10 December 2012

J&K: Theatre of the Next War

Issue Courtesy: Aakrosh | Date : 09 Oct , 2012



Significance of the Gilgit–Gwadar Corridor

The ominously rising strategic salience of the Gilgit–Baltistan region was made sharply apparent by Selig Harrison’s startling disclosure in 2010 that some 7,000–11,000 Chinese troops had entered the Gilgit–Baltistan area, ostensibly for flood control. The Chinese version claimed it was for repair of the Karakoram Highway (KKH). Indian military sources later reported that some 3,000–4,000 Chinese military engineering personnel were engaged in repair/widening of the KKH, construction of hydroelectric projects and building of tunnels (which could serve to hide missiles). A Chinese civil company (China Mobile) is also constructing cell towers for mobile networks in this region.

…Pakistani plans to lease the Gilgit–Baltistan area to China for the next 50 years.

For the protection of this workforce, initial media reports had indicated that a Chinese infantry battalion was deployed at the Khunjerab Pass but was later withdrawn due to the international uproar in May 2010. Reportedly, some permanent Chinese logistical infrastructure is now coming up at Challas that is indicative of a long-term stay. This is further reinforced by media reports in the Pakistani press of Pakistani plans to lease the Gilgit–Baltistan area to China for the next 50 years.

NTRO: India’s Technical Intelligence Agency

Issue Vol 23.1 Jan-Mar 2008 
 
Date : 22 Sep , 2012




In the Indian Defence Review issue of Oct–Dec 2007, Shri B Raman, wrote an article on Indian Intelligence which I read with great interest—especially since the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) figured in it. At the very outset, let me state that Shri Raman is highly respected in the Intelligence community. I personally also hold him in great regard. It is not my intention to comment on the views expressed by him in the said article. However, I will take the liberty to comment on the issues that he has raised about the NTRO. I take this liberty because I was intimately involved in a number of discussions with the Kargil Review Committee and later the Task Force when the process of making recommendations for the restructuring of the Intelligence apparatus, was in progress. More importantly, I actually raised the NTRO from scratch.

While creating an organisation with multiple responsibilities and a complex charter from scratch, it made no recommendation, and gave no guidance whatsoever as to how such an organisation could be raised. No magic wand was either provided. Was it purposely left vague and ambiguous?

Indian Army: Enhancing Night Capability



E-Mail- raveen.ss@gmail.com

Across its spectrum, future conflict will occur in a continuous 24 hour engagement cycle to enable a Force to maintain the tempo of operations. An essential component of progressing operations in such a manner is the ability of troops to operate by night. While the substantial increase in defence budget allocation in the past decade is heartening, capital acquisitions have been of particularly big ticket items. Little progress has however been made in equipping the army with the wherewithal to fight by night, which could impact on force effectiveness.

The Army’s current night fighting capability is limited. What the Army needs is “third generation” night vision devices (NVDs) for soldiers, night sights for rifles and night vision equipment for armoured and mechanised formations. What the Army has are limited second generation devices which at times are more of a hindrance than an asset and too few third generation NVDs. Pakistan, on the other hand, has got a range of third generation devices from the US under the ‘War on Terror’ pact. China too has operationalised its entire tank and mechanised fleet for night fighting and possesses significantly higher night capability in the other arms too. Limited night fighting capability decreases force effectiveness and leads to reduced deterrence, thus providing a window of opportunity to hostile powers to increased chances of misadventure from either country.

Maldives: Loss of Traditional Goodwill


Paper No. 5320 
 
Dated 9-Dec-2012

By B.Raman

1.The unfortunate cancellation by the Government of Mohammad Waheed of the Maldives of the contract given to a consortium led by the GMR, an Indian company, for the running of the Ibrahim Nassir International Airport highlights our loss of tradional goodwill with a section of the Maldivian political class due to perceptions that India was trying to take sides in the political dispute between former President Mohammed Nasheed, who resigned under controversial circumstances in the beginning of this year, and his opponents led by Mr.Mohammad Waheed in order to facilitate his return to power.

2.So long as the Maldivian authorities were sensitive to our national security interests, we followed a policy of benign non-involvement in internal political issues. Our national security interests in the Maldives had primacy over our economic and commercial interests. The Government of India carefully avoided creating any impression of backing any Indian business company operating in the Maldives.

