1 March 2014

Let’s Face It—It’s the Cyber Era and We’re Cyber Dumb

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Right now, Chinese criminals and spies are targeting the United States and other countries in the biggest semi-organized campaign of theft and espionage in world history.

And it’s all being done online, through hacks, fraud and other Internet trickery.

But Americans—and especially our leaders—hardly know the first thing about “cyber” threats. And that badly complicates any organized response to Internet attacks.

We’re cyber dumb in an era of cyber danger.

That’s one of the main points that Brookings Institution scholars P.W. Singer and Allan Friedman make in their new book Cybersecurity and Cyberwar. Wonky-sounding though it may be, the book is a brisk and fun read—and terrifying.

“China is at the center of the largest theft in all of human history that is playing out right now,” Singer tells War is Boring, “with the intellectual property targets being vacuumed ranging from jet fighter designs to soft drink company negotiating strategies to academic papers.”

“Is it war in the traditional sense of politically motivated mass violence?” Singer asks rhetorically. “No. But it is something that matters hugely in economic and national security, especially when you think about all that investment, all those potential edges in the boardroom and maybe even future battlefields just lost.”

“Death by a thousand cuts does matter,” Singer stresses.

Some myths about the Indian military-industrial complex

There are too many uninformed fallacies about our defence production programmes

As a student of military and security affairs, I find both analysts and the media having many misconceptions about our military industrial complex. This article deals with some major ones to promote a correct understanding of the matter.

First, our defence hardware imports are around 60 per cent, and not 70 per cent. Second, delays and cost over-runs in our defence production programmes also occur in all North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) countries; the reasons are many and complex. These have been documented in numerous reports of the General Accounting Office of the US Congress. The UK Comptroller and Auditor General has done likewise.

A specific major example is the M-88 aero-engine for the latest French fighter-bomber Rafale. France's sole and public sector aero-engine manufacturer, Snecma, which has been making military aero-engines for 30 years, took 11 years to design and develop that engine against its commitment of seven years to the French ministry of defence. There was also a 320 per cent cost over-run. As a result, there was also a massive delay in Rafale's first test flight from 1982 to 1987.

Another misconception is that the design and development (D&D) of the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) took three decades. In fact, it took only two, despite encompassing laboratory R&D, production of two technology demonstrators and two prototypes plus 2,500 hours of test flying. The Tejas series production plan would be: six LCAs in 2014-15, eight in 2015-16 and 10 in 2016-17, all for induction in operational Indian Air Force (IAF) squadrons against an IAF order of 40 aircraft by 2020 - which will be met.

As for the IAF mainstay, the 4.5 generation Sukhoi-30MkI, it is misconceived that the plane continues to be assembled and not manufactured in depth by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL). Actually, the 30MkI (where the I stands for India), is radically different from the Su-30 Russia makes for its own air force. Their plane is a pure air-defence fighter; ours is a multi-role aircraft, i.e. it also includes air-to-ground attack capabilities. Moreover, the MkI was a joint D&D project with large technical and operational inputs from IAF engineers and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) scientists working with Russian engineers. So, the 30MkI is the creation of joint Indo-Russian knowledge, ingenuity and skill to meet the IAF's operational needs.

HAL started its phased manufacturing programme for the 30MkI in 2004-05. Over 2004-05 to 2012-13, HAL manufactured 174 aircraft. By 2012-13, the air frame was 100 per cent indigenous while the more complex engine was 70 per cent indigenous. This included some 1,500 highly sophisticated and complex castings and forgings - to the great surprise of Russian engineers. Today, the aircraft's overall indigenous content is around 75 per cent. A detailed plan is underway to take that to 85 per cent in 2015-16.

'Navy chief's resignation will dent morale of young officers'

February 28, 2014

'If the navy was part of the ministry of defence then, of course, the defence minister would have been jointly responsible for everything that happened. But that is not so.'

'The defence minister can shrug his shoulders and say, "Look I don't know what is going on in the navy, so let the chief handle it".'

'The politician is free to do what he feels. If his conscience hurts him, he is welcome to quit,' former naval chief Admiral Arun Prakash tells Rediff.com's Vaihayasi Pande Daniel.

In the early hours of Wednesday, February 26, the Indian Navy's Russian-built, kilo-class submarine, the INS Sindhuratna, caught fire in the high seas off Mumbai harbour.

Seven sailors were evacuated to hospital by helicopter. Two other naval officers were killed.

The bodies of Lieutenant Commander Kapish Muwal and Lieutenant Manoranjan Kumar were discovered in a compartment of the vessel when the submarine returned to the harbour.

The disaster comes six months after the massive explosion on the INS Sindhurakshak, another Russian-built and newly-overhauled submarine in Mumbai harbour that led to the death of all its 18 members on aboard that August night. In between there have been other mishaps in the navy, but fortunately there was no loss of lives.

Naval Chief Admiral Devendra Kumar Joshi accepted moral responsibility for the latest accident and resigned February 26.

Former naval chief Admiral Arun Prakash, left, sheds light on why the Indian Navy is facing trouble with its submarines in this interview to Rediff.com's Vaihayasi Pande Daniel.

What do you feel about the latest statement by Defence Minister A K Antony expressing confidence that the navy was correcting any deficiencies it was facing? Should not someone in the political leadership have taken responsibility for this recent accident and resigned instead of the naval chief? Why did Admiral D K Joshi have to resign?

Al Qaeda Preparing for U.S. to Withdraw From Afghanistan

Officials: Al-Qaida plots comeback in Afghanistan

Associated Press, February 28, 2014

WASHINGTON (AP) — Al-Qaida’s Afghanistan leader is laying the groundwork to relaunch his war-shattered organization once the United States and international forces withdraw from the country, as they have warned they will do without a security agreement from the Afghan government, U.S. officials say.

Farouq al-Qahtani al-Qatari has been cementing local ties and bringing in small numbers of experienced militants to train a new generation of fighters, and U.S. military and intelligence officials say they have stepped up drone and jet missile strikes against him and his followers in the mountainous eastern provinces of Kunar and Nuristan. The objective is to keep him from restarting the large training camps that once drew hundreds of followers before the U.S.-led war began.

The officials say the counterterrorism campaign - a key reason the Obama administration agreed to keep any troops in Afghanistan after 2014 - could be jeopardized by the possibility of a total pullout.

House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rogers, R-Mich., said the number of al-Qaida members in Afghanistan has risen but not much higher than as many as the several hundred or so the U.S. has identified in the past.

"I think most are waiting for the U.S. to fully pull out by 2014," he said.

The administration would like to leave up to 10,000 troops in Afghanistan after combat operations end on Dec. 31, to continue training Afghan forces and conduct counterterrorism missions. But without the agreement that would authorize international forces to stay in Afghanistan, President Barack Obama has threatened to pull all troops out, and NATO forces would follow suit. After talking to Afghan President Hamid Karzai this week, Obama ordered the Pentagon to begin planning for the so-called zero option.

The Pakistan-China Corridor

A new project will give Pakistan the tools of globalization. Will it use them? 

By Christopher Ernest Barber
February 27, 2014

Historian Daniel Headrick made the crucial connection between means and ends in the projection of global influence. For instance, Headrick argued that the Suez Canal, which opened in 1869, acted a tool of empire for the great powers of the nineteenth century. The building of a canal through the Sinai Peninsula not only made trade and empire in Asia faster by avoiding the Cape of Good Hope, but more economical too. This was particularly the case for the world’s superpower, Great Britain. For Britain, the Suez was an important strategic consideration in its imperial outlook, making the transport of goods, officials and soldiers to Bombay and other key colonial hubs easier and affordable. At the same time, the canal aided the wider globalization process of the nineteenth century, which opened Asia up to the advent of Western adventure capitalists with exploitation and domination never far from the surface. The Suez Canal acted as a “tool of empire,” as Headrick put it, and in a small but important way, the world became that much more global—all to the benefit of those Western nations that could harness of the power of the sea. 

