http://www.tribuneindia.com/2014/20140317/edit.htm#5
India needs to highlight the dichotomy between word and deed in the matter of nuclear security at the summit being held next week in the Netherlands. Many countries subscribe to international agreements to protect their nuclear materials. However, they often transfer nuclear materials, technology and equipment in violation of these prohibitions
P. R. Chari
Participating countries at the Summit will be persuaded to commit themselves to reducing the use of highly enriched uranium and plutonium in reactors Photo: AFP
HOW do we define nuclear security? Essentially, nuclear security involves the protection of nuclear materials to guard against its theft or diversion, or sabotage of a nuclear facility; it involves physical protection, deployment of guards to meet on sites and respond from off site to emergencies. Besides, it also involves automated systems to prevent unauthorised persons from gaining access to nuclear materials.
The Nuclear Security Summits that have reviewed these issues owe greatly to the initiatives taken by President Obama. It would be recollected that the break-up of the erstwhile Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1990 had led to an acute angst regarding “loose nukes”.
Great fears arose that chaotic conditions in the erstwhile Soviet Republics would invite non-state actors to acquire nuclear materials and, perhaps, even operational nuclear weapons.
In his historic Prague speech (2009), President Obama highlighted the need to bring nuclear materials around the world under national and international control, and set a target of four years to accomplish this task.
Towards this end, he had declared that: “We will set new standards, expand our cooperation with Russia, pursue new partnerships to lock down these sensitive materials.” This task has yet to be completed, but it brooks no delay.
Significantly, IAEA Director-General Amano confessed that, “More than 100 incidents of thefts and other unauthorised activities involving nuclear and radioactive materials are reported to the IAEA every year…Some material goes missing and is never found.”
His predecessor, Mohamed El Baradei, had revealed that, “A large percentage of materials, which are recovered have not been previously reported as missing.”
Are we even aware then of the dimensions of this problem? Fortunately, no nuclear terrorist attack has occurred till now. But, the first such event would be as traumatic for the international system as the first use of nuclear weapons in 1945.
Two Nuclear Security Summits have been held earlier in Washington (2010) and Seoul (2012) that have underlined the need for maintaining strict security over weapons-usable nuclear materials. The Third Summit is scheduled to be held in the Netherlands on March 23 and 24. Holding the Third Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands has symbolic significance because the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court are situated in the Hague. Moreover, nuclear security in the Netherlands has been lax in the past. Apropos, A.Q Khan had stolen the blueprints for a uranium-enrichment plant from the Almelo plant in the Netherlands where he was employed.
Nuclear terrorism
What were the broad conclusions of the first two Summits? The danger of nuclear terrorism was appreciated in the Washington Summit. All world leaders present agreed to pool their efforts to secure nuclear materials, particularly such materials present in their own territory, apart from jointly improving global nuclear security. In Seoul, the participants further appreciated the need to protect radiological sources, which can be used to make a “dirty bomb” that releases radiation, causing panic and massive social disruption. In general, these two Summit meetings have sought to raise consciousness about the need to tighten controls over nuclear materials and establish greater transparency in regard to counter-measures taken.
In the upcoming 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, the United States, Netherlands and South Korea are likely to persuade participants to commit themselves to reducing the use of highly enriched uranium and plutonium in reactors; more frequent reviews by IAEA advisory missions; national registration and protection of radioactive sources; a greater role for industry in nuclear security issues; and more information being published by states on what steps they have taken to secure their nuclear materials and facilities. A major objective would also be gaining more adherents to implement the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidelines for protecting nuclear materials. These guidelines automatically become the national law in some Western countries, but this is not a universal practice.
Resolutions apart, what has been the success achieved so far? Significantly, the number of countries possessing one kilogramme or more of weapons-usable nuclear materials — a criterion used by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) in the US to estimate nuclear security worldwide — has reduced from 32 to 25 in the last two years, implying that seven states have removed dangerous nuclear materials from their territories. Some 12 others have reduced their holdings and arranged for their better security.