3.The traditional goodwill enjoyed by us for nearly three decades in the Maldives since 1979 when the Government of India responded positively to a request from Male for assistance in revamping their national security set-up started dissipating when our perceived backing for the democracy movement of Mr.Nasheed and the jettisoning of the policy of benign non-involvement in internal political matters after Mr.Nasheed became the President created perceptions of Indian political favourites. As a result of our open and enthusiastic embrace of Mr.Nasheed, he came to be perceived as India’s prop in Male. Many of his decisions in commercial and national security matters, which were favourable to India, were projected by his opponents and detractors as quid pro quo for India’s support to him.

China’s Cyber Capabilities


Issue Book Excerpt: Rise of China | Date : 29 Oct , 2012




This paper deals with Chinese Cyber Capabilities, their assessment of the global cyber eco-system and the gradual evolution of their dominant position in this emerging realm. The historical step-wise attainment of this position through the stages of nationalism to commercialism, the rise and fall of unorganised as well as organised Hacker groups, the funding patterns, etc have a very interesting story to tell. The chapter also traces and evidences of structured and coordinated approach of industrial espionage, as a policy being taken forward in China and some of the latest exploitations from the Chinese side targeted towards our national critical information infrastructure including the critical human beings.

Expansion of the Karakoram Corridor: Implications and Prospects



Senge H. Sering

IDSA Occasional Paper No. 27
 
2012

China has huge and long-term presence in Gilgit-Baltistan and is building extensive road, bridge and telecom networks to sustain it. The drivers compelling China to develop Karakoram Corridor are diverse and mainly pertain to its economic, strategic and political ambitions. However, the projects, which currently serve the strategic and economic interests of the investor, need to promote interests of the local people and enhance their decision-making power and control over project revenues on priority basis. Growing Chinese interference in local affairs will create friction among different stakeholders and lead to instability in Gilgit-Baltistan. Chinese and Pakistani control over resource-revenues may be a short-term tactical move, but will fail to provide any long-term strategic gains. The role that locals see for China in Gilgit-Baltistan is firstly, to withdraw from the occupied valleys of Shaksgam, Raskam, Shimshal, and Aksai- chin; secondly, to refrain from getting involved in the affairs of J&K including Gilgit-Baltistan; and thirdly, to persuade Pakistan to withdraw from PoK including Gilgit-Baltistan.This can help bring peace and stability to South Asia.

Why China and Pakistan want demilitarization of Siachen

Karan Kharb | Date:09 Dec , 2012

Karan Kharb The author is a retired Army Officer, author of two international best sellers. 


Siachen and Sir Creek are back on the menu again. The Track II diplomacy to bring about a rapprochement between India and Pakistan is interesting in many ways. Official bilateral conclaves having failed to make much headway in ‘confidence building measures’, the Track II peace initiative is now joined by those who have fought fierce battles against each other – the military veterans from both sides of the border and the Line of Control (LoC). Sworn enemies and acclaimed warriors then, they now realise futility of war and advise India to abandon its defences to ‘demilitarise’ Siachen complex at one end and reconcile to Pakistan’s idea of border alignment at Sir Creek. 

Siachen Glacier, the highest battlefield of the world, is at the northern extremity of the LoC in J&K. Sir Creek is the lowest point at its southern end where the Indo-Pak border meets the Arabian Sea. There is no human habitation at either location. Siachen, they say, is a wasteland bereft of life and resources taking avoidable toll of soldiers besides being a huge burden on the defence exchequers. Sir Creek, likewise is a mass of uninhabitable marshlands where the alignment of the IB is in dispute for about 100 kilometres. India believes it runs along midcourse of the stream; Pakistan believes it runs along the eastern edge of the creek. 


Higher Defence Management through Effective Civil-Military Relations

Issue Vol. 27.4 Oct-Dec 2012 | Date : 10 Dec , 2012 


“He (the soldier) is thus the very basis and silent, barely visible cornerstone of our fame, culture, physical well-being and prosperity; in short, of the entire nation building activity. He does not perform any of these chores himself directly. He enables the rest of us to perform these without let, hindrance or worry (‘nirbhheek and nishchinta’). 