Headrick’s argument turns on a profound if easily overlooked point: those with easy access to the sea-lanes of the world invariably have the tools for global power and trade. Even today, the laws of economic scale dictate that air and rail, while important in their own right, will always be poor cousins to the efficiency and capacity of container ships and waterborne trade. 

Despite the fact that the free trade zone port of Gwadar in Pakistan’s southwestern province of Balochistan has been an unprofitable enterprise with operational control now in Chinese hands, its potential remains. If anything, the development of the deep ocean port and an associated international airport, as well as the creation of a transport corridor connecting Gwadar to China’s easternmost province of Xinjiang, is a game changer for the Central Asian region. In Beijing this February, President Mamnoon Hussain and Chinese President Xi Jinping signed a series of agreements designed to breathe life to the corridor project. In the coming years, the once sleepy fishing enclave of Gwadar will become a staging ground for the geopolitical reorganization of the region. 

China Says Decision On New Air Defense Zone Depends On Threat

February 27, 2014

BEIJING Feb 27 (Reuters) – China said on Thursday any decision to set up new air defense identification zones would depend on the level of threat it faced in the air, following speculation it wants one for the disputed South China Sea. 

China alarmed Japan, South Korea and the United States last year when it announced an air defense identification zone for the East China Sea, covering a group of uninhabited islands at the center of a bitter ownership spat between China and Japan. 

Concern has grown since in Washington and Asian capitals that Beijing plans one for the South China Sea, where China is engaged in territorial disputes with Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei. 

Asked if China did plan such a zone for the South China Sea, Defense Ministry spokesman Yang Yujun told a monthly news conference that China, as a sovereign nation, had every right to set them up. 

“But whether or not to set up an air defense identification zone depends on the level of threat faced to security in the air, and all sorts of factors have to be considered,” Yang said, in comments on the ministry’s website. 

“What needs stressing is that China has confidence that the general situation in the South China Sea and China’s relations with countries surrounding it are stable.” 

China, which is swiftly ramping up military spending, has regularly dispatched patrols to the East China Sea since it established the defense zone. 

The United States, Europe and Japan have criticized China’s air defense zone, saying its establishment last November was provocative and exacerbates tensions between Beijing and Tokyo. 

Yang blamed “right-wing Japanese forces” for cooking up stories that China had such plans for the South China Sea. 

“Their aim is to distract international attention, and they have hidden intentions,” he added. 

Deteriorating Sino-Japan relations have been fuelled by the row over the chain of uninhabited islands in the East China Sea. Ships from both countries frequently shadow each other around the islets, raising fears of a clash. 

Rising Tensions in the Pacific

By David Ignatius
February 27, 2014
SHANGHAI -- A Chinese military expert is explaining to a conference here what he sees as the benign inevitability of Beijing's rising power in the Pacific. "You should trust China," he says cheerily. "In 10 years, we will be much stronger, and you will feel safer." 

This Chinese prediction did not appear to reassure most of the several dozen European and American experts gathered for discussions last weekend. Instead, there was a consensus, even among most of the Chinese participants, that Beijing's growing military power has worried its neighbors and led to friction with Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam over disputed islands and maritime rights.

"You think we are a bully," conceded the Chinese military expert. "We think we are a victim." But nobody in the room disagreed about the reality that tensions in the Pacific are rising -- and that China and its neighbors cannot seem to find a way out. Which leaves the United States awkwardly in between, trying to support traditional allies such as Japan, without encouraging them to take reckless moves. 

It is a sign of the times that delegates here talked openly about the danger of war in the Pacific. That's a big change from the tone of similar gatherings just a few years ago, when Chinese officials often tried to reassure foreign experts that a rising China wasn't on a collision course with the U.S. or regional powers. Now, in the East and South China seas, the collision seems all too possible. 

Just two weeks ago, U.S. Navy Captain James Fanell warned at a conference in San Diego that China had been training for a "short, sharp war" to assert primacy over islands claimed by Japan as the Senkaku and by China as the Diaoyu. 

"I do not know how Chinese intentions could be more transparent," he said, noting that Beijing's talk of "protection of maritime rights" was actually "a Chinese euphemism for the coerced seizure of coastal rights of China's neighbors."
This is the Asian real-world backdrop for U.S. debates over military spending. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said in Washington Monday that the Pentagon "will continue to shift its operational focus and forces to the Asia-Pacific." But will allies such as Japan and the Philippines be bolstered by such talk at a time when the U.S. is sharply cutting troops and warplanes -- and will potential adversaries such as China be deterred? 

The changing political-military map in Asia formed the context for last weekend's meeting of the Stockholm China Forum, an annual event sponsored by the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies and the German Marshall Fund of the United States (of which I'm a trustee). The not-for-attribution discussions were surprisingly frank, on all sides. But they dispelled, at least for me, the hope that China will continue deferring to a powerful U.S. Instead, we're clearly entering a period of greater Chinese assertiveness, especially in maritime issues. 

China Watching India-Japan Relations

Paper No. 5655 Dated 27-Feb-2014 
By Bhaskar Roy 

China has been cautiously, and with uncharacteristic restraint, watching the new flourish in India-Japan relations. 

Beijing kept its counsel to itself with the state visit of the Emperor and Empress of Japan in early December 2014, followed by the visit of Prime Minster Shinzo Abe in January 24 which was a combination of guest of honour for India’s Republic Day celebration (January 26) on official visit. This was preceded by the visit of Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera earlier last year. 

Apart from the trade and economic agreement signed and initiated during Abe’s visit, China would be assessing Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Japan in May last year when an encampment of Chinese troops in the Indian side of the western border in Depsang had raised hackles in India. Dr. Singh had extended his visit by a day in Tokyo to meet Japanese business leaders. 

Equally important for Chinese strategists is the fact that when Dr. Singh visited Japan in 2007, Shinzo Abe was the prime minister, and the two prime ministers agreed on the Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership. 

Personalities matter, and China sees Shinzo Abe as a right wing hardliner pushing to lower the bar of Japan’s post war peaceful constitution and break the restrictive “self defence” military clause. 

After a pause for thought, the official Global Times (Feb. 19) a subsidiary of the party mouthpiece the People’s Daily, published the opinion of a leading expert on South and Central Asia titled “India uncertain as Abe looks for anti-China alliance”. The expert, Wang Dehua, head of the institute of Southern and Central Asian Studies at the Shanghai Municipal center for International Studies recalled Abe’s suggestion to establish a “democratic security diamond” consisting of Australia, India, Japan and the US state of Hawaii, which the Chinese saw as an architecture to encircle China. 

Wang Dehua concluded that in the event of a military clash between China and Japan, which also he said was very unlikely, India will not back Japan. 

In the last several years when China began to demonstrate its assertiveness with military backing on disputed maritime territorial issues, it began to perceive an encirclement threat led by the US and supported by Japan, India and, perhaps, Australia. In its propaganda barrage aimed at India, Chinese official media also mentioned repeatedly that India always followed an independent foreign policy and was not likely to join an alliance against China. 

The Chinese have their own peculiar logic to argue their case. The Global Times article mentioned that the 1962 war remained a big obstacle to India and China coming closer; in 2013 India accused China of stirring trouble along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) by deploying PLA border guards in disputed territory, while China urged India not to aggravate problems on this border; but an upset India launched the Agni-V missile that is said to be aimed at China. It then went on to write positively about the developments in the India-China border issue. 

Three Hidden Time Bombs in the US-Japan Alliance

The US and Japan need to align their policies on China strategy, deterrence and offensive military capabilities. 

By Patrick M. Cronin
February 28, 2014

The new defense plans emerging from Tokyo and Washington, D.C. offer a high degree of convergence. In Japan’s December 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and the United States’ forthcoming 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), both allies seek to address the short- and long-term challenge of a reemerging China, while placing military forces within a comprehensive framework. However, there remain at least three hard questions to be answered regarding future alliance cohesion: viz., how to forge a common China strategy, how to sustain extended deterrence, and how to integrate Japan’s increasingly independent capabilities, including offensive strike weapons. Absent candid and persistent reflection on these issues, what now appear to be acceptable gaps could develop over time into deep fissures. 

Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) 

Japan’s latest NDPG is the fifth such document to be published in the postwar period. The 1976 National Defense Program Outline (as it was called then) emerged in the midst of U.S.-Soviet détente and burgeoning strategic arms control agreements. A second was released in 1995 to update and rejuvenate the alliance after the end of the Cold War. A third was written in 2004 in the aftermath of the threat of global terrorism and growing nuclear and missile threats. A fourth, issued at the end of 2010 by the previous Democratic Party of Japan government, emphasized the rapid shift in the global balance. The latest document, perfectly synchronized with the release of Japan’s first National Security Strategy and a five-year Mid-Term Defense Plan, emphasizes the deteriorating security environment in East Asia: North Korea is unstable and better armed; mitigating the effects of major disasters requires better preparedness and civil-military crisis management; and China’s coercive diplomacy and military modernization are causing alarm. 

Chief among Japan’s concerns is China’s growing maritime assertiveness. One aspect of the assertiveness is China’s resort to tailored coercion in “gray zone” areas of the East and South China Seas. Another aspect is China’s acquisition of anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities (a concept alluded to for the first time in an NDPG). The near-term challenge is mostly a probing and nibbling strategy to test reactions to China’s unilateral alteration of the status quo; but in so doing, China has effectively stiff-armed repeated high-level Japanese requests to develop a crisis prevention and response mechanism between Japan’s Ministry of Defense and China’s Ministry of National Defense. The long-term challenge is China’s apparent intention to exercise sea control over its “near seas,” and sea denial out to at least the first island chain of countries ringing these bodies of water. 

The Asian Status Quo

Global Affairs WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2014


By Robert D. Kaplan and Matt Gertken

Arguably the greatest book on political realism in the 20th century was University of Chicago Professor Hans J. Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, published in 1948. In that seminal work, Morgenthau defines the status quo as "the maintenance of the distribution of power that exists at a particular moment in history." In other words, things shall stay as they are. But it is not quite that clear. For as Morgenthau also explains, "the concept of the 'status quo' derives from status quo ante bellum," which, in turn, implies a return to the distribution of power before a war. The war's aggressor shall give up his conquered territory, and everything will return to how it was.

The status quo also connotes the victors' peace: a peace that may be unfair, or even oppressive, but at the same time stands for stability. For a change in the distribution of power, while at times just in a moral sense, simply introduces a measure of instability into the geopolitical equation. And because stability has a moral value all its own, the status quo is sanctified in the international system.

Let us apply this to Asia.

Because Japan was the aggressor in World War II and was vanquished by the U.S. military, it lay prostrate after the war, so that the Pacific Basin became a virtual American naval lake. That was the status quo as it came to be seen. This situation was buttressed by the decades-long reclusiveness of the Pacific's largest and most populous nation: China. Japanese occupation and civil war left China devastated. The rise to power of Mao Zedong's communists in 1949 would keep the country preoccupied with itself for decades as it fell prey to destructive development and political schemes such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. China was not weak, as the United States would discover in the Korean and Vietnamese wars and later turn to its advantage against the Soviets. But its revolution remained unfinished. The economy did not truly start to develop until the late 1970s, after Mao died. And only in the mid-1990s did China begin its naval expansion in a demonstrable and undeniable way. Thus the United States, in its struggle with the Soviets, got used to a reclusive China and a subordinate Japan. With these two certainties underlying the Cold War's various animosities, the United States preserved calm in its lake.

But the 21st century has not been kind to this status quo, however convenient it may have been for American interests. China's naval, air, cyber and ballistic missile buildup over the past two decades has not yet challenged U.S. military supremacy in the region, but it has encroached significantly on the previously unipolar environment. Moreover, to measure China's progress against U.S. supremacy is to neglect the primary regional balance of power between China and Japan. Tokyo, over the same time period, has come to see China as reaching a sort of critical mass and has accelerated its own military preparations, both in a quantitative and a qualitative sense. Recently, Tokyo has taken to trumpeting its abandonment of quasi-pacifism in order to adjust the world's expectations to what it sees as a new reality. Japan was already a major naval power -- it ranks fourth in total naval tonnage, has more destroyers than any navy besides that of the United States, and its technology and traditions give it a special edge. But now it is moving faster to loosen restrictions on its rules of engagement and to upgrade the capabilities it needs to defend its most distant island holdings.

The Asian Status Quo By Robert Kaplan And Matt Gertken

February 27, 2014 


The United States must try both to accommodate rising Chinese power and to fortify U.S. allies in response to it. But it acts from a position of military security that Japan — not to mention China’s smaller neighbors — cannot assume. Regardless of whether Japan overcorrects, the status quo in the Pacific is changing. And the stability of the region can no longer be taken for granted. 

The Asian Status Quo 

Global Affairs
FEBRUARY 26, 2014

Global Affairs with Robert D. Kaplan 


By Robert D. Kaplan and Matt Gertken 

Arguably the greatest book on political realism in the 20th century was University of Chicago Professor Hans J. Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, published in 1948. In that seminal work, Morgenthau defines the status quo as “the maintenance of the distribution of power that exists at a particular moment in history.” In other words, things shall stay as they are. But it is not quite that clear. For as Morgenthau also explains, “the concept of the ‘status quo’ derives from status quo ante bellum,” which, in turn, implies a return to the distribution of power before a war. The war’s aggressor shall give up his conquered territory, and everything will return to how it was. 

The status quo also connotes the victors’ peace: a peace that may be unfair, or even oppressive, but at the same time stands for stability. For a change in the distribution of power, while at times just in a moral sense, simply introduces a measure of instability into the geopolitical equation. And because stability has a moral value all its own, the status quo is sanctified in the international system. 

Let us apply this to Asia. 

America Turns East, China Turns West

February 28, 2014 

“Bugging out” is exactly what our friends and foes alike in the greater Middle East think the United States is doing after more than a decade of war in the region. And perceptions are just as important as realities in international politics. Players in the region saw that the United States withdrew its forces from Iraq in 2011 only to have the country return to the grips of sectarian violence. Many anticipate that the United States is soon to do the same by leaving few, if any, forces in Afghanistan to significantly increase the prospects for an upswing in Taliban violence. 

To jaded observers, President Obama is bugging out of the Middle East under the guise of a strategic “pivot” to Asia. Former secretary of state Hillary Clinton publicly launched the administration’s pivot in the pages of Foreign Policy in October 2011. Although administration officials subsequently have tried to talk about “rebalancing” rather than pivoting, the later term still lingers. The president’s national-security adviser, Susan Rice, in a November 2013 speech at Georgetown University, claimed that “…rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific remains a cornerstone of the Obama administration’s foreign policy.” This so-called “cornerstone” of President Obama’s foreign policy looms large in the future of American grand strategy and warrants critical appraisal. 

Obama Packing Up American Security Bags in the Greater Middle East 

Arab states once bubbling with expectation that President Obama, after his 2009 Cairo speech, would arm twist the Israelis into a peace agreement with the Palestinians, have had their hopes deflated. They see Secretary of State John Kerry’s recent diplomatic efforts as a solo show, not energetically backed by his boss. The Arab states, moreover, have had their attentions diverted from the Palestinian issue by the painful aftermath of the so-called Arab Spring. The Arab Gulf states, in particular, are furious that the United States abandoned a long-term security partner in Egypt for the sake of a democracy-promotion agenda. 

