13 August 2014

CHINA’S GAME PLAN IN AFGHANISTAN: MANY REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS – ANALYSIS



China’s Foreign Ministry on July 18 said it had appointed a special envoy for Afghanistan, underscoring Beijing’s concerns over developments in that country which could turn into a hotbed of militancy at its doorstep.

Sun Yuxi, a former ambassador to both Afghanistan (between 2002 and 2004) and India, has been named as the special envoy and will have “close communication” with Afghanistan and other relevant parties to help “ensure lasting peace, stability and development for Afghanistan and the region”, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said in a statement.

To that end, Sun Yuxi’s appointment not only signals Chinese concerns regarding possible threats emanating from the region, but also an intent to firm up some of its geo-economic initiatives in the wake of the US drawdown from Afghanistan.
Terrorism

One of China’s chief worries is that Uighur militants, who are fighting for a separate state called East Turkestan in China’s Xinjiang region, will step up their activities by exploiting the security vacuum in Afghanistan after most of the NATO forces withdraw by the end of the year. China believes hundreds of Uighur militants of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) are holed up in the tribal areas straddling Afghanistan and Pakistan. There is a good cause for the Chinese worry; despite employing a wide range of measures it has failed to get a grip on the insurgency in Xinjiang.

Early on July 28, the last day of Ramadan, 215 Uighurs armed with knives and axes attacked a police station and government offices in Elixku and Huangdi towns in Shache County in Xinjiang. Chinese police shot dead 59 of the attackers while 37 civilians also died in the incident. A total of 13 armed Chinese personnel were killed and about 67 people were arrested in this connection.

In early July, China banned civil servants, students and teachers in Xinjiang region from taking part in fasting during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.

On July 30, Jume Tahir, the imam of China’s largest mosque in the westernmost city of Kashgar, was attacked as he was leaving the Id Kah mosque and stabbed to death. The 74-year-old Imam, who was also a former deputy to the official National People’s Congress (NPC), was reportedly supporting the Chinese Communist Party by publicly speaking out against the wave of violence in Xinjiang and accusing the separatist Muslims for halting progress and social and ethnic cohesion.

According to China’s special envoy for the Middle East, Wu Sike, Muslim extremists from Xinjiang have gone to the Middle East for training, and some may have crossed into Iraq to participate in the upsurge of violence there.
Afghanistan

Appropriately, Sun Yuxi commenced his charge with a visit to Kabul; and on July 23 he had talks with President Hamid Karzai and presidential candidates Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani on separate occasions. During his stay in Afghanistan, Sun also met with US and European Union ambassadors to the country as well as the head of the United Nations Assistance Mission.

Sun reaffirmed China’s support for the ongoing political and reconciliation process in Afghanistan and said if groups in Afghanistan, including Taliban, reach an agreement on national reconciliation then nobody will make trouble. “So far we have not directly got involved with Afghan groups including Taliban and we place our hope on the new government.” He said he will visit US, Russia, India and Iran to discuss the situation in Afghanistan.

On Afghanistan’s future, Sun said the immediate and the most important task is to achieve reconciliation among all parties and sectors as only nationwide reconciliation is an effective measure for long-term stability. He added that China is concentrating on economic development and raising standards of living to help create peace and security in Afghanistan, and to that end the private sector must be involved.
Pakistan

In his first presser in China on July 21, Sun Yuxi had praised Pakistan and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for their fight against terrorism and all but absolved them of any involvement in the recent attack on the Indian consulate in Herat. Sun Yuxi said: “I think ISI has been effective in fighting against terrorism. I do believe that Pakistan government or any responsible agency of Pakistan will only fight against terrorism, instead of being involved with any terrorist.” Sun told the media that he saw in the future the Pakistan government playing an important and positive role in the peaceful reconstruction of Afghanistan.

While visiting Pakistan, Sun Yuxi called on the Pakistani foreign secretary and expressed China’s solidarity with Pakistan in this endeavour and appreciated Pakistan’s contribution to global efforts against terrorism. Pakistan highlighted its constructive engagement to promote regional cooperation. The two sides also discussed the upcoming Ministerial Meeting of the Heart of Asia/Istanbul Process, to be held in Tianjin, China.

At the same time, Pakistan is eying Beijing’s proposed huge investment of about $40 billion over the next eight years in the country’s energy, water, coal, roads and other infrastructure projects. China has reportedly commissioned a “preliminary research study” to build an international rail link connecting its westernmost city of Kashgar in Xinjiang with Pakistan’s deep-sea Gwadar Port, according to the director of Xinjiang’s regional development and reform commission. The 1,800-km China-Pakistan railway is planned to also pass through Pakistan’s capital of Islamabad and Karachi, with land ports to India and Afghanistan also being proposed.
Assessment

Sun Yuxi’s statements during his visits to Afghanistan and Pakistan are indicative of Chinese approach to Af-Pak. Pakistan is the primary partner, who will play a dominant role in the reconciliation and reconstruction process in Afghanistan. Efforts will be made to integrate the Taliban into politics and governance at the provincial level and ideally at the national level. Chinese capital would power the Kashgar-Gwadar economic corridor; Pakistan would ensure its security and indirectly contribute to the security of Xinjiang. Exploitation of natural resources would be the main plank of the Chinese strategy to revive Afghan economy, and Pakistan would gain control of the Afghan transit trade.

Russian buy-in would come from the fact that it would get access to a land route for selling its gas, diverting it away from Europe and expand its arms supply to Afghanistan and other nations in Central Asia. It would assist in curbing narcotics trade and receive support in checking the rise of Islamist militancy. Iran would get to retain its cultural influence in Western Afghanistan, sell gas to Pakistan and probably India through a land pipeline and have the main Chinese “silk route” to Europe running through northern Iran.

In the coming few months Beijing would be focussed on the establishment of the new Afghan government and the Istanbul Process, a ministerial-level dialogue that brings together all of Afghanistan’s neighbours and major donors. China is hosting the next conference in Tianjin and is eager to make it a meaningful event by using the meeting as a means to confer the international community’s approval on the next Afghan government.

Beijing, in the scheme of things, appears remarkably eager to cooperate with the US in Afghanistan. However, the key is how China is reading the situation in Afghanistan; does it anticipate a complete US drawdown from the region by 2016 or will it find space to articulate its interest despite US presence in a counter-terror posture in Afghanistan. If not would it look to squeeze out the US from the region with support from Pakistan, which would make it easy for it to negotiate with the Taliban and of course call the shots in Af-Pak .

In the current situation, the US seems keen on just curbing terrorism emanating from Afghanistan (and directed at the US) and it would be happy to go along with China as long as it is achieved. India would most probably then be coerced into accepting the Chinese game plan, with the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) and the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipelines and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) membership thrown in as sweeteners.

This article was published at South Asia Monitor.

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