Our military sinews, on the other hand, lend credibility to our pronouncements of adherence to good Dharma, our goodwill, amiability and peaceful intentions towards all our neighbour nations (‘sarve bhavantu sukhinaha, sarve santu niramayaha…’) as also those far away and beyond. These also serve as a powerful deterrent against military misadventure by any one of them against us.”—Chanakyaniti 

Civil-military relationship, a very broad-based term, describes the link between civil society at large and the military, an organisation that has been specifically created to protect it. When considered in a narrow perspective, it is the rapport or the lack of it, between the civil authority of any given society and the military authority. The matter has been a subject of study and controversy since the times of Sun Tzu1 and Clausewitz2, both of whom argued that the military was primarily a servant of the State, basing it on an assumption that civilian control of a State is preferable to military control. 


Why India should look at Vietnam more keenly

The US, Japan and Singapore have all factored Vietnam’s critical place in their strategic calculations in recent years. It is time that India integrated Vietnam in its strategic objectives in the region and took full advantage of its potentialities

Baladas Ghoshal

“VIETNAM values India’s friendship most. India has always stood by us in our difficult times and we can always depend on India,” said Truong Tan Sang, the then President designate of Vietnam, at a meeting with me on 23rd June 2011 in Hanoi. After an excellent overview of the current strategic and political environment in Asia-Pacific region, he made a forceful point: “India is a responsible stake holder in the peace, stability and security in the region and has a unique role to play in the security architecture of Asia.”

A busy and congested road in Hanoi, which has an estimated population of 6.5 million, making it the second largest city in Vietnam. Photo: Shutterstock 

Within three months after becoming the President, Mr Truong travelled to India last year in October to reaffirm Vietnam’s consistent policy of giving high priority to the strategic partnership with India, elevate it to a higher level and to promote the two countries’ cooperation in all fields and at regional and international forums. Since then there has been a spurt in high-level visits from Vietnam to India, supported by business and government-level delegations. The latest is Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, who is coming on December 19 to Kolkata first to meet business leaders and then to New Delhi to attend the anniversary of the India-ASEAN summit to be held on December 20-21. 

Whither India-China ties?

When economics and politics collide
by Harsh V. Pant 


ONCE again, Sino-Indian ties present a strange spectacle. On the one hand, India and China have signed 11 agreements entailing an investment of over $ 5 billion during the second India-China Strategic Economic Dialogue in New Delhi while on the other India had to protest vigorously against China’s newly revised passports that show disputed territory near their shared border as part of China and respond by issuing Chinese citizens visas embossed with New Delhi’s own maps. For a long time, the idea that economic ties will lead to a maturing of political ties was a mantra that serious policymakers in New Delhi were willing to consider. But clearly the argument was a specious one and anyone with even an iota of understanding global politics would have known that this trade leads to peace thesis rarely works. 

There are multiple levels — diplomatic, economic and cultural — at which China and India are engaging each other. Sino-Indian economic ties are at an all-time high with annual bilateral trade expected to reach around $100 billion over the next three years. Yet despite that pretence of a sustained engagement, suspicions of each other are at an all-time high with the two states sharing one of the world’s most heavily militarised border areas. Alarmed by China’s reiteration of its claims over the whole of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, India is expanding its military deployments in its north-eastern region. If China has deployed around 300,000 troops across the Tibetan plateau, India is responding by raising its military deployment from 120,000 to 180,000 along with two Sukhoi-30 fighter squadrons in the region. And the issue is not merely about the border and Tibet anymore. Today, New Delhi and Beijing both view themselves as rising powers and as a consequence, their interests and capabilities are rubbing off against each other not merely in Asia but in various other parts of the world as well. 

The two countries do not fully comprehend the complexities of each other’s domestic politics either. China’s opaque political system festers a lack of transparency that can only be dangerous over the long term. India’s, often cacophonous, domestic political system seems perpetually unable to attain a seriousness of purpose vis-a-vis China. As if this were not enough, popular opinion in both countries is rapidly turning against each other. A recent Pew Research Center poll found that two-thirds of Chinese respondents viewed India unfavourably. The feeling is mutual with only 23 per cent of Indians describing their relationship with China as one of cooperation and only 24 per cent viewing China’s growing economy as a good thing. So much for the trade leads to greater understanding thesis! 

Can India be a breakout nation?

By Ruchir Sharma | Dec 9, 2012

In my day job as an investor I wander the world, kicking the tires of emerging economies to see how fast they can go, but I've been a writer for as long as I have been an investor because I see my job as more art than science. I find many of the popular theories about why emerging nations grow amusingly academic and overconfident, for example in their attempt to forecast decades into the future by looking decades into the past. I try and travel to at least one emerging market every month not because I love planes but to get a first-hand grip on the unique mood and feel of a country to understand where its economy is likely to head in the next five to ten years, the period that matters to practical people.