Both Arab Gulf state and Israeli confidence in American power in the Middle East was shattered by President Obama’s lack of leadership and engagement as Syria has been destroyed by civil war. Obama seemingly has been unmoved—strategically or emotionally—by the civil war that has destroyed Syria, killed more than one hundred thousand people, and made millions more refugees in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. Washington has dithered for three years and not nurtured a militarily-capable and politically moderate opposition to Assad’s brutal regime. The Arab Gulf states, absent American policy assertiveness, have backed the Sunnis jihadists to wage sectarian war against the Iranian and Hezbollah-backed Damascus regime. 

Both Arab Gulf states and Israel were alarmed that Syria crossed President Obama’s “red line” and used chemical weapons only to have President Obama renege on his public threat to use American force against Damascus. Instead, the international process to rid Syria of chemical weapons has served only to politically legitimize the Syrian regime, delegitimize insurgents, and take any military options against Syria “off the table.” 

Choose Geopolitics Over Nonproliferation

February 28, 2014

Editor’s Note: Please take a look at Elbridge Colby’s recent debate with T. X. Hammes: AirSea Battle vs. Offshore Control

In a thoughtful and provocative January essay, David Santoro argues that America’s East Asian allies are likely to face increasing incentives to throw off their nonproliferation straitjacket and seek to obtain nuclear weapons if North Korean belligerence worsens and China’s ambitious assertiveness waxes. Santoro contends that, if Tokyo or Seoul elects to pursue nuclear weapons of their own, Washington will be faced with a stark choice. On the one hand, the United States could swallow the bitter pill of indigenous allied nuclear weapons capabilities, the development of which Washington has opposed, for the sake of what he terms “geopolitical” considerations. Or, on the other hand, Washington could hold true to the nonproliferation gospel that any further proliferation is too perilous to regional stability and menacing to the nonproliferation order, and so take the road of “terminating its alliances.” Santoro admirably doesn’t beat around the bush and forthrightly argues that, in the event U.S. allies like Japan and/or South Korea make for a nuclear weapons capability, Washington should “cut them adrift” and end its alliances with them. In his words, nonproliferation should trump geopolitics. 

Santoro is to be commended for making his case clearly and for highlighting the increasingly pressing question of how to address U.S. allies’ disquiet about the reliability and credibility of our extended deterrent. But he is wrong to argue that we should, in all or even most of the variants of the scenario he posits, terminate our alliances with Japan or South Korea if they pursue nuclear weapons. 

More broadly, he is wrong to contend that nonproliferation should trump geopolitics. Santoro is wrong because there are numerous plausible scenarios in which it would be ill-advised and perhaps even foolhardy for the United States to abandon its long-established and valuable alliances with two of the world’s largest powers for the sake of a principle that, while certainly valid and thus worth pursuing, should not be held as the highest good of U.S. foreign policy. In other words, geopolitics should trump nonproliferation. 

Why? Because the specific characteristics of American foreign policy, including its alliance relationships and its nonproliferation policies, should not be fixed but, like Aristotelian morality, should be determined by reference to a more fundamental focus—in the case of U.S. foreign policy, on the broad-minded defense of Americans’ lives, liberties and prosperity, and on the enlightened advancement of their interests in the international arena. And, because the world is ever-changing—with new powers rising and old powers falling, new threats emerging and old ones falling away, and new opportunities opening and old ones closing—the specific characteristics of the fulfillment of this broad mandate is inherently subject to change. Thus American foreign policy should be—or, more accurately, must be—guided by elastic political judgment rather than marble dictates, steered by continual recalculation of how to pursue these core national aims in light of a changing international landscape the dimensions of which impose the necessity of choices among goods. 

Fracking Won't Bring Energy Independence

February 25, 2014 

THE WORLD has been caught by surprise by the United States’ shale-oil boom. Analysts and experts are still clashing about both its true extent and the possibility of extending a shale revolution beyond North America. In just a few years shale oil could make the United States the world’s top oil producer. But a shale revolution is unlikely in the rest of the world, due to some unique factors that characterize the U.S. oil and gas patch. The single-minded focus on the future of shale oil, however, risks obscuring another evolving dimension of the global oil picture that defies the past pessimism spread by peak-oil theorists who claimed that shortages loomed: beyond the United States, the world’s oil-production capacity is also growing much faster than demand. 

So far, this imbalance has been offset by two things: continuous outages of existing oil supply affecting several Arab and African countries, and the recurring fears of escalating crises in the Middle East. But supply capacity is bound to grow in the future as well, so that unless demand rebounds strongly in the next few years, a significant downturn of oil prices may well occur. The connections among a number of factors—the U.S. shale boom, the global rise of oil supply, and the inner volatility of oil prices due to temporary outages and political crises—provide a somewhat contradictory picture of the global oil market. These contradictions may, in turn, trigger unexpected changes in the direction of the oil market. All of these changes may have deep and sometimes paradoxical consequences for U.S. energy security. 

THERE ARE several issues in the current debate over the boom in so-called U.S. tight and shale oil (hereafter referred to as shale oil) that serve to reinforce extreme and seemingly irreconcilable attitudes. One of the central questions revolves around the real potential of this boom and can be formulated simply as follows: Is oil production from shale formations just a temporary bubble, or is it capable of significantly altering the U.S.—and possibly global—energy outlook? To answer this question, I studied more than four thousand shale wells, along with the activities of about one hundred oil companies involved in shale-oil exploitation. The main results of this analysis are multifaceted. On the one hand, the large resource size and the ability of the industry to develop it through steady improvements in technology and cost suggest that the United States may become the largest global oil producer in just a few years, and maintain a high output for many years to come. The U.S. shale-oil boom is thus not a temporary bubble but a long-term, transformational phenomenon. 

GCHQ OPTIC NERVE Program Copied Millions of YAHOO Webcam Chats

Yahoo webcam images from millions of users intercepted by GCHQ

Spencer Ackerman and James Ball

The Guardian, February 27, 2014

Britain’s surveillance agency GCHQ, with aid from the US National Security Agency, intercepted and stored the webcam images of millions of internet users not suspected of wrongdoing, secret documents reveal.

GCHQ files dating between 2008 and 2010 explicitly state that a surveillance program codenamed Optic Nerve collected still images of Yahoo webcam chats in bulk and saved them to agency databases, regardless of whether individual users were an intelligence target or not.

In one six-month period in 2008 alone, the agency collected webcam imagery – including substantial quantities of sexually explicit communications – from more than 1.8 million Yahoo user accounts globally.

Yahoo reacted furiously to the webcam interception when approached by the Guardian. The company denied any prior knowledge of the program, accusing the agencies of “a whole new level of violation of our users’ privacy”.

GCHQ does not have the technical means to make sure no images of UK or US citizens are collected and stored by the system, and there are no restrictions under UK law to prevent Americans’ images being accessed by British analysts without an individual warrant.

The documents also chronicle GCHQ's sustained struggle to keep the large store of sexually explicit imagery collected by Optic Nerve away from the eyes of its staff, though there is little discussion about the privacy implications of storing this material in the first place.

Former Employee Describes What It Is Like Inside Britain’s GCHQ SIGINT Agency

GCHQ Revealed: Inside Her Majesty’s Listening Service

Christoph Scheuermann

Der Spiegel

February 27, 2014

On a Monday in January of 2003, Katharine Gun received an email that worried her. Gun, a 28-year-old linguist and analyst with the British intelligence service, was a calm, thoughtful woman. The message, which was classified “top secret” and came from a department head of an American intelligence service, informed aBritish counterparts that, “as you all probably know by now,” a joint eavesdropping operation was being planned against United Nations delegations. Gun couldn’t believe her eyes.At the time, the UN was in the midst of a debate about a possible invasion of Iraq. The fateful appearance of the US Secretary of State Colin Powell before the UN Security Council, in which Powell would attempt to secure allies for an attack on Baghdad, was to take place in five days. Gun, like many of her fellow Britons, was opposed to a war and considered what she should do about the email. By targeting UN diplomats with their espionage, weren’t the United States and Great Britain trying to forcibly bring about a war? Were they trying to determine diplomats’ feeling about a conflict? Was it legal?