What has been India’s record in contributing to the goals of the Nuclear Security Summits? What could it do further to strengthen its own nuclear security, which is the main objective of these Summits meetings? Finally, what are the positions India could adopt in the next Summit meeting to refresh the debate?
India’s nuclear programme
Here, it would be fair to mention that India’s record is mixed. On the credit side. it might be highlighted that India has accepted its international legal obligations in regard to the security of its nuclear materials by entering the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials with its 2005 Amendment, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. India’s record in implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, concerned with preventing trafficking in materials, technology and equipment relevant to nuclear security has been exemplary. More significantly, no case of leakage of nuclear materials from India’s extensive nuclear programme has ever come to light.
On the debit side, however, it also needs mention that India has been reluctant to inform what are its on-site and off-site emergency response arrangements for its civilian nuclear facilities, although they have been established and are believed to be working satisfactorily. Nothing apart from a general penchant for secrecy can explain this reticence, apart from the belief that transparency compromises national security.
Further, India had committed to the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit that it would establish an independent regulatory board to oversee its nuclear programme. It had also laid its Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority (NSRA) Bill before Parliament in 2011. However, this Bill has not been passed, and has now lapsed with the last session of Parliament having ended. Hopefully, the next government will accord priority to this matter. But this issue would have to be suitably explained to the Summit participants. Some apologists for the government have claimed that India already has adequate oversight provisions through its Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB); since it functions under the administrative control of the Atomic Energy Department, there is scepticism about its independence.
Besides, India had also volunteered to establish a Centre of Excellence for sensitising and training personnel in nuclear safety and security issues. It is believed that land has been acquired for this Centre in Haryana, and buildings and other infrastructure will come up soon. Apparently, its charter of duties and mode of functioning have also been decided upon, but this information, too, is not in the public domain. There is still time for New Delhi to finalise remaining issues make a public announcement, and inform the Summit meeting accordingly.
A general issue that India should highlight in the Summit meeting is the dichotomy between words and deeds in the matter of nuclear security. Many countries subscribe to international agreements to protect their nuclear materials, establish regulatory authorities to oversee their nuclear programmes and so on. But, several have also transferred nuclear materials, technology and equipment clandestinely in violation of these prohibitions with impunity. The usual suspects hardly need mention, but they present major security threats to India. That apart, several firms in the West have also indulged in such illicit trade for commercial reasons, and with official indulgence. For instance, there is incontrovertible evidence that supplies to Iraq’s nuclear program in the Saddam era were made by several European countries and the United States. An airing of these uncomfortable issues could be initiated by India. How could India contribute further to the success of this Summit? Two suggestions are made here. First, its gifting of $1 m to the IAEA for strengthening its supervisory functions has been appreciated. India could raise the relevance of this UN body by making a further donation and also by offering to train IAEA personnel in its newly created Centre of Excellence. Second, India might erode its penchant for secrecy, become more forthcoming, and agree to a “peer review” of its nuclear security arrangements by international experts or the IAEA.
Some part of its present reluctance to accept this dispensation derives from the inability of the nuclear establishment to coordinate its policies with the foreign policy and defence bureaucracies.
Besides, India could also draw attention to the dangers involved in transporting nuclear materials, which will increase in future as appreciation grows regarding the need to keep spent fuel away from nuclear facilities, post the Fukushima disaster. Apropos. India’s atomic power plants are also situated along its coastline, and are vulnerable to cyclones and other turbulences. This also applies to transferring radiological substances like Cobalt-60, which came into a Delhi market some years back. The need, therefore, to establish international norms for transferring nuclear materials by different modes of transport should be pressed by India.
Nuke talks
The Nuclear Security Summit was establisehd with the aim of preventing terrorism around the globe.
The first summit was held in Washington, DC on April 12-13, 2010. It saw participation by 47 countries
The 2014 summit, to be held in the Netherlands, will be attended by 58 world leaders, nearly 5,000 delegates and some 3,000 journalists
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