The glory that was India or China in the 18th Century can't tell you much about who the next leaders will be or what they will do for prosperity. Loosely speaking, in the last decade economists have tried to explain and forecast which nations will succeed or fail by focusing on one key factor. The hottest one right now—based on a US bestseller that I didn't write—focuses on institutions, the basic idea being that countries with stable and open banks, courts, legislatures and other institutions create an environment in which entrepreneurs can build businesses and innovate, one of the keys to a competitive economy. Like all such grand theories, this one gets one clue right but starts to fall apart as soon as you try to apply to it every mystery, case by case. If open institutions are the magic key, how do you explain the many success stories in Asia, especially China, where most institutions are intensely secretive yet also quite competent? And neither does China have very clear property rights - a favorite factor of many development economic theorists.

Another set of these ideas focuses on geography, arguing that nations fail because of remote or landlocked locations, off the beaten path of global trade, or isolated in the deserts of equatorial Africa. Sounds plausible enough, but some of the most out-of-the-way nations of Central Asia were among the world's fastest growing economies in the last decade, including Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. These theories miss a lot of facts on the ground, much like the movie "Borat", which was spoofing Kazakhstan as hilariously backward at a time when it was booming. The fastest growing province of China is now Inner Mongolia, long a punch-line synonym for the back of beyond.

Don't be on the back foot


Those who seek to dilute Navy chief Joshi's message don't really understand sea power

By Sushil Kumar | Dec 10, 2012

Was it fair of the government to brush aside the Navy Day message of Navy chief D K Joshi, suggesting that it was a media goof-up? The admiral's message merely conveyed the classical role of any navy such as ours which has a blue water capability. It is universally known that navies are meant to swiftly deploy and operate in any oceanic area where the interests of the nation require it to do so. That has always been the purpose of any navy and China certainly knows this. 

Frankly speaking, did not the media get it right when it linked the Navy chief's message to China's aggressive maritime posture? Rather than fault the media, we need to seriously introspect on India's timidity. Why do we always remain on the back foot when dealing with China? 

The Chinese debacle of 1962 is now history and the military equation is quite different today. Yet, we are just not able to deal with China on an equal footing. What this recent incident shows is that our inferio-rity complex does not lie only across the McMahon Line but extends even to India's maritime dimension. 

This is indeed ironic, for unlike the landward frontier with China where we find ourselves tactically disadvantaged, the situation at sea is entirely in our favour; we have an immense geographical advantage. 

India's geographical location in the Indian Ocean could provide us with strategic leverage which our political leadership ought to bear in mind. With the Indian subcontinent positioned dominantly astride the vital sea lanes of communication (SLOC) - which include China's new silk route through the Indian Ocean - it is not India but China that finds itself on the back foot. 

CHANGING TO DEMOCRACY

India must transform its administrative mindset and function 
Commentarao - S.L. Rao

Kashmir has needed an occupying Indian army (about a quarter of a million soldiers) for decades. The Northeast, particularly Nagaland, has been in turmoil for over 30 years. Only Tripura has overcome conflict. The army is there in large numbers to control violence. Assam has seen large-scale riots after the formation of Bangladesh. These could be controlled only by the army. 

We have a civilian-controlled army. But we have become very dependent on the army for sorting out civil problems. Governments do not use development expenditures honestly and effectively to improve peoples’ well-being. Development activity and force might together control these movements. Civilian forces are poorly trained. 

The pace of urbanization has led to rapidly rising migration from rural to urban areas. There is no anticipatory government planning for infrastructure and housing. Slums proliferate in urban India. 

Local people in cities like Mumbai and Bangalore resent this migration. Mumbai is no more the welcoming melting pot for people from all over India. Migration to Mumbai continues, with migrants seeking employment and incomes, but they do so in some fear. This will happen in more cities and towns. 

Bangalore is much like Mumbai was. Migrants find employment and income. It is no longer the ‘garden city’ or the ‘pensioners’ paradise’ of earlier years. But Bangalore experienced the panic reverse migration of Northeasterners fearing violence from local Kannadigas. They have come back, but it is a signal to politicians and governments. Migrants of different cultures must be helped to assimilate. Facilities must be created so that they do not overwhelm infrastructure. 