After hesitating for two days, Gun forwarded the email to an acquaintance with contacts in the media. Four weeks later, the email was printed on the cover page of the Observer.

Gun may not have been able to prevent the war, but, in the ensuing scandal, she was able to, for a brief moment, shine on a spotlight on one of the United Kingdom’s most secretive agency: GCHQ, or Government Communications Headquarters.

A Ballooning, Secretive Agency

GCHQ’s spies, who see themselves as the country’s eyes and ears, don’t like being the center of attention. It was only through the actions of American whistleblower Edward Snowden that the worldlearned about many of their operations. The documents Snowden leaked, from the innermost circles of the USNational Security Agency (NSA), revealed that the British agency has begun monitoring increasingly large portions of global data traffic in recent years — infiltrating computer networks around the world, launching attacks and extracting information from mobile telephones.

In 2008, GCHQ agents began testing the “Tempora” program, which they hoped would allow them to tap into global data links, especially fiber optic cables. In the four years that followed, the agency’s access to data grew by 7,000 percent, according to a PowerPoint presentation described in the British newspaper The Guardian. Today the agency — which cites “mastering the Internet” as one of its objectives and boasts about extracting more data from the web than the NSA — employs 6,100 women and men, almost as many as MI5 and MI6, Britain’s domestic and foreign intelligence agencies, combined.

NSA Review Group Member Richard Clarke Speaks About NSA and U.S. Intelligence Community

February 27, 2014

Richard Clarke at RSA Conference: 10 Observations on US Intelligence Gathering

Sean Deuby, Windows IT Pro

February 26, 2014

I’m in San Francisco this week to attend the RSA security conference, and to cover the Cloud Security Alliance summit for security professionals. The CSA is a terrific organization, a non-profit founded with the purpose of promoting best security practices for cloud computing. I’ve watched this summit grow over the years commensurate with the increase in visibility of cloud security concerns, and once again attendees filled up the largest venue yet.

The opening keynote speaker was Richard A. Clarke, chairman and CEO of Good Harbor and former advisor to several presidents on counter-terrorism subjects. His keynote was based on his tenure last fall on the highly select Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technology requested by President Obama in the wake of the Snowden revelations. (There were only five men in this group.) Given carte blanche intelligence clearance to every program, this group issued a300-page unclassified report*, with 46 recommendations on intelligence collection, specifically how the United States should improve privacy and civil liberties while continuing to protect national security. Clarke’s short but very interesting keynote focused on his takeaways and his top 10 observations in the 46 recommendations.

His big-picture takeaway was that “In terms of collecting intelligence, (the NSA and other intelligence agencies) are very good – far better than you can imagine. But they have created the potential for a police surveillance state.” As a result, the task of controlling them is more urgent than it ever was. The group found that the intelligence agencies were full of very talented individuals dedicated to the protection of the United States and its allies. What they did not find “was a bunch of people randomly (reading) your emails.” But the potential is there.

Here are 10 key observations from a Washington veteran who had the opportunity to see everything under the intelligence kimono.
There is a complete disconnect between the policy makers who want the information, and the people who are collecting it. “The collectors were doing exactly what they thought they should be doing; if they could collect it, they did collect it within the law (which is pretty broad).” If the policy makers didn’t specify how (and how not) to collect the information they wanted, agencies would use every means at their disposal. The disconnect has now been fixed, but senior policy makers must now spend a great deal of time being very specific about what intelligence they want and need…and what they don’t. The new mantra from the President is, “Just because we can collect it, doesn’t mean we should collect it.”

CyberCom Chief Alexander Lays Down Cyber Red Line; Destroy A Network, Risk War

By Colin Clark on February 27, 2014
CAPITOL HILL: On the day that China’s president took personal charge of his country’s new cyber body, pledging to make the People’s Republic of China a “cyber power,” the outgoing head of America’s Cyber Command laid out a clear red line that, if crossed, could lead to war.

“If it destroys government or other networks, I think it would cross that line,” Army Gen. Keith Alexander, head of both Cyber Command and the National Security Agency, told the Senate Armed Services Committee today when asked what level of cyber “attack” would potentially cause America to go to war.

The question of what might spark a war in the event of cyber intrusions is extremely sensitive. For most of the last 15 years the United States denied it even possessed offensive cyber capabilities to respond to an attack, although we have had them for at least most of the last decade. Drawing red lines is always a highly sensitive exercise for the military. On the one hand, deterrence requires that potential enemies know we will not tolerate certain behaviors and have a reasonably clear idea of what will happen to them should they cross those lines. On the other hand, strategic ambiguity is often extremely useful in that it increases the uncertainties a potential enemy faces and must consider before acting. Alexander’s comment eliminates some of that ambiguity and appears to be a sign of just how important he and other military leaders believe the threat is and how important imparting a clear message is to those we would deter.

The Chinese government, in particular, regularly probes US networks and engages — as do we – in extensive cyber espionage.

In other news from this morning’s hearing, Gen. Alexander reiterated his belief that “we’re getting to that stage” when asked if he thought Cyber Command should be elevated to a full combatant command alongside the nine existing COCOMs. Today, it sits underneath Strategic Command. “I think, from an operational consideration that’s something they will need to consider in the next year or so,” he said. The most important reason for the elevation? “I do get conceded that, in the event of an attack, having a streamlined chain of command is going to be important.”

NSA Director Pleads With Senate To Pass Cyber Security Legislation” Says “We’re Not Ready”

February 27, 2014 

Spy chief: ‘We’re not ready’ 

by Julian Hattem

The head of the NSA on Thursday pleaded with senators to pass cyber security legislation. 

The head of the National Security Agency (NSA) on Thursday pleaded with senators to pass legislation to protect the country from cyber attacks. 

Gen. Keith Alexander, who also serves as the head of the U.S. Cyber Command, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the country needs a “reset” in terms of how it thinks about cyber threats. 

“I think we have to get on with cyber legislation,” he said. 

“Those attacks are coming, and I think those are near-term and we’re not ready for them. The nation needs an agency like NSA with its technical capabilities to help ensure that we can evolve to that future space to where we need to be.” 

Cyberspace, he said, “is changing so rapidly that our policy and laws lag behind it,” which could pose a threat to government and critical networks that are vulnerable to attack. 

“We should protect these networks better than we have protected them today, not just within the Defense Department but within our critical infrastructure.” 

Lawmakers last tried to push a major cyber security bill through the Senate in 2012, but that effort failed. The Cyber security Act would have increased cyber protections for critical infrastructure programs like the country’s electric grid and financial networks. 

Earlier this month, the Commerce Department released a cyber framework to help critical infrastructure businesses defend against threats, but the guidance is voluntary, and some critics have worried that there are not enough incentives for companies to participate. 

“We’ve been kicking around this legislation, cyber security legislation, now for several years,” Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) said. “Everybody knows we need legislation.” 

One of the problems getting a bill through Congress, McCain said, is that the issue cuts across the jurisdiction of multiple congressional committees. He suggested that a select committee could be formed to focus specifically on the issue. 

Sen. Angus King (I-Maine) agreed with that idea as a “procedural way” to hammer out the differences between the Judiciary, Intelligence and Armed Services Committees. 

“If we have an attack in two or three months from now and we haven’t done anything, we’re going to look pretty dumb around here,” King said, since military and intelligence officials have repeatedly warned about the prospect of a massive cyber attack. 

Boeing Reveals New Spy SmartPhone

February 27, 2014  

Anthony Wood has an online article in Gizmag.com with the title above. Mr. Wood notes that Boeing “has stepped outside the field of aeronautics to develop a security-focused SmartPhone — the Boeing Black. Boeing says this new, secure cell phone, “will not be available to the general public and is being designed from the ground up to be the go-to phone mobile device for the Defense, Intelligence and National Security communities. It offers what Boeing describes as “trusted access to data,” allowing said agencies to carry out highly sensitive missions. 

