FAA authority, which in this case includes both PRISM and the STORMBREW program of the Upstream collection capability. Information derived from both sources made the NSA/CSS Threat Operations Center (NTOC) figure out that someone had gotten access to the network of a cleared defense contractor (CDC) and was either preparing to, or at least had the ability to get 150 gigabytes of important data out. NTOC then alerted the FBI, which alerted the contractor and they plugged the hole the same day, apparently December 14, 2012.

Another cyber attack that was detected by PRISM occured in 2011 and was directed against the Pentagon and major defense contractors. According to the book ‘Der NSA Komplex’ this attack was codenamed LEGION YANKEE, which indicates that it was most likely conducted by Chinese hackers.*


17. This slide of the PRISM presentation appeared on the website of O Globo and is titled “A Week in the Life of PRISM Reporting” and shows some samples of reporting topics from early February 2013.

It seems the bottom part of this slide was blacked (or actually whited) out by Brazilian media, as the Indian paper The Hindu disclosed that this slide also mentions “politics, space, nuclear” as topics under “India”, and also information from Asian and African countries, contributing to a total of “589 End product Reports”.

These lists show that collection under the PRISM program is not restricted to counter-terrorism, but is also not about monitoring ordinary people all over the world, as many people still think. PRISM is used for gathering information about a range of targets derived from the topics in the NSA’s Strategic Mission List (pdf). The 2007 edition of this list was also among the Snowden-documents and subsequently published, but got hardly any attention.

According to former NSA deputy director Chris Inglis some 41 terrorist plots were foiled by information collected under section 702 FAA, most of them by PRISM. This is not a very large number, but as we’ve seen, PRISM is also used for creating intelligence reports about many other topics.

In 2012, these were cited as a source in 1477 items of the President’s Daily Brief, making PRISM one of the main contributors to this Top Secret intelligence briefing which is provided to the president each morning.



Links and Sources
- MatthewAid.com: New NSA Report on Its Electronic Eavesdropping Programs
- EmptyWheel.net: Back Door Searches: One of Two Replacements for the Internet Dragnet?
- DNI.gov: NSA’s Implementation of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Section 702 (pdf)
- TED.com: Edward Snowden: Here’s how we take back the Internet
- C-Span.org: Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board Hearing, Government Officials Panel
- TechDirt.com: Why Does The NSA Focus So Much On ‘TERROR!’ When PRISM’s Success Story Is About Cybersecurity?
- SealedAbstract.com: The part of the FISC NSA decision you missed
- GlobalResearch.com: New Documents Shed Light on NSA’s Dragnet Surveillance