From Gibraltar to Grand Slam

Inder Malhotra : Mon Dec 10 2012

If the massive Pakistani infiltrations into Jammu and Kashmir on August 5, 1965 were codenamed Operation Gibraltar, the September 1 armoured attack on the strategic Chamb Jaurian sector (‘Strange March to 1965 War’, IE, November 26) had a resounding codename, Grand Slam. Two important and intriguing questions about this operation, which the Indian army halted successfully, arise. The first is: How did Pakistan President Ayub Khan, who was initially reluctant to sanction even Gibraltar, later approve a much wider and highly risky military action? The answer, provided by his information secretary, confidant, biographer and alter ego, Altaf Gauhar, is simple. 

Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, his trusted foreign secretary, Aziz Ahmed, and other cohorts, persuaded him that if Pakistan were to “wrest” Kashmir from India by force, 1965 was its “last chance”. It was now or never. Their arguments did seem convincing. India, they said, was “demoralised and vulnerable” because of the “humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chinese”, Jawaharlal Nehru’s death, the “palpable weakness” of his successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, (Khan, after a brief, informal summit with Shastri at Karachi airport in October 1964, had got the same impression), a virulent anti-Hindi agitation in south India and an acute food shortage across the country. 

At the same time, the votaries of war with India told Khan that the expansion and modernisation of the Indian armed forces was in full swing. Once it was completed, the balance of power would shift back in India’s favour, and Pakistan’s “last opportunity would be lost”. The clinching argument of Bhutto and company was that “fear of China would deter India” from extending the war beyond Kashmir. This took care of Khan’s prime concern. He had once confided to some advisors: “While winning Kashmir, I don’t want to lose Pakistan.” 

As Gauhar records, it was around this time that a sand-model presentation was made to Khan at Murree where he suddenly put his finger on Akhnoor on the map and asked, “Why don’t you go for the jugular?” The point was well taken because Pakistan’s occupation of Akhnoor would have cut the Kashmir Valley from the rest of India. Khan then embarked on the standard Pakistani self-delusion: The Hindus could not fight. “Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of hard blows at the right time and right place. Such an opportunity should therefore be sought and exploited”. 

The “Long Pole in the Tent”: China’s Military Jet Engines

SecurityTopicChina December 09, 2012 
By Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins

Much has been made of Beijing’s growing military might. Developing and producing high-performance jet engines could be the toughest -- but most rewarding -- advance. 

The PLA Navy surprised many foreign observers yet again when an indigenously-produced J-15 fighter became the first known fixed wing aircraft to take off from and land on the aircraft carrier Liaoning since its refitting and commissioning. Yet a critical question remains unanswered: how rapidly and to what extent will the J-15 and other Chinese military aircraft be powered by indigenous engines? 

As in so many other areas, China’s overall development and production of military aircraft is advancing rapidly. Yet, as with a tent, it is the “long pole” that is essential to function and undergirds performance. In the case of aircraft, the most critical and difficult-to-produce component—the “long pole”—is the engine. Given the wide array of market-tested alternatives, nobody will buy a unit in which this central component is flawed. Hence, China’s currently significant efforts to make progress in this area. Still, the outcome and impact of these efforts remain uncertain. 

As part of a larger effort to consolidate and enhance the industry, China’s jet engine makers, led by Aviation Industry Corp. of China (AVIC), are expected to invest 100 billion yuan (US$16 billion) in jet engine development in the near term, and perhaps up to 150 billion yuan (nearly US$24 billion) by 2015. According to Reuters, “Some Chinese aviation industry specialists forecast that Beijing will eventually spend up to 300 billion yuan (US$49 billion) on jet engine development over the next two decades.” With this level of capital investment, which is many times larger than previously-reported levels, China is finally deploying the financial wherewithal needed to enable major breakthroughs. For context, the Pratt and Whitney F135 powering the F-35 Lightning II, which is the world’s most advanced and powerful tactical aircraft engine, is estimated to cost around US$8.4 billion to develop (at least in terms of officially-reported funding sources). On this basis, China has deployed funds sufficient to potentially support the parallel development of several advanced high-performance jet engines and large turbofans. 