Boeing has repeatedly said “because of the covert nature of the device, the inner workings of the phone will not be made available to the public;” however, as Mr. Wood notes, some basic specifications for this new SmartPhone have been released. 

The Boeing Black, will run on a heavily customized version of the Google Android operating system and will weigh approximately 170g (5.9 oz.) with a 4.3x540x960-inch aHD display. The Bluetooth-enabled SmartPhone has room for two SIM cards, allowing the user to switch between government and commercial networks. 

Mr. Wood says there is no word on how much internal storage the device will carry but it does offer a microSD expansion slot. The handset is powered by a dual 1.2GHz ARM Cortex A9 CPUs, supports LTE connectivity and hosts a 1,590 mAh battery. 

Mr. Wood adds. “whilst these specifications appear underwhelming when compared with flagship handsets such as the newly announced Samsung Galaxy S5, it’s fair to say that Boeing Black isn’t aiming to compete with the cream of the Android crop.” Mr. Wood adds that “Boeing Black was designed with modularity in mind. The back of the phone slides off to allow various modules such as additional sensing equipment, or satellite connectivity, giving the phone a high-level of flexibility for a mobile device.” 

Boeing Black is in effect a sealed unit, utilizing covered screws and epoxy glue to seal the casing. According to papers the company sent to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). “Any attempt to break open the casing of the device would trigger functions that would delete the data and software contained within the device, rendering it inoperable.” 

The company claims these features “means it is impossible to service or swap out components within the phone. I am not an engineer; but, these kind of claims do make me a bit nervous. I suspect that over 90% of the time, such a claim is accurate and that is probably good enough. But to say it is impossible? Perhaps the adversary could make one exactly like it — assuming they could somehow steal or, get their hands on the blueprints — then substitute one of theirs for a certain individual they are targeting and have under surveillance. One would have to assume that the specs on this device will be a high priority collection target by those who wish us harm, as well as others. I don’t want to imply that Boeing isn’t correct here when they say it is impossible to “break into this phone.” I just wary of such a statement. You know there will be those foreign intelligence services that will take that statement as a challenge and try and get their hands on the blueprints and/or a device. Perhaps a way to remotely self-destruct the phone would be a good feature — if possible. 

News Letter Feb 2014


The National Interest

Can the Republican Party reinvent itself?
A deep look at the key GOP factions and how successful primary candidates navigate them.
Time is running out for the little island coveted by its gigantic, growing neighbor.
An allegedly illiberal idea—and its liberal father.
America is making its energy supply more secure—but we can't untie ourselves from the global energy market.
We fear weapons of mass destruction in terrorist hands. Yet the greater danger continues to from terrorists' older tools—the gun and the bomb.
Do the presidents who are pushiest abroad get the most done?
The wisest of the wise men.
John B. Judis' new book on Israel is right, but for the wrong reasons.
Failing to play a dominant role in the Far East wouldn't just be foolish. It would change who we are.

February 2014 issue of the CTC Sentinel
West Point's Combating Terrorism Center has released the February 2014 issue of the CTC Sentinel. It is a special issue on Africa. It can be downloaded here.

The issue contains the following articles:

- The Future Role of U.S. Counterterrorism Operations in Africa

By Michael A. Sheehan and Geoff D. Porter

- Al-Shabab’s Capabilities Post-Westgate

By Ken Menkhaus

- An In-Depth Look at Al-Shabab’s Internal Divisions

By Stig Jarle Hansen

- The Malian Government’s Challenge to Restore Order in the North

By Bruce Whitehouse

- The In Amenas Attack in the Context of Southern Algeria’s Growing Social Unrest

By Hannah Armstrong

- Will Terrorism in Libya be Solely Driven by Radical Islamism?

By Geoffrey Howard and Henry Smith

- Religious Violence in Tunisia Three Years after the Revolution

By Anne Wolf

- Leadership Analysis of Boko Haram and Ansaru in Nigeria

By Jacob Zenn

- Recent Highlights in Political Violence

Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, January 2014

This issue includes looks at modernization of the armed forces through budgetary allocations, the Navy's submarine arm, maritime security, projections of IAF equipment over the next 20 years, directed energy weapons technology, and oceanographic studies. It also includes an analysis of the recently concluded India-China Border Defence Cooperation Agreement.

-- Amit Cowshish 
-- Sataluri Govind 
-- Bijoy Das 
-- Sarabjeet Singh Parmar 
-- Vivek Kapur 
-- Bishwajit Bose 
-- Arnab Das 
Book Reviews 
-- S. Samuel C. Rajiv 
-- Stuti Banerjee

International Affairs is a leading journal of international relations.
The featured article in the current issue is Learning from the past: the relevance of international history by David Stevenson. This article is free for non-members to read.

January 2014

Capitalism and the emergent world order
Barry Buzan and George Lawson

Parameters, Winter 2013-14, Now Online
Special Commentary
       What the QDR Ought to Say about Landpower by Francis G. Hoffman
American Power in Transition
       The True Tragedy of American Power by Isaiah Wilson
       Redirecting US Diplomacy by James E. Goodby and Ken Weisbrode
       Rebalancing US Military Power by Anna Simons
Fighting Irregular Fighters
       Is the Law of Armed Conflict Outdated? By Sibylle Scheipers
       Defeating Violent Nonstate Actors by Robert J. Bunker
       Confronting Africa's Sobels by Robert L. Feldman and Michel Ben Arrous
Conflict by Other Means
       Waging Financial War by David J. Katz
       The Coming Financial Wars by Juan Zarate
       Economic Statecraft: China in Africa by Douglas W. Winton
Preparing for Netwars
       Repurposing Cyber Command by Frank J. Cilluffo and Joseph R. Clark
Of Note
       A War Examined: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003 by Kevin C. Benson

“Air and Space Power Journal”
January–February 2014  

Happy New Year from your ASPJ team! We are delighted to announce that the website is once again operational. The January–February 2014 issue is now available for downloading from the Air University website. Please take a moment to visit us at http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/. We appreciate your patience and hope that you enjoy the issue.

In this issue. . . . 

General Mark A. Welsh III, USAF
General Hawk Carlisle, USAF

Maj Gen Kenneth S. Wilsbach, USAF
Lt Col David J. Lyle, USAF

Capt Adam B. Young, USAF

Lt Col Aaron D. Burgstein, USAF

Capt Albert C. Harris III, USAF

LTC Kelvin Mote, USA

The Editor 


If democracy continues to flourish in Pakistan and the establishment’s flawed policies are scrapped, Pakistan would finally become a peaceful country. “Liberal newspaper Express Tribune cowed into silence by Pakistani Taliban,” reads a...

Strategy: A History is a work on the cultural historical origins of strategy and the myriad ways in which men have sought to use strategy to gain the edge in battle or politics. Strategy is a fascinating subject. Seemingly always useful, sometimes...

The new proposal brought in by three of the Cricket boards, will restructure the International Cricket Council (ICC).  The world of Cricket has been abuzz with a Draft Proposal brought in by three of the Cricket boards, namely, Board of Control...

It should be possible to have profound questioning and open debate without encouraging intolerance or separatism. There is a long tradition of dialogue and debate within all the spiritual and philosophical traditions of India, whether Hindu,...

There are nearly one million fewer girls than boys in India and not enough is being done to change this. Census 2011 has brought out a terrifying figure. As per the Single Year Age Data released recently, for children below the age of one,...

If democracy continues to flourish in Pakistan and the establishment’s flawed policies are scrapped, Pakistan would finally become a peaceful country. “Liberal newspaper Express Tribune cowed into...

Strategy: A History is a work on the cultural historical origins of strategy and the myriad ways in which men have sought to use strategy to gain the edge in battle or politics. Strategy is a fascinating...
The new proposal brought in by three of the Cricket boards, will restructure the International Cricket Council (ICC).  The world of Cricket has been abuzz with a Draft Proposal brought in by three of...

It should be possible to have profound questioning and open debate without encouraging intolerance or separatism. There is a long tradition of dialogue and debate within all the spiritual and philosophical...