China’s Cyber Capabilities

Issue Book Excerpt: Rise of China | Date : 29 Oct , 2012 


This paper deals with Chinese Cyber Capabilities, their assessment of the global cyber eco-system and the gradual evolution of their dominant position in this emerging realm. The historical step-wise attainment of this position through the stages of nationalism to commercialism, the rise and fall of unorganised as well as organised Hacker groups, the funding patterns, etc have a very interesting story to tell. The chapter also traces and evidences of structured and coordinated approach of industrial espionage, as a policy being taken forward in China and some of the latest exploitations from the Chinese side targeted towards our national critical information infrastructure including the critical human beings. 

…most recent high profile cases involving Chinese hackers was the attempts to steal the Google source code which resulted in the Google deciding to shut its base in China. 

The spread of ‘BotNets’ by Chinese and a statistical estimate of their action is included in the paper. One of the very important and sophisticated espionage attacks that they performed breaching the air gaps and picking up a very specific file format that was encrypted also analysed exhibiting their abilities for cryptanalysis. 

Viewpoint: Pakistan seeks Afghan talks between government, Taliban and US


  


Pakistan has its own internal security headaches 

Pakistan's military has undergone a dramatic shift in policy in recent weeks, writes journalist and author Ahmed Rashid. After a decade spent allowing the Afghan Taliban sanctuary and freedom to sustain its insurgency in Afghanistan, it is now pushing for peace talks between the Taliban, the Afghan government and the Americans before Nato forces withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014. 

Pakistan's change of heart - if sustained - could open up several new tracks in the peace process, bring about a ceasefire with the Taliban, encourage a wider regional settlement and improve Islamabad's own fraught relations with Washington. Most significantly, a ceasefire and peace talks with the Taliban could dramatically improve the chances of survival for the weak Afghan government and army once Western forces leave. 

Ahmed Rashid is a Pakistani journalist and author based in Lahore.

His latest book is Pakistan on the Brink - The Future of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the West. 
Earlier works include Descent into Chaos and Taliban, first published in 2000 which became a best seller In a rare sign of the new relationship, recently not one but several senior Afghan officials in private conversations have praised the Pakistan army and its chief, Gen Ashfaq Kayani, for taking visible actions to encourage reconciliation between the Taliban and the Afghan government. For years President Hamid Karzai and other officials have openly accused the army and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of supporting the Afghan Taliban. 

David Frum: The post-9/11 wars have taken their toll on the U.S. military


David Frum | Dec 8, 2012

Scott Olson/Getty Images 

Has the U.S. military been pushed too far? 

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have taken a heavy toll on the U.S. armed forces. 

About 6,650 Americans have died in those two wars, as have 1,390 allied personnel, Canadians prominent among them. 

That’s tragically a big number. The roster of the slain would have stretched even longer, but for the amazing advances in military armour and military medicine over the past generation. 

More than 50,000 Americans have been wounded in battle since 9/11 — 16,000 of them so seriously that they would certainly have died had they suffered an equivalent wound in any prior conflict. 

Because the post-9/11 wars have lasted so long, soldiers have been exposed to the risks of combat again and again and again. Troops are rotated into combat zones, out of them and then back in again. One authoritative study found that the accumulating strain had inflicted post-traumatic stress disorder on as many as one-fifth of all U.S. troops who had served in the Afghanistan and Iraq theatres. 

In the current issue of National Journal, senior correspondent James Kitfield tallies the off-battlefield echoes of war fatigue: 
  • A U.S. military suicide rate that has reached one death per day. 
  • A rise in military divorces, up 38% over the past decade. 
  • Prescription drug and alcohol abuse rates much higher than the civilian population. 
  • One in five female personnel reporting sexual abuse during their service. 

Kitfield argues that prolonged war-fighting has also nurtured a culture of arrogance and impunity in the U.S. military’s higher ranks. 

“Why did Brig. Gen. Jeffrey Sinclair, a married former deputy commander of the 82nd Airborne Division in Afghanistan, become involved with five women (he is under investigation after being accused of adultery, sexual misconduct, and forcible sodomy)? Did colleagues of Col. James H. Johnson III, former commander of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Iraq, know that he was involved in a bigamous relationship with an Iraqi woman, and that he was attempting to steer government contracts to her father? Why did Gen. William (Kip) Ward, the four-star head of Africa Command, deem it acceptable to take his wife and a large entourage on lavish government-paid trips before he was stripped of a star and ordered to repay $82,000 to the Treasury?