There are nearly one million fewer girls than boys in India and not enough is being done to change this. Census 2011 has brought out a terrifying figure. As per the Single Year Age Data released recently,...

Dear Friends and Colleagues, 

We are happy to share with you our recent publications and events. Additionally, please find attached the ISSSP digest for the month of January, 2014 in the mail. 



Authors: S. Chandrashekar and Soma Perumal

ISSSP Reflections

Author: M. Mayilvaganan

Author: Viswesh Rammohan

Outreach Publications

- India-US row: Voices from the streets (Al Jazeera- English) 

Author: Arun Vishwanathan, Assistant Professor, ISSSP

The World Today

Articles from the current issue are open-access. Cover Stories
1914-18: Legacy of the Great War
100 years of generals v politicians: from Ypres to Helmand
James de Waal, Visiting Fellow, Chatham House International Security Programme
Why we still flock to visit the Somme
Nicholas Bird, battlefield tour guide
Trench technology against gas attack which is still in use today
Dr Gabriel Moshenska, lecturer, Public Archaeology, UCL Institute of Archaeology
Suffragists who tried to stop the carnage
Helen Kay, Scottish branch of WILPF
Paying war's medical bill
Lt-Gen Louis Lillywhite, Surgeon-General of the British Armed Forces 2006-2009
Germany: historians are missing a big opportunity
Sönke Neitzel, Professor of International History, London School of Economics
India: a sacrifice that went unrecognized
Rahul Bedi, defence journalist, New Delhi
Ireland: from conflict to respect
Eamon Gilmore T.D., Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs & Trade, the Republic of Ireland
South Africa: troopship sinking lives on in memory
Albert Grundlingh, author and professor of History, Stellenbosch University
Caribbean: racism in the trenches
Richard Smith, author and lecturer in Media & Communications, Goldsmiths University of London
Chatham House, born from the ashes of war
Jason Naselli, Editorial & Project Coordinator, Chatham House
Bringing 'War Horse' to a Berlin theatre
John von Düffel, dramatist and writer
The audacity of a Pope
Paul Vallely, papal biographer
Dr Zbigniew Brzezinski on how to avoid a new Middle East explosion
Alan Philps
Learning the wrong lessons from the Three Gorges Dam
Michael Sheridan, Far East Correspondent, The Sunday Times
A tonic for democracy in 2014
Canvassing for ‘None of the above’
Anthony King, professor of government, University of Essex
USA: Let them have God and guns
Louis Michael Seidman, Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law Center
Egypt: How the Brotherhood failed
Dr Hazem Kandil, author & lecturer
Chatham House Quiz
Test your knowledge of 2013
A Bayeux Tapestry for the Western Front
Alan Philps
A new profile of Steve Biko, father of Black Consciousness
Benjamin Pogrund,
A selection of Great War books
Japan’s sun is rising again
John Swenson-Wright, Senior Consulting Fellow, Asia Programme, Chatham House
Playing the game of nations

Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS)

· Homeland Security Affairs Journal, February 2014, v. 10 http://www.hsaj.org/

o Preparedness Revisited: W(h)ither PPD-8? http://www.hsaj.org/?article=10.1.2

o Hybrid Targeted Violence: Challenging Conventional 'Active Shooter' Response Strategies http://www.hsaj.org/?article=10.1.3

o Towards a Unified Homeland Security Strategy: An Asset Vulnerability Model http://www.hsaj.org/?article=10.1.1

MCU Journal, v. 4, no. 1 Spring 2013

o Stopping Atrocities: Field Commanders’ Moral Responsibility in Srebrenica and Rwanda

o The Syrian Kurds: A House Divided

o Understanding Terrorism and the Islamist Challenge in the Maghreb 

o Bridging the Gap: High-Level Policy Meets On-the-Ground Realities in Eastern Afghanistan

o Agnatic Rivalry, Social Instability, and Scapegoating: The Consequences of Integrating Pashtunwali with Afghan Formal Law

Journal of Military Operations, Winter 2014, v. 2, no. 1 

o Does Operational Art Exist? Space, Time and a Theory of Operational Art

o Out of Balance: Rebalancing Access and Overcoming Denial
o The Edge of Glory: The Western Way of Combat and the Seach for the Elusive Decisve Battle in an Age of Terror

o The Tactics Gap: Why We Wrestle with the Basics

o Training Obversations

o The Killing of an Unknown Afghan Fighter in September 2011: A Breakdown in Battlefield Discipline

Military Review, January-February 2014, v. 94, no. 1

o Virtual Influence: Leveraging Social Media as a Leadership Tool

o Preferring Copies with No Originals: Does the Army Training Strategy Train or Fail?

o A Tale of Two Districts: Beating the Taliban at Their Own Game

o States, Societies, Resistance and COIN

o Of Burning Platforms and Champions

o Strategic Gain or Backlash?

o The Fourth Revolution: Hyper-Learning

o Lessons of a Coalition Partner in Afghanistan: 2002-2013

o Harmony in Battle: Training the Brigade Combat Team for Combined Arms Maneuver

o Creeping Death: Clausewitz and Comprehensive Counterinsurgency

o Managing Risk in Today's Army

o The Lessons of "The Surge"

Parameters, Winter 2013-14, v. 43, no. 4 

o What the QDR Ought to Say About Landpower

o The True Tragedy of American Power

o Redirecting US Diplomacy

o Rebalancing US Military Power

o Is the Law of Armed Conflict Outdated?

o Defeating Violent Nonstate Actors

o Confronting Africa's Sobels

o Waging Financial War

o The Coming Financial Wars

o Economic Statecraft: China in Africa

o Repurposing Cyber Command

o A War Examined: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003

Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ), January 2014, no. 72 

o The Role of Professional Military Education in Mission Command

o The Pen and the Sword: Faculty Management Challenges in the Mixed Cultural Environment of a War College

o Putting “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” to Work: A Wargaming Perspective

o Godzilla Methodology: Means for Determining Center of Gravity

o Improving DOD Adaptability and Capability to Survive Black Swan Events

o Strategy for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

o The Joint Stealth Task Force: An Operational Concept for Air-Sea Battle

o Unifying Our Vision: Joint ISR Coordination and the NATO Joint ISR Initiative

o “Gallantry and Intrepidity”: Valor Decorations in Current and Past Conflicts

o Cut Defense Pork, Revive Presidential Impoundment

o Biometric-enabled Intelligence in Regional Command–East

o Strategic Implications of the Afghan Mother Lode and China’s Emerging Role

o Improving Safety in the U.S. Arctic

o Forging a 21st-century Military Strategy: Leveraging Challenges

o Learning and Adapting: Billy Mitchell in World War

Naval War College Review, Winter 2014, v. 67, no. 1 

o Strengthening Our Naval Profession through a Culture of Leader Development

o President's Forum - RADM Walter E. "Ted" Carter, Jr., USN

o Trends in Modern War Gaming: The Art of Conversation

o Your Boss, Players, and Sponsor: The Three Witches of War Gaming

o The Idea of a "Fleet in Being" in Historical Perspective

o Kamikazes: The Soviet Legacy

o "Winning" the Pacific War: The Masterful Strategy of Commander Minoru Genda

o Was There Something Unique to the Japanese That Lost Them the Battle of Midway? [Research & Debate essay]

o Strength in Numbers: The Remarkable Potential of (Really) Small Combatants [Research & Debate essay]

o Reflections on Leadership


 The Political Landscape of Afghanistan and the Presidential Election of 2014

Independent Assessment of the Afghan National Security Forces

Game Over? The EU’s Legacy in Afghanistan 

Ankara Summit: A Possible Road to Afghan Peace?

Afghanistan: The View from India 

Afghanistan: Sustainable Engagement to 2014 and Beyond 

Afghanistan – The Endless Challenge 


Objectives and Differences among Militant Groups in FATA

The Punjabi Taliban

Afghanistan: The View from Pakistan

Monitor On Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan 

 Potential and Prospects of Pakistani Diaspora 

Pakistan’s Energy Crisis: Causes, Consequences and Possible Remedies 

Joint Strategy to Control Militancy and Pak-Afghan Conflict Resolution Post-2014 

 Implementation Status on Recommendations from the Pakistan-Afghanistan Parliamentarians Dialogues Since 2011 


Can China and India Coexist in Myanmar? 

Harnessing Myanmar's Hydropower and Negotiating Conflict

Painful Polls and Dhaka’s Dilemmas 

China, The United States, And The Kachin Conflict 

Central Asia: Democracy, Instability and Strategic Game in Kyrgyzstan
P. Stobdan, Author, 2014, Publisher: Pentagon Press
ISBN 978-81-8274-752-4
Price: Rs.995/- [Download Book]


Unrest in Xinjiang, Uyghur Province in China

China Brief, January 10, 2014, v. 14, no. 1 

o Brief: Xi Evokes “New Left” Vision of China’s Future

o Xi Invokes Mao’s Image to Boost his own Authority

o Tiananmen Attack: Islamist Terror or Chinese Protest?

o The Language of Terrorism in China: Balancing Foreign and Domestic Policy Imperatives

o China-US WMD Cooperation: Progress within Limits

China Brief, February 20, 2014, v. 14, no. 4 

o Beijing’s Fight Against Democracy Activism in Hong Kong

o Chin a’s Ideological ‘Soft War’: Offense is the Best Defense

o Falling Coal Prices Help Chin a’s ‘New Silk Road’ Win Over Mongolia

China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities: Implications for the U.S.-Japan Alliance

India Advances in Naval Arms Race With China

People’s Republic of China Maritime Disputes 

The People’s Liberation Army General Political Department: Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics 

Airpower Across the Himalayas: A Military Appreciation of Chinese and Indian Air Forces http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/policy_brief/Policy%20Brief%20-%202013-12-31%20-%20Airpower%20Across%20the%20Himalayas.pdf

China and India: A Sisyphean Bilateral? 

China, India and the United States: Tempered Rivalries in Asia 

Growth of China's Power and Implications for Asia in the 21st Century


The 16th Symposium (FY 2013), November 12, 2013 - "Prospects of Multilateral Cooperation in the Asia Pacific: To Overcome the Gap of Security Outlooks" [conference papers] 

Japan in East Asia: Challenges and Opportunities for 2014 
Japan’s New Approach to National Security 

 Carving up the Skies: China's New Air Defense Zone

Sino-Indian Panchsheel and Japan’s Overture to India 

Thailand: Conflict Alert 

Air Defense Identification Zone Intended to Provide China Greater Flexibility to Enforce East China Sea Claims 

The Indian Ocean Region: A Strategic Net Assessment
By Anthony H. Cordesman, Abdullah Toukan 


Impact from Syria's War on Militancy in FATA

Consent by Force: Strategies to Avoid Failure in Syria
Iran and the P5+1
Iraq in Crisis 

Islamist Responses to the "End of Islamism"

Next Steps Toward a Final Deal with Iran 

Syria Country Analysis Brief - February 2014 

Attacking America: Al Qaeda’s Grand Strategy in Its War with the World 

Legitimacy Versus Legality Redux: Arming the Syrian Rebels

Leadership Divided? The Domestic Politics of Iran's Nuclear Debate

 Iraq in Crisis 

After the Awakening: Future Security Trends in the Middle East

Western Policy Towards Syria: Ten Recommendations 


Russia’s G8 Presidency: With an Ambitious Agenda, Can Moscow Deliver?

Great Unfulfilled Expectations: Russia’s Security Dialogue with Europe

Towards a Greater Eurasia: Who, Why, What and How? 

Issue Guide: Crisis in Ukraine 

Engaging Cuba 

The EU, Russia and Eastern Partnership: What Dynamics under the New German Government? http://www.ifri.org/downloads/ifrindc109tolksdorfeng.pdf

Why Europe Can’t Leave Asia to the US 

Ukraine’s February Revolution: What Next?


Presentation on the Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2014 to 2023

New Realities: Energy Security in the 2010s and Implications for the U.S. Military - Executive Summaries 

Big Bets & Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book 

Oil Security 2025: U.S. National Security Policy in an Era of Domestic Oil Abundance 

Alternatives to U.S. Hard Power: The Saudi Response to U.S. Tactics in the Middle East 


Crisis in the Central African Republic: The EU Response

No Place Like Home: Returns and Relocations of Somalia’s Displaced

Security Sector Reform and Governance Processes in West Africa: From Concepts to Reality 

 Whose Development? Human Rights Abuses in Sierra Leone’s Mining Boomhttp://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/sierraleone0214_ForUpload.pdf

Africa Watch, February 20, 2014 

Conflict and the Formation of Political Beliefs in Africa http://www.hicn.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/HiCN-WP-164.pdf


FM 3-38, Cyber Electromagnetic Activities 

Pandemonium: Nation States, National Security, and the Internet https://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/TP_Vol1No1_Geers.pdf

Peacetime Regime for State Activities in Cyberspace http://ccdcoe.org/427.html

2014 as the Year of Encryption: A (Very) Brief History of Encryption Policy 

Cybersecurity and Stability in the Gulf 

The Enduring Need for Electronic Attack in Air Operations 

 Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Technologies

20YY: Preparing for War in the Robotic Age
Robert O. Work, Shawn Brimley


Electromagnetic Spectrum Strategy 

Disaster Prep Wednesday: "Managing Worker Fatigue During Disaster Operations"

Harmonizing Policy & Principle: A Hybrid Model for Counterterrorism

Aspects of Leadership: Ethics, Law, and Spirituality

Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance is Greater Than Aerial Surveillance http://smallwarsjournal.com/printpdf/15265

The Process of Radicalization http://smallwarsjournal.com/printpdf/15276

Some Recent Approaches to Cultural Intelligence Gathering http://smallwarsjournal.com/printpdf/15296

Lessons From Previous Competitive Strategies: Interview with Thomas G. Mahnken 

 Mega Cities, Ungoverned Areas, and the Challenge of Army Urban Combat Operations in 2030-2040 

 More than Weather: The Strategic Importance of Remote Environmental Monitoring Capabilities to DOD 

Robots on the Battlefield: Contemporary Issues and Implications for the Future http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/FrenchRobots.pdf

Joint Pub 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, 03 January 2014 


Indian Ocean Region: A Strategic Net Assessment 

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: India Seeking New Role in the Eurasian Regional Mechanism
Meena Singh Roy, IDSA Monograph Series No. 34, 2014 
Heavy Satellite Launch Vehicles: An Assessment 
Indo-Russian Defence Trade: A Recipe for Revival
Back to Reality: India’s National Interests and Multilateralism
Quenching India’s Thirst for Energy 
Employment in India – Latest Data and Implications 
Arthasastra: Lesson for the Contemporary Security Environment with South Asia as a Case Study http://www.idsa.in/system/files/Monograph31.pdf

 INS Vikramaditya—Deployment Options for India http://www.idsa.in/system/files/IB_INSVikramaditya.pdf

 Internal Security Trends in 2013 and a Prognosis http://www.idsa.in/system/files/IB_InternalSecurityTrends2013.pdf

Jihadist Violence: The Indian Threat 
· China’s Gorbachov Angst 

· Defense Innovations in India: The Fault Lines 

· India and Maldives—Ties Must Be Consolidated 

· Measures for Improving Management of National Security http://idsa.in/system/files/gkanwal_160114.pdf

Indian Strategic-Military Transformation - Revolutionary in Nature, Evolutionary in Character 


Strengthening Coastal Planning

The Future of the U.S. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Force

 The Role of Arctic Hydrocarbons for Future Energy Security 

Water as a Geopolitical Threat

World Economic Forum (WEF) Global Risks 2014 [9th